Reality is harsh.
Korean companies still lack the effort to enhance shareholder value, and shareholders do not receive a proper share of the profits.
There is a widespread negative perception among investors that they cannot work with Korean companies, and the capital market and companies have become objects of distrust.
In addition, stock investment has been transformed into a dynamic gambling den due to the misconception that one can make money by buying and selling in the short term.
As a result, the Korean capital market is unable to escape a state of perpetual undervaluation and is being ignored by the public.
There are numerous cases where companies with net asset values ​​of 1 trillion won are traded at market capitalizations of 400-500 billion won, and companies that should be valued at 500 billion won are traded at 200-300 billion won.
It's not like there's half water and half fish, but there's a lot of fish, but strangely enough, investors don't want to take it.
This is a strange phenomenon that can only be seen in Korea's capital market.
--- p.27

Let's assume, to the extreme, that all of our citizens do not invest in our own companies, but only in foreign companies.
So what will ultimately become of our companies? And what will become of our citizens who work for them? (Omitted) The competitive edge of today's cutting-edge industries lies in speed.
Securing investment funds is paramount to responding quickly to rapidly changing technological trends and international situations.
And the easiest way to do this is to attract domestic investors to the stock market.
This is why we must catch the Donghak ants.
(Omitted) It is necessary to keep in mind that the saying, ‘If you sell all your Korean stocks, you will go to the US’ did not come out of nowhere.

--- p.68

The Western ants have one belief.
It is the belief that the performance of the company in which I invested will definitely come back to me.
Whether it is capital gains or dividends.
American companies actively pursue shareholder-friendly policies to repay investors' trust.
They do their best to increase their stock price through stock buybacks and are not stingy with dividends.
It is a structure in which corporate value cannot but be properly reflected in stock prices.
On the other hand, domestic companies not only have low shareholder return rates, but also frequently make news with incidents such as spin-offs and tunneling, where controlling shareholders seize wealth from common shareholders.
There is no way for the corporate value to increase and the stock price cannot escape the box.
Korean companies have a significantly low dividend payout ratio, let alone buybacks of their own stock.

--- p.75

The Korean economy has been pursuing catch-up economic growth, taking unfair practices for granted in order to achieve results in a short period of time.
We also neglected to establish institutional mechanisms for a healthy investment environment.
Perhaps for this reason, shareholder protection mechanisms that are taken for granted in OECD countries do not exist in Korea.
As a result, Korea's capital market has become a lawless place where assaulting others goes unpunished.
To overcome these problems, a plan to effectively compensate for the collective damage suffered by ordinary shareholders must first be established.

--- p.183

What if something like a simultaneous listing after a spin-off had happened in the United States, not in Korea? Shareholders would have immediately filed a class action lawsuit demanding discovery.
Because the company made a decision that clearly harmed the interests of shareholders.
Of course, such an incident could never happen in the United States.
In the United States, the discovery system allows both sides to simultaneously disclose evidence before a formal trial begins.
Accordingly, the company's board of directors or controlling shareholder can be requested to disclose specific evidence that can be used to determine 'why such a decision was made' and 'whether such a decision is truly in the interests of shareholders.'
This is why shareholders do not hesitate to file lawsuits. (Omitted) An example of a class action lawsuit filed in the United States is the lawsuit filed by Twitter shareholders in 2016.
Shareholders filed the lawsuit in federal court in the Northern District of California, alleging that management misled shareholders in November 2014 by inflating the company's growth prospects.
At the time, management predicted that Twitter's monthly active users would increase by approximately 20% in the short term, reaching 550 million, but it was claimed that this misled investors. (Omitted)
Ultimately, in September 2021, Twitter agreed to pay a total of $895 million (approximately 950 billion won) to shareholders who had filed a class action lawsuit regarding its earnings forecast.
This is possible in the United States because of the five-part set of shareholder rights protections.
These include the securities class action system, the discovery system, the punitive damages system, the obstruction of justice (false statement crime), and the permission for law firms to advertise for shareholder recruitment.
There is no such legal system in Korea.
So, it is said that investors have no place to vent their grievances and are only able to hang around the shareholder bulletin boards of portal sites.

--- p.186~188

In other countries, such as the United States, market capitalization is calculated based on the number of outstanding shares, excluding treasury shares, from the total number of issued shares.
When a company buys back its own stock, the number of outstanding shares immediately decreases, the market capitalization decreases, and the stock price rises.
This creates a shareholder return effect.
However, in Korea, strangely, market capitalization is calculated based on the total number of issued shares.
So, even if you buy back your own stock, the market capitalization calculation does not change, and there is no change in the stock price.
Our exchange discloses in its financial statements that treasury stock repurchases constitute shareholder returns, but does not recognize treasury stock repurchases as shareholder returns based on market capitalization.
It is the only contradictory calculation method in the world.
These market capitalization calculation criteria are merely internal guidelines of the exchange.
In other words, the Korea discount can be partially resolved simply by changing the market capitalization calculation guidelines internally.
We can change the bad practices and order in our capital markets and improve governance in a healthy way through simple methods.
What remains is a matter of will and practice.

--- p.171~172

A class action system related to securities has also been introduced in Korea.
However, the cases in which a class action lawsuit can be filed are very limited, as it is limited to reasons such as false disclosure and fraudulent accounting.
The barriers to class action lawsuits related to securities are so high that it can be seen as virtually blocking attempts at class action lawsuits.
There are many obstacles, such as high litigation costs, difficulty proving corporate wrongdoing, and limitations on litigation attorneys, making it difficult to even begin. (Omitted) A bigger problem is that, unlike general litigation, securities class action lawsuits can only be initiated after filing a class action application with the court and receiving permission to file.
Moreover, if the company raises an objection, i.e., an ‘immediate appeal’ during this process, the procedure is suspended.
After that, it takes three trials, including the first trial, the second trial, and the Supreme Court, to decide whether or not to file a class action lawsuit.
Only the application process, not this lawsuit, goes up to three trials, and if you include this lawsuit, it can be said to be a six-trial system.

--- p.183~185

Some people say that the separate taxation of dividend income or the policy of lowering dividend income tax are 'tax cuts for the rich.'
But increasing dividends isn't just good for controlling shareholders.
In the case of domestic companies, the controlling shareholder typically owns 20-30% of the shares, and general shareholders own 70-80%. Therefore, if dividends increase, more citizens can enjoy the fruits of our company. (Omitted) Rather than allowing controlling shareholders to avoid receiving dividends and receive high salaries or create multiple subsidiaries to take salaries here and there, sharing the fruits of our company through dividends is a better choice, even at the national level.
Moreover, if an investment environment is created in which our citizens invest in our companies and share in the results, not only our companies but also the lives of our citizens will greatly improve.
As a result, it becomes a way to move forward on the path to living well together. (Omitted)
--- p.211~213

Korea's capital market has been far from the spirit of 'noblesse oblige'.
Controlling shareholders have viewed the capital market as merely a means of raising capital and inheriting and gifting assets, and have even used it as a channel for personal gain.
Social responsibility and sharing of achievements were put on the back burner, and only personal interests were pursued.
Even though the law and system supported the controlling shareholder, the various atrocities committed by the controlling shareholder, such as embezzlement, breach of trust, work hoarding, and tunneling, showed no end.
Things must change now.
The capital market must be reborn as a source of hope for all citizens.
We need to remember once again that a company cannot exist alone, and that its value comes from the nation and its people.
A nation can become prosperous only when households and businesses grow together.
This is why the government, businesses, controlling shareholders, general shareholders, and all citizens must join forces to create a society where the promises of corporations are kept.

--- p.244