{"product_id":"105813","title":"hereditary middle-class society ","description":"\u003ccenter\u003e\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:center\"\u003e\u003cimg src=\"https:\/\/tmgdisk01.cafe24.com\/images\/vs\/4172\/sv\/3jYHtSBewALp9GFeI920BgMGylhmoW.png?v=1765124114\" style=\"max-width:100%;max-height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\u003ccenter\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:95%\"\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:center;font-size:30px;font-weight:bolder;line-height:1.6em\"\u003e hereditary middle-class society \u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"border-bottom:1px;border-bottom-style:dotted;border-color:;padding-bottom:20px\"\u003e\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable align=\"center\" width=\"100%\"\u003e\u003ctbody style=\"border:0px\"\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"center\" style=\"line-height:1.2em;text-align:center;font-size:18px;color:black;font-weight:bold;padding-bottom:20px;\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align:center\"\u003e\u003cimg src=\"https:\/\/image.yes24.com\/goods\/86027878\/XL\" style=\"max-width:100%;height:auto\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\n\n\n\u003c\/tbody\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:95%;{split_style6}padding-top:20px;padding-bottom:20px\"\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:left;font-size:16px;font-weight:bold;padding-bottom:20px\"\u003e Description \u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:left;word-break:break-all;font-size:14px;line-height:1.6em;\"\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003ch5\u003e \u003cb\u003eBook Introduction\u003c\/b\u003e\n\u003c\/h5\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cdl\u003e\n\u003cdt\u003e A word from MD\u003c\/dt\u003e\n\u003cdd\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e Korea, where it's becoming difficult to live an ordinary life\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e During the period of rapid economic growth in Korea, the word 'middle class' meant 'middle'.\u003cbr\u003e As inequality deepens and social mobility becomes increasingly difficult, middle-class life is not accessible to everyone.\u003cbr\u003e Currently, South Korea is a middle-class hereditary society. \u003cbr\u003eIt records the current state of inequality and its causes in this society.\u003cbr\u003e\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e \u003cspan\u003eJanuary 21, 2020.\u003c\/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003eSocial and Political PD Son Min-gyu\u003c\/span\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/dd\u003e\n\u003c\/dl\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e \u003cb\u003eA sharp and weighty question raised in an unequal society\u003cbr\u003e “The problem is not generation, it’s heredity!”\u003cbr\u003e Lee Cheol-hee, a member of the Democratic Party of Korea's National Assembly, strongly recommends reporter Cheon Gwan-yul of \"Sisa IN\"!\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e 2019 was a year of continuous social interest and exploration regarding the 90s generation.\u003cbr\u003e This book, which prepares for Korean society after 2020, after the 'Great Patriotic War,' properly analyzes and diagnoses the 'inequality problem of those born in the 1990s.'\u003cbr\u003e How does inequality among those in their 20s differ from that of those in their 30s? How are those in their 20s in 2019 different from those in 1999 and 2009? This book explores the 20-something demographic through specific yet extensive data, along with the clear and poignant analysis gleaned from it, to explore the 20-something demographic from a fresh perspective, free from conventional frameworks.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003eThe essence of the inequality experienced by today's 20-somethings lies in the fact that the generation of parents in their 50s, who accumulated wealth based on their educational background and labor market status, not only invested in education but also used intangible assets such as cultural competencies and social networks to pass on the same educational background and labor market status to their children.\u003cbr\u003e This gap fixation determines the entire subsequent life cycle.\u003cbr\u003e Let's delve into the multiple inequalities plaguing our hereditary middle-class society: college entrance exams, employment, marriage, real estate...\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/tbody\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e You can preview some of the book's contents.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cspan\u003ePreview\u003c\/span\u003e\n\n\u003c\/li\u003e\u003c\/ul\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003ch5\u003e \u003cb\u003eindex\u003c\/b\u003e\n\u003c\/h5\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e \u003cb\u003ePrologue: Welcome to the world of the hereditary middle class.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Society of the 10s and 90s | Multiple Inequalities Experienced by People in Their 20s | Changes in the Labor Market Since 2010 | Structure of the Article\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eChapter 1: The Problem with the Labor Market\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eOnce an outsider, always an outsider | Your first job determines your status | The first gateway is to a prestigious university | Only 10 percent have decent jobs | A generation experiencing fiercer competition than ever before\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eChapter 2: The Narrowing Gates to the Middle Class\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The Changing Job Market | Fewer Jobs at Large Companies | Fierce Competition to Become an Insider | Women's Advancement | Mid-Skilled Jobs Disappear\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eChapter 3: The Hidden Twenties: The Provinces and High School Graduates\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \"If you study well, you're a cheetah, if you don't, you're a returning student.\"｜The marginalized: 'local university students and high school graduates'｜The reality of local areas: a lack of quality jobs｜Local areas have become the 'rural areas' of the job market｜The deindustrialization tsunami has begun｜High school graduates are invisible to our society｜High school graduates with no future｜Young people in working poverty\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eChapter 4: The Emergence of the Hereditary Middle Class\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eHow is inequality in your 20s different from that of your 30s? | The 'prestigious high school' system is back in operation. | \"We design the 'life' of middle-class children.\" | The gap becomes apparent from middle school. | Even the power of the elderly follows class. | Choi Soon-sil's children, born in 1956 vs.\u003cbr\u003e Children of the fatherland born in 1965\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eChapter 5: The Privilege of a \"Normal Family\"\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The Class Gap in Marriage and Real Estate | One in Five Men Enters Their 40s as a 'Bachelor' | Lower-Class Men Forced to Be Single | Women: The 'Perfect Marriage' vs.\u003cbr\u003e \"It's OK to Be Single\" | Real Estate = Generation + Class | \"Seoul Residents, Two-Home Owners\": A Hereditary Middle Class\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eChapter 6: The Origins of the Hereditary Middle Class\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e What Makes the 1960s Generation Different? | A Tale of Two Generations | The Growth of Large Corporations and the Emergence of Technocrats | The Working Life of Generations: A History of Victory | Another Fruit of Growth: Finance, IT, and Large-Scale Factory Production | The Combination of Education, Occupation, and Economic Status\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 7: The Formation of Class Consciousness\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \"It was like a movie where I couldn't be the main character.\" | The Coexistence of Generation G and Generation N | Political Polarization Among Men and Women in Their 20s? That's the Inside Story of the \"Hereditary Middle Class\" | Perceptions of Injustice and Inequality Are a Class Issue\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eChapter 8: The Myth of \"Conservatism in Men in Their 20s\"\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The Truth Behind the '20s Male' Discourse | Analysis of the 'Conservative Defection' Among 20-Somethings in 2016-2017 | The Emergence of 'No Party Support' | Gender Conflict and the 'Class' Behind SNS | The Political Party of 60-Something Building Owners vs.\u003cbr\u003e The political party of a manager in his 50s\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eEpilogue∥The Evolution of the Hereditary Middle Class\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The global competition for prestigious university diplomas | The end of high growth, the beginning of hereditary capitalism | The 'educational arms race' intensifies during low growth | An impossible project: intergenerational concessions | The problem is not the '60s generation,' but the 'hereditary middle class.'\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e main\u003cbr\u003e References\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003ch5\u003e \u003cb\u003eInto the book\u003c\/b\u003e\n\u003c\/h5\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e  \u003cdiv\u003eThe inequality experienced by people in their 20s today is closer to the gap between the \"hereditary middle class\" and the rest of the population.\u003cbr\u003e Thomas Piketty's observation that \"a society structured almost entirely around a hierarchy of wealth has shifted to one structured almost entirely around a hierarchy of labor and human capital\" applies not only to the West but also to Korea.\u003cbr\u003e If those born in the 1960s formed the first generation of the hereditary middle class, thanks to the expansion of university enrollment (especially at prestigious universities), entry into the labor market during the economic boom, the rapid growth of large export companies, and the resulting increase in labor income and soaring asset prices, those born in the 1990s are the second generation of the hereditary middle class, created through their investment in education.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The essence of the inequality experienced by people in their 20s today lies in the fact that the middle-class people in their 50s, the parental generation, pass on the same educational background (or, more precisely, academic credentials) and labor market status to their children. \u003cbr\u003eThe fact that children of the hereditary middle class are monopolizing the \"good jobs\" is what makes the 20-somethings of 2019 different from those of 1999 or 2009.\u003cbr\u003e This deepening 'gap fixation' has a powerful impact on life cycle opportunities such as marriage and housing.\u003cbr\u003e Marriage and housing issues are both a consequence of the widening gap between the hereditary middle class and the rest of the population, and at the same time, factors that widen that gap.\u003cbr\u003e --- p.12\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e How many people in their 20s successfully enter the labor market as \"insiders\"? If we define \"decent\" or \"good\" jobs as those paying a starting salary of 3 million won or more per month, then as of 2017, only 72,000 people could be considered \"insiders.\"\u003cbr\u003e This is estimated to be about 11.4 percent of people of the same age who have a high school diploma or higher. \u003cbr\u003eThis figure is significantly lower than the 16.5 percent estimated to be workers in the primary labor market among all employed people (including the self-employed).\u003cbr\u003e It is much more difficult for today's 20-somethings to become middle class than it was before.\u003cbr\u003e --- p.33\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Ultimately, the most significant characteristic of the job market for college graduates since 2010 is that the job market conditions for graduates of four-year universities in Seoul have deteriorated significantly as “good jobs” or “decent jobs” have disappeared.\u003cbr\u003e As the number of decent jobs decreases, competition before and after employment is bound to become fiercer.\u003cbr\u003e The number of positions available to \"insiders\" in the labor market is decreasing, and if you are pushed out as an \"outsider\" in your first job, there are few opportunities to advance to an insider position.\u003cbr\u003e For graduates of science and engineering colleges or graduate schools, the employment situation appears to have worsened less.\u003cbr\u003e In the end, the biggest influence is 'Send a message'. \u003cbr\u003eThis suggests that the phenomenon of the number of college graduates employed decreasing by more than 50,000 per year since 2010, as mentioned above, was mainly observed in occupations such as human resources, finance, marketing, and sales.\u003cbr\u003e On the other hand, in the case of secondary labor market jobs, it is difficult to see that the ‘quality’, such as wages, has deteriorated even if the ‘quantity’ of jobs is considered separately.\u003cbr\u003e --- p.64\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Those who graduated from local universities and those who graduated from high school or lower are not mentioned in today's youth discourse.\u003cbr\u003e The reason why these are not mentioned is clearly revealed in the previous reaction to “The Return of the King.”\u003cbr\u003e They say that they were unable to go to good universities because they were 'bad at studying', and therefore their inferior status in the labor market is natural.\u003cbr\u003e Their inability to find a job is a result of their 'bad character' and lack of 'effort'.\u003cbr\u003e The discourse that counters this type of thinking is limited to the following: 'Talented local university students are being discriminated against because of the social climate that only selects students based on their appearance.' \u003cbr\u003ePeople within local universities say that the reason local university students are dropping out of the fierce academic competition among young people in their 20s is because they are facing a 'predestined defeat.'\u003cbr\u003e Professor Yang Seung-hoon of Gyeongnam National University said about them, “They try to take the civil service exam, but it is difficult to overcome it with focus.\u003cbr\u003e Even if I'm advised to take the TOEIC, I don't think I should try, so I can't focus enough to get a high score.\u003cbr\u003e “Eventually, through acquaintances, they find low-paying jobs available in the local community,” he explains.\u003cbr\u003e Their actions are both a cause and a result of habits learned from the experience of defeat.\u003cbr\u003e --- p.93\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Extracurricular activities are considered important in building so-called 'specs', and since the mid-2000s, there have been criticisms that there is a large gap in opportunities according to social class in college entrance exams. \u003cbr\u003eUltimately, it shows that the gap in non-cognitive abilities, such as conscientiousness, achievement motivation, and self-esteem, which are referred to as 'character', occurs depending on the parent's class.\u003cbr\u003e The common saying that 'children from good families study well and have good personalities' is truly true.\u003cbr\u003e Children who grow up in families with good parenting environments, that is, families where parents have economic power and social status supported by education and occupation, are superior to children from other classes not only in cognitive ability but also in non-cognitive ability.\u003cbr\u003e And because non-cognitive abilities are supported, investments in education through places like Daechi-dong Academy are bearing fruit.\u003cbr\u003e Effort is not skill.\u003cbr\u003e It's a hierarchy.\u003cbr\u003e --- p.144\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eWhy does a book discussing the class gap between people in their 20s bring up the story of people in their 30s? The gap experienced by people in their 20s today isn't simply a matter of college degrees, job types, or income. It's a crucial issue that has a decisive impact on family formation and asset accumulation—life after employment—which determines their future.\u003cbr\u003e The gap that people in their mid-to-late 30s face is likely to widen even further when today's 20-somethings reach their 30s.\u003cbr\u003e The two biggest challenges for people in their 20s and early 30s are employment and forming a family.\u003cbr\u003e Also, after getting a job, you need to save up assets to prepare for old age.\u003cbr\u003e In the process, securing a home has a significant impact not only on asset accumulation but also on subsequent economic decisions.\u003cbr\u003e However, in order for the life cycle of employment, marriage, childbirth, and asset accumulation to function in line with the 'middle-class nuclear family' model of the past, a 'decent job' and 'parental support' are essential. \u003cbr\u003e--- p.152\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The reason why people born in the 60s are different from those born in the 40s and 50s is, roughly speaking, because their experiences in the labor market were different.\u003cbr\u003e There are four major aspects in which the 60s generation differs from previous generations.\u003cbr\u003e First, the number of college graduates increased rapidly following the introduction of the university graduation quota system in 1982.\u003cbr\u003e Second, due to the three lows boom in the late 1980s and early to mid 1990s, demand for these college graduates in export-oriented large corporations skyrocketed, and as export-oriented large corporations that survived the IMF foreign exchange crisis grew rapidly in the 2000s, their share of income increased.\u003cbr\u003e Third, in the industrial advancement phase of the 2000s, those born in the 1980s and 1960s, who had a college degree and had worked for a large company for about 10 years, had the opportunity to occupy key positions in newly growing industries such as IT and finance. \u003cbr\u003eFinally, this increased income flowed directly into the asset market, especially the real estate market, widening the gap between the 'middle class', who own one or two houses in prime locations in Seoul, and the rest of the population.\u003cbr\u003e --- p.180\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The political, social, and economic awareness of people in their 20s shows significant differences depending on their parents' socioeconomic status and gender.\u003cbr\u003e The gender difference here does not simply mean that men are conservative and women are progressive.\u003cbr\u003e This means that the political, social, and economic consciousness of men and women change in different ways depending on social class.\u003cbr\u003e There is a greater 'gap in perception based on social class' in the 'worldview' of those in their 20s than in those in their 30s.\u003cbr\u003e Even among those in their 30s, there was a gap in perception based on social class.\u003cbr\u003e But in the 20s, the gap widens further, and the way in which the difference occurs also changes. \u003cbr\u003eThis division of consciousness by gender and class cannot be captured simply by stating that people in their 20s are less progressive or more conservative than in the past.\u003cbr\u003e --- p.226\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The more fundamental flaw in the theory of 'conservatism among men in their 20s' lies, as I have described several times, in the fact that people in their 20s cannot be lumped together as a single 'generation' and live within a much wider class gap than previous generations.\u003cbr\u003e There are classes that can be called the 'hereditary middle class' and classes that cannot, and even within the two groups, there are large gaps in details such as socioeconomic status.\u003cbr\u003e Therefore, the political consciousness of those in their 20s, who live by breathing it in as if it were air, cannot be homogeneous.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e --- p.244\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e If the current problem is \"How can we stop the monopoly of the hereditary middle class?\", nothing better demonstrates their influence and dominance than the arguments for intergenerational concessions and securing fairness in education. \u003cbr\u003eThe slogans of the 86-style political struggle, which hides the real problem of 'hereditary succession' by raising voices about the problem of generations and fairness, while pretending to make appropriate concessions and suffering no real losses, are covering Korean society.\u003cbr\u003e The problem is the very system of Korean society in 2019, in which their class interests are enforced and maintained.\u003cbr\u003e Isn't what Korea needs now not concessions and fairness, but duty and equity?\u003cbr\u003e Fairness from the very beginning and the economic and social burden of the hereditary middle class for that purpose.\u003cbr\u003e\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e --- p.291\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003ch5\u003e \u003cb\u003ePublisher's Review\u003c\/b\u003e\n\u003c\/h5\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e \u003cb\u003e“Today’s 20-somethings are not a single generation,\u003cbr\u003e 10 percent of the hereditary middle class\u003cbr\u003e The remaining 90 percent are the super-gap generation.”\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e 2019 was hot as always.\u003cbr\u003e There has been steady social interest and exploration regarding the 'mysterious 90s generation (20s)'. \u003cbr\u003eAs time passed, the topic shifted to backlash against '90s marketing' and generational debates, but the trend with '90s generation' as the subject has already become a mainstream in many parts of society.\u003cbr\u003e As if to prove this, the '90s generation' was once again summoned in the controversy surrounding former Minister of Justice Cho Kuk, who resigned after only 35 days in office.\u003cbr\u003e In this case, the issue of 'inequality' was the subject of intense firepower, no less than the keyword 'prosecutorial reform', and among them, the generation that received the most attention was them.\u003cbr\u003e This clearly shows that there is a growing need to properly analyze and diagnose the 'inequality problem of those born in the 1990s' in our society.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Here, in response to this urgent call, a book has been published that delves deeper into the inequality issues facing people in their 20s with a sharp and refreshing perspective. \u003cbr\u003eWhile previous analyses have highlighted their unique values ​​and lifestyles, different from those of previous generations, this book takes a bold step forward in understanding the nature of inequality, focusing on the job market.\u003cbr\u003e Furthermore, rather than staying at the large, uniform level of explanation that has been done by grouping by generation, the term 'hereditary middle class' is used to closely examine the inequality structure of Korean society divided into '10' and '90'.\u003cbr\u003e These attempts offer readers a different perspective and approach than the generational discourse that has persisted to date, providing an opportunity to truly explore the problems we face and the alternatives we can offer.\u003cbr\u003e The author, who has actively researched the structure of the Korean economy and its transformation processes, has written \"Hereditary Middle Class Society: How Does the Inequality Experienced by Those Born in the 1990s Differ?\" armed with meticulous collection and solid analysis.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eParents born in the 80s and 60s and their children born in the 90s,\u003cbr\u003e Digging into the hereditary middle class!\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eTo understand the hereditary middle class, it is necessary to revisit the controversy surrounding former Minister Cho Kuk.\u003cbr\u003e The group that expressed the most anger regarding the suspicions surrounding their children's college admissions and scholarships were those in their 20s from middle-class families attending so-called prestigious universities.\u003cbr\u003e Candlelight vigils demanding resignation continued at Seoul National University, Korea University, and other universities, and they expressed their anger, saying, “I feel a relative sense of deprivation.”\u003cbr\u003e On the other hand, the majority of people in their 20s outside of prestigious universities remained silent throughout and showed a helpless response, saying, \"It's someone else's business.\"\u003cbr\u003e The book argues that the phenomenon of 20-somethings being divided between the anger of the middle class and the cynicism of the majority in the \"Great Patriotic War\" is due to the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the inequality they experience.\u003cbr\u003e In short, today's 20-somethings live in a fundamentally unequal world and experience complex inequalities that are different from those of previous generations. \u003cbr\u003eAnd their position in the hierarchy of unequal structures depends on which class or caste their parents belonged to.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Thomas Piketty points out in “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” that “a society structured around a hierarchy of wealth has shifted to one structured almost entirely around a hierarchy of labor and human capital.”\u003cbr\u003e This is an observation that applies not only to the West but also to Korea, and is in line with the reason why, in order to approach the problem of inequality among those born in the 1990s, we must first look at the '60s generation', the generation of their parents.\u003cbr\u003e People born in the 60s are a special generation.\u003cbr\u003e This is because they are the first generation to create multiple gaps in Korean society, including educational background, income, occupation, assets, and social networks. \u003cbr\u003eThe 586 generation formed the first generation of a solid and splendid hereditary middle class, thanks to the expansion of university enrollment (especially at prestigious universities), entry into the labor market during an economic boom, the rapid growth of large export companies, and the resulting increase in labor income and soaring asset prices.\u003cbr\u003e The book describes the difference between these '80s class-60s generation' and '60s generation without class number' as different from before.\u003cbr\u003e If the previous '50s generation without a college degree' had the capacity to occupy a relatively high position in the labor market, it was an unimaginable dream for the '60s generation without a college degree', but (except for some production workers at large corporations) most of the 'good jobs' were taken by college graduates.\u003cbr\u003e In this way, the '80s generation - 60s generation' has been widening the gap between them and the rest of the '60s generation without a university degree' based on their academic background and labor market status through the IMF and the 2000s. \u003cbr\u003eAnd as these people use their intangible assets, such as cultural capabilities and social networks, as well as their investments in education, to pass on the same status to their children born in the 1990s, a second generation of hereditary middle class is created.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Based on the hereditary middle class, the book carefully yet systematically explores the gaps within them, pointing out that the core of the problem faced by people in their 20s in Korean society is the reproduction of class or hierarchy.\u003cbr\u003e When we look at recent issues facing people in their 20s, there are many issues centered around 'gender conflict' and 'conservatism among men in their 20s.'\u003cbr\u003e Following the numbers presented in the book and the author's arguments, we can see that many of these factors were strongly influenced by socioeconomic factors, such as access to the labor market and the growing inequality. \u003cbr\u003eFurthermore, based on the fact that political and social awareness differs depending on gender and class, we see that today's 20-somethings are not a single entity that can be grouped into a single generation, but rather a 'super-gap generation.'\u003cbr\u003e This is because the heterogeneity of experiences in a situation of widening inequality and fixed gaps influences political and social consciousness, creating differences in worldviews that can be called 'class consciousness.'\u003cbr\u003e This analysis doesn't explain everything about the problems facing people in their 20s, but it provides a clear and sufficient basis for understanding the driving forces that have brought major issues to the forefront.\u003cbr\u003e At the same time, it contributes greatly to taking a close look at the true face of the '10 and 90 society' that is firmly established in Korean society.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eMultiple inequalities experienced by people in their 20s:\u003cbr\u003e Only 10 percent of 'pretty jobs' are available\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eTo examine how a hereditary middle-class society operates, the author focuses on the experiences of people in their 20s as they enter the job market and later in their lives.\u003cbr\u003e Entry into the labor market is a process that determines occupational and class status, and is the result of previous investment in human capital.\u003cbr\u003e The book broadly divides the labor market into the 'primary labor market (high wages and high employment stability centered on regular workers in large corporations)' and the 'secondary labor market (low wages and low employment stability in small and medium-sized enterprises and non-regular workers)', and notes that the proportion of those entering the primary labor market has decreased to around 10 percent since 2010.\u003cbr\u003e In the primary labor market, or in other words, assuming a decent job with a starting salary of 3 million won or more per month, only 72,000 people, or about 10 percent of the same age group, entered that market in 2017. \u003cbr\u003eIn the midst of such fierce competition, the first generation of the hereditary middle class, based not only on economic power but also on social networks and cultural capital, passed down to the second generation of the hereditary middle class a decent job worth 10 percent of the total, packaging it as a \"difference in ability.\" The book's core argument is that this hardened gap determines the entire life cycle, including marriage and asset accumulation.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e When the primary and secondary labor markets are replaced with the terms 'insider' and 'outsider,' the meaning of those words becomes even more vivid.\u003cbr\u003e Just as it is difficult to become an 'insider' once you become an 'outsider' in any organization, it is also not easy to become an 'insider' once you become an outsider in the labor market. \u003cbr\u003eData supports this, showing that from 2004 to 2006, 3.5 percent of workers at small and medium-sized enterprises moved to large corporations after one year, but that percentage dropped to 2.2 percent between 2013 and 2015.\u003cbr\u003e That is why, when entering the labor market, one's 'school of origin' has a huge impact, as it is an important crossroads that separates insiders from outsiders.\u003cbr\u003e The extreme difference between insiders and outsiders is reminiscent of the term \"bourgeoisie\" that came to refer to the class of people in medieval European cities, the \"people inside the castle walls.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e In discussions of the labor market, a particularly noteworthy aspect is the change that has occurred since 2010. With the introduction and spread of IT, the number of attractive jobs at large corporations, particularly general-purpose office jobs requiring no special skills, has begun to decline. \u003cbr\u003eAccordingly, the employment conditions for graduates of four-year universities in Seoul, especially those in the humanities, have deteriorated significantly, and among them, the gender ratio of men securing decent jobs has decreased sharply.\u003cbr\u003e This phenomenon is a result of the increasing proportion of women entering four-year universities in Seoul and the disappearance of male dominance in the labor market.\u003cbr\u003e The fact that men, especially those from middle-class backgrounds, are forced into extremely competitive situations sets the stage for conflicts over jobs within this group to manifest as gender conflicts.\u003cbr\u003e The book emphasizes that today's 20-somethings are facing a more intense competition to enter the \"sex\" than previous generations.\u003cbr\u003e In the competitive process, their fates are divided depending on who loses more 'opportunities' and who 'prevents' more, based on gender, class, education level, and region of residence. \u003cbr\u003eThe 'real' problem hidden in the unequal reality of those in their 20s was not that there were few jobs, but that there were few decent jobs created.\u003cbr\u003e If we follow the data presented in the book, we can confirm that the number of jobs and conditions in the secondary labor market have not deteriorated that much.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eMultiple inequalities experienced by people in their 20s:\u003cbr\u003e The privilege of a \"normal family\" as demonstrated by marriage and real estate\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The author argues that the fact that children of the hereditary middle class are monopolizing the good jobs is what makes 20-somethings in 2019 different from 20-somethings in 1999 or 2009.\u003cbr\u003e The deepening gap has a powerful impact on life-cycle opportunities such as marriage and housing. Marriage and real estate issues are both a consequence of the widening gap between the hereditary middle class and the rest of the population, and at the same time, factors that further widen the gap. \u003cbr\u003eIn short, the gap experienced by people in their 20s goes beyond issues of college diplomas, job types, and income, but also becomes a major criterion for determining 'life after employment', such as family formation and asset accumulation.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e One of the characteristics of today's 20-somethings is that their perception of the so-called 'normal family' is different from that of previous generations.\u003cbr\u003e This is because they recognized that whether a man and a woman can form a normal family by meeting, getting married, having and raising one or two children, and becoming homeowners depends not on their own abilities but on their 'class of origin.'\u003cbr\u003e The fact that parental support is absolutely essential in this process suggests that the concept of an “independent 20-something” is no longer solid.\u003cbr\u003e The book says that, especially for the middle class, familism is essential for the reproduction of normal families. \u003cbr\u003eThis means that, unlike the main approach of the existing discourse on people in their 20s, which presupposes 'free and independent individuals,' the existence of family has become important to them as a supply base for reproduction or a provider of a basic social safety net.\u003cbr\u003e The act of forming a nuclear family of four has become a privileged act of the middle class within the 'fence'.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The results of a public opinion poll conducted in 2018 by the Hankyoreh Economic and Social Research Institute, the Hankyoreh 21, and Global Research show that the so-called 'Generation G (Global Generation)' and the 'N-po Generation' coexist among people in their 20s.\u003cbr\u003e Generation G is a concept proposed by the Chosun Ilbo in 2010 to define people in their 20s, and is characterized by a confident and hopeful attitude.\u003cbr\u003e Meanwhile, the N-po generation is derived from the new word 'Sampo Generation' created by the Kyunghyang Shinmun in 2011, which refers to young people who have given up on dating, marriage, and childbirth, and later expanded to mean 'the generation that has given up on N things'. \u003cbr\u003eThe gap between wealthy and affluent 20-somethings in the marriage and housing markets is wide.\u003cbr\u003e As the book's central argument suggests, this is because the experiences and outcomes of those in their 20s entering the labor market fundamentally differ across social classes.\u003cbr\u003e Therefore, the author points out that the N-po generation is not a term that refers to all 20-somethings, but rather the 'remaining' 20-somethings who do not belong to the 20-somethings with wealthy and capable parents.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003e\"The End of High Growth, the Beginning of Hereditary Capitalism\"\u003cbr\u003e Preparing for Korean Society Beyond 2020\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The book does not stop at delving into the issue of inequality among those born in the 1990s, but also does not forget to examine the 586 generation, their parents' generation and the origin of the hereditary middle class.\u003cbr\u003e What on earth was different about the people born in the 1960s, and how their small efforts led to such great inequality, we delve into. \u003cbr\u003eThose born in the 1980s and 1960s are a group that grew up riding the wave of growth and development of large corporations around 1980 and the resulting explosion in demand for 'technocrats'.\u003cbr\u003e As soon as they entered the labor market, they formed a thick middle layer as the size of large corporations and various professional groups expanded.\u003cbr\u003e Afterwards, when the generation immediately above him was restructured due to the IMF foreign exchange crisis, he advanced to the management position and has been in the position for a long time to this day.\u003cbr\u003e In the 2000s, amidst the qualitative development of Korean capitalism and the explosive growth of large export companies, they took on the status of a \"first generation\" or \"core group\" in new industries such as finance and IT.\u003cbr\u003e The problem arose after the 2008 global financial crisis, when the qualitative development of the Korean economy began to stall.\u003cbr\u003e With the end of high growth, hereditary capitalism, in which the return on capital, as Piketty said, overwhelms the income growth rate, began.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eHowever, the author does not agree with the '586 concession theory' that can be easily seen in generational discourse.\u003cbr\u003e In the second half of 2019, criticism of the 586 generation poured in like a flood from all sides.\u003cbr\u003e The crux of the criticism was that they were vested interests, and therefore, as a generational group, they should make concessions.\u003cbr\u003e However, the author points out that 'class inheritance' is not taken seriously in these discussions.\u003cbr\u003e The real problem is not the unfairness of the process, but the inequality of opportunity or inequality in developing capabilities.\u003cbr\u003e \"Hereditary Middle-Class Society\" reminds us that the real problem is not \"generation\" or \"fairness,\" but \"hereditary.\"\u003cbr\u003e What Korean society needs is not compromise and fairness, but duty and equity.\u003cbr\u003e Fairness from the very beginning and the economic and social burden of the hereditary middle class for this purpose.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The book consists of a total of eight chapters. \u003cbr\u003eChapter 1 provides an overview of the characteristics of the labor market that people in their 20s are entering.\u003cbr\u003e Chapter 2 examines the changes in the \"experiences\" of those in their 20s entering the labor market since 2010, and Chapter 3 examines how education serves as a generator of inequality that maintains the hereditary middle class.\u003cbr\u003e Chapter 4 discusses local university students and high school graduates, who account for the '90 percent'.\u003cbr\u003e Chapter 5 analyzes the class differentiation patterns that appear in life cycle tasks after employment, such as marriage and home purchase.\u003cbr\u003e Chapter 6 discusses how the current multiple gap among those born in the 1990s stems from the historical specificity of their parents' generation, those born in the 1960s.\u003cbr\u003e Chapter 7 focuses on how the worldview of today's 20-somethings differs by gender and class.\u003cbr\u003e Chapter 8 addresses how such differences in worldview influence the most superficial party support.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eAfter the chaotic year of 2019, the outlook for the general elections to be held this April is shrouded in fog.\u003cbr\u003e As expected, the generation that receives the most attention is those in their 20s.\u003cbr\u003e Since 2018, the theory of \"conservatism among men in their 20s\" has been spreading, particularly among progressive groups, but the book argues that this trend has many flaws.\u003cbr\u003e Looking at trends in political approval ratings, there is no basis to believe that men in their 20s have become particularly conservative recently.\u003cbr\u003e At the same time, he adds, we need to examine whether the political leanings of women in their 20s, the comparison group, have been progressive in the past.\u003cbr\u003e This is because we cannot objectively look at the issue of political consciousness among people in their 20s by examining only one side of the phenomenon.\u003cbr\u003e Furthermore, those in their 20s, who live in a much wider class gap than previous generations, have different mechanisms depending on their class, even if they are all men, such as those in the upper-middle class and those who are not. \u003cbr\u003eIn short, the author emphasizes that today's 20-somethings live in an extremely stratified society, and therefore, we must acknowledge that experiences in the everyday world differ depending on the class.\u003cbr\u003e This book, which delves into the inequality issues facing those in their 20s, also does not neglect to examine the periphery of our society, represented by 'local university students and high school graduates.'\u003cbr\u003e Specific yet extensive data, along with clear and penetrating analysis gleaned from it, allows us to look at the 20s from a new perspective, breaking free from existing frameworks.\u003cbr\u003e If you want to truly understand the 20-something generation, who experience more complex inequalities than any other generation, this book will be an invaluable guide.\u003cbr\u003e The key to solving the problem lies in accurately recognizing its cause.\u003cbr\u003e In 2020, the problem isn't the '60s generation.'\u003cbr\u003e It is the 'hereditary middle class'. \u003cbr\u003e\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:95%;padding-top:20px;padding-bottom:20px\"\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:left;font-size:16px;font-weight:bold;padding-bottom:20px\"\u003e GOODS SPECIFICS \u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:left;font-size:14px;line-height:1.6em;\"\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:100%;margin-bottom:5px;line-height:1.6em;font-size:14px\"\u003e - \u003cstrong\u003eDate of issue:\u003c\/strong\u003e January 20, 2020\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n \u003cdiv style=\"width:100%;margin-bottom:5px;line-height:1.6em;font-size:14px\"\u003e- \u003cstrong\u003ePage count, weight, size:\u003c\/strong\u003e 312 pages | 465g | 140*210*18mm\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:100%;margin-bottom:5px;line-height:1.6em;font-size:14px\"\u003e - \u003cstrong\u003eISBN13:\u003c\/strong\u003e 9791185585826\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:100%;margin-bottom:5px;line-height:1.6em;font-size:14px\"\u003e - \u003cstrong\u003eISBN10:\u003c\/strong\u003e 1185585826 \u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd 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