{"product_id":"112019","title":"Culture of Growth ","description":"\u003ccenter\u003e\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:center\"\u003e\u003cimg src=\"https:\/\/tmgdisk01.cafe24.com\/images\/vs\/4172\/sv\/WQt5IL3kSTMNqVKpBMiuSL.png?v=1764958046\" style=\"max-width:100%;max-height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\u003ccenter\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:95%\"\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:center;font-size:30px;font-weight:bolder;line-height:1.6em\"\u003e Culture of Growth \u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"border-bottom:1px;border-bottom-style:dotted;border-color:;padding-bottom:20px\"\u003e\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable align=\"center\" width=\"100%\"\u003e\u003ctbody style=\"border:0px\"\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"center\" style=\"line-height:1.2em;text-align:center;font-size:18px;color:black;font-weight:bold;padding-bottom:20px;\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align:center\"\u003e\u003cimg src=\"https:\/\/image.yes24.com\/goods\/58787696\/XL\" style=\"max-width:100%;height:auto\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\n\n\n\u003c\/tbody\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:95%;{split_style6}padding-top:20px;padding-bottom:20px\"\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:left;font-size:16px;font-weight:bold;padding-bottom:20px\"\u003e Description \u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:left;word-break:break-all;font-size:14px;line-height:1.6em;\"\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003ch5\u003e \u003cb\u003eindex\u003c\/b\u003e\n\u003c\/h5\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e Acknowledgements\u003cbr\u003e preface\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Part 1: Evolution, Culture, and Economic History\u003cbr\u003e 01 Culture and Economy\u003cbr\u003e 02 Nature and Technology\u003cbr\u003e 03 Cultural Evolution and Economy\u003cbr\u003e 04 Cultural Evolution by Selection\u003cbr\u003e 05 Cultural Evolution and Bias\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Part 2: Cultural Entrepreneurs and Economic Change in the 16th and 17th Centuries\u003cbr\u003e 06 Cultural Entrepreneurs and Cultural Evolution by Choice \u003cbr\u003e07 Cultural Entrepreneur: Francis Bacon\u003cbr\u003e 08 Cultural Entrepreneur: Isaac Newton\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Part 3: Innovation, Competition, and Pluralism in 16th-17th Century Europe\u003cbr\u003e 09 Cultural Choices: Human Capital and Religion\u003cbr\u003e 10 Cultural Changes and the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in the 16th and 17th Centuries\u003cbr\u003e 11 Division, Competition, and Cultural Change\u003cbr\u003e 12 Competition and Letter Republic\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Part 4: The Prelude to the Enlightenment\u003cbr\u003e 13 Puritanism and English Exceptionalism\u003cbr\u003e 14 Culture of Progress\u003cbr\u003e 15 Enlightenment and Economic Development\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Part 5: Cultural Changes in the East and West\u003cbr\u003e 16 China and Europe\u003cbr\u003e 17 China and the Enlightenment\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Conclusion: Useful Knowledge and Economic Growth\u003cbr\u003e main\u003cbr\u003e References\u003cbr\u003e Search\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003ch5\u003e \u003cb\u003eInto the book\u003c\/b\u003e\n\u003c\/h5\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e In the mid-18th century, China was by no means a backward country.\u003cbr\u003e Commerce was active, the monetary economy was developed, and the level of education was high.\u003cbr\u003e China's bureaucracy was well-educated and professional, and after 1680 it managed to avoid the Malthusian trap and achieve significant population growth. \u003cbr\u003eGiven that good institutions lead to Smithian economic growth, the case of China, where excellent institutions coexisted with a stagnant economy, is certainly puzzling.\u003cbr\u003e The Chinese system was certainly different from the European system, but by no means inferior.\u003cbr\u003e China's central government was run by officials selected through a merit-based civil service examination, and it strictly enforced land property rights and systematically maintained law and order.\u003cbr\u003e But some European thinkers, who had little contact with China beyond the writings of travelers and missionaries, began to sense that there were differences until the Industrial Revolution.\u003cbr\u003e For example, David Hume, in his The Rise of Arts and Sciences, contrasted Europe's diversity and pluralism with China's homogeneity and unity, noting the differences between the two regions. \u003cbr\u003eAccording to him, political divisions were the main reason why useful knowledge could spread in Europe.\u003cbr\u003e Of course, he acknowledged China's science, technology, and sophisticated culture, which had achieved outstanding results in the past.\u003cbr\u003e However, he pointed out that China's scientific development has slowed down significantly compared to Europe.\u003cbr\u003e The reason was obvious.\u003cbr\u003e In China, the authority of the great teacher spread easily throughout the empire, and “no one dared to resist the prevailing trend, nor were later generations brave enough to refute what their ancestors had universally handed down” [Hume, (1742) 1985, p.\u003cbr\u003e 122〕Because.\u003cbr\u003e This idea has found sympathy among many scholars.\u003cbr\u003e Wen-yuan Qian, 1985, pp. \u003cbr\u003e25, 114] regarded a unified China as politically and intellectually “parochial,” while European pluralism ultimately laid the foundations for a political structure and ideology more favorable to the “emergence of modern science.”\u003cbr\u003e Political divisions gave rise to “mutually restraining” political groups in Europe, giving considerable freedom to thinkers who did not conform to conventional wisdom.\u003cbr\u003e The difference David Hume identified was crucial.\u003cbr\u003e In short, intellectual activity in China was more centrally controlled and diffused by the government than in Europe, and consequently the market for ideas in China operated differently than in Europe.\u003cbr\u003e Just how far behind was China? A groundbreaking study by Carol Shiue and Wolfgang Keller (2007) found that in terms of allocative efficiency, China was not far behind Europe even as late as 1750. \u003cbr\u003eThey argued that although they lagged behind the UK in terms of market integration (as measured by price co-ordination), they were on par with other European countries, thus questioning the claim that simply improving allocative efficiency (Smithian growth) would accelerate technological progress.\u003cbr\u003e Instead, their research suggests that industrialization (including improvements in transportation networks) and institutional changes (including the elimination or relaxation of internal trade barriers or moves toward freer international trade) led to a higher level of integration of European markets in the first half of the nineteenth century.\u003cbr\u003e In other words, many sources suggest that trade did not spur technological progress, but that technological progress and institutional change led to more efficient markets.\u003cbr\u003e Moreover, in the Qing Dynasty, the 'buds of capitalism' sprouted, especially in the mining industry, which introduced advanced financing and management techniques. \u003cbr\u003eIn 18th-century China, large textile workshops and paper mills employing wage workers began to threaten cottage industries, a phenomenon similar to that occurring in Europe (Rowe, 2009, pp.\u003cbr\u003e 125-126).\u003cbr\u003e Many scholars have shown that although China had different institutions for contract enforcement and dispute resolution than Europe, it was still sufficient to create a well-functioning market economy.\u003cbr\u003e Moreover, the Chinese government has played a greater role in enforcing property rights than has been previously acknowledged.\u003cbr\u003e Local Chinese officials resolved property disputes, such as land ownership and contracts, even in the absence of formal civil codes (Rowe, 2009, p.\u003cbr\u003e 58). \u003cbr\u003eAlthough craftsmen's guilds existed in Song Dynasty China, there is no evidence that existing merchants formed cartels to seek rents by excluding others who were not members of the association, as guilds did in Europe until the 19th century (Pomeranz, 2013, pp.\u003cbr\u003e 106-108).\u003cbr\u003e When we take the traditional meaning of 'good' institutions as the foundation for well-functioning markets and supporting their smooth operation, there is not much difference between the institutions of China and the most developed European countries.\u003cbr\u003e Perhaps the most striking difference was that China had no intellectual property rights of any kind, including copyright (Alford, 1995).\u003cbr\u003e But the absence of intellectual property rights is a consequence and symptom of deeper cultural differences, and is itself a secondary factor in explaining the growing gap in the development of useful knowledge between Europe and China. --- p.398-401\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eIt has also been argued that China during the Qing Dynasty overproduced human capital.\u003cbr\u003e Traditionally, Chinese education was designed to prepare students for public service, but by 1800, the pool of talented individuals was so narrow that only 1.4 million educated people were competing for 20,000 public positions.\u003cbr\u003e Even the best scholars belonging to the Hanrimwon (Hanrimwon) were sometimes unable to avoid unemployment.\u003cbr\u003e William Rowe argued that the Chinese imperial court's decline in demand for officials and the corrupt way in which they were distributed were mistakes (Rowe, 2009, p.\u003cbr\u003e 152), the more fundamental problem was that education was designed solely for the purpose of producing public officials.\u003cbr\u003e Unlike Europe, China had no educational institutions to impart useful knowledge and prepare young people for commerce or industry.\u003cbr\u003e Although slow, education in 18th-century Europe was moving in this direction. \u003cbr\u003eOn the other hand, other cultural spheres, including China, lagged far behind.\u003cbr\u003e What cultural differences explain why Europe experienced such a successful Enlightenment and achieved economic modernization around the Industrial Revolution, which widened the gap with Asia by approximately two centuries? Greif and Tabellini (2014) argue that while the most basic social unit organizing cooperation among Chinese people was the extended family or clan, Europe had voluntary groups called \"corporations\" rather than blood-related ties.\u003cbr\u003e The authors also associated these groups with a general morality that imposed greater binding power and a conventional 'parochial morality' that was mostly valid only among smaller kin.\u003cbr\u003e As argued in Chapter 2, general morality is more conducive to individual and distributed efforts to generate intellectual innovation. \u003cbr\u003eIndeed, the concept of general morality can be used to understand how the European republics of letters operated.\u003cbr\u003e Members of the Republic of Letters had to work within a loosely connected network of strangers.\u003cbr\u003e However, it can be observed that the general rules of ethics were applied, such as not manipulating the results, clearly stating the sources, and responding to various letters.\u003cbr\u003e However, the differences between China and the West should not be exaggerated.\u003cbr\u003e In China, too, there existed a marketplace of ideas where strangers exchanged letters and ideas and information.\u003cbr\u003e Historical evidence shows that most of the useful knowledge in China during the Tang and Song dynasties was disseminated by public officials (Mokyr, 1990, pp.\u003cbr\u003e 209-238). \u003cbr\u003eThis is not to say that useful knowledge created by public officials is by no means worthless, but the useful knowledge created and disseminated in this way has difficulty in continuing to develop due to political ups and downs.\u003cbr\u003e Indeed, the rise of a conservative government in China suggests that scientific and technological progress has slowed dramatically compared to a society led by the private sector.\u003cbr\u003e The Greif-Tabellini theory argues that the divergence between Europe and China stemmed from deep cultural and institutional differences, not from metaphysical differences between Confucianism or Judaism-Christianity, but from fundamental social structures.\u003cbr\u003e According to their theory, “endogenous social institutions and cultural characteristics were mutually reinforcing” (Greif and Tabellini, 2014, p.\u003cbr\u003e 21). \u003cbr\u003eIt is noteworthy that the momentum of technological progress began to slow after the clans' important role as the organization responsible for the Chinese economy reached its peak during the Song Dynasty.\u003cbr\u003e More importantly, it was a cultural evolution driven by the choices of an intellectual elite.\u003cbr\u003e This cultural evolution by choice is shaped by institutional structures, and thus contributes to the creation of these institutions.\u003cbr\u003e The question we should be addressing here is not “Why did China fail?” (China did not fail) or “Why didn’t China make more technological progress?” (China did make a lot of technological progress).\u003cbr\u003e Rather, the question we should be asking is why, during the period known as the early modern period (1500–1700), Europe and China were so different that they developed such a large technological and economic gap that has persisted to the present day. \u003cbr\u003eAgain, it is not so much that China did something wrong, but rather that a peculiar series of intellectual shifts that led to the Enlightenment occurred only in Europe.\u003cbr\u003e And the unique power of the European Enlightenment influenced not only Europe but every corner of the globe.\u003cbr\u003e Despite the strong arguments of revisionist scholars such as James Blaut (1993) and Jack Goody (2010), emphasizing this gap between Europe and China cannot be dismissed as mere Eurocentrism.\u003cbr\u003e There are two extreme positions regarding this historical fact.\u003cbr\u003e One is the deep-rooted European exceptionalism and superiority that has existed since ancient times, viewing non-European societies as 'primitive' and 'backward'.\u003cbr\u003e Historians of the revisionist California School have criticized this interpretation and have presented radically opposing views. \u003cbr\u003eAccording to them, there is no real difference between East and West, and the Great Divide is merely a counterweight (of intersecting histories) that temporarily gives one side an upper hand over the other.\u003cbr\u003e Between these two extremes there is room for a third interpretation.\u003cbr\u003e A third interpretation holds that at some point in early modern Europe, the cultural landscape began to shift dramatically, with various cultural entrepreneurs and their followers influencing the mindsets and beliefs of elite groups, creating an environment in which institutions could adequately accommodate these changes.\u003cbr\u003e These changes were particularly favorable to innovation and technological advancement, laying the foundation for a fateful shift in the way useful knowledge is utilized in society.\u003cbr\u003e As a result, these changes broke down the barriers that had prevented living standards in Europe from rising before 1800. \u003cbr\u003eAnd this led to two centuries of European global dominance.\u003cbr\u003e As non-European societies began to be exposed to Western culture, they had to undergo tectonic shifts that were previously unimaginable.\u003cbr\u003e Of course, Western influence was resisted and changed, modified and mixed to suit local characteristics.\u003cbr\u003e This produced different results depending on the region.\u003cbr\u003e Exchange between the West and the East flowed in both directions.\u003cbr\u003e The West has long adopted many Eastern technologies and inventions, from gunpowder and porcelain to umbrellas and smallpox inoculation.\u003cbr\u003e Even in modern times, the West still feels no distance from Eastern culture and techniques such as acupuncture and cooking.\u003cbr\u003e But the West has generally been uninterested in China's useful intellectual foundations of philosophy and institutions. \u003cbr\u003eThe Western brand of active Baconian philosophy, which explores and studies nature to discover usable natural laws and transform the physical world to improve material wealth, still holds the upper hand.\u003cbr\u003e\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e --- p.406~409\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003ch5\u003e \u003cb\u003ePublisher's Review\u003c\/b\u003e\n\u003c\/h5\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e \u003cb\u003eThe conditions for economic growth are a pluralistic culture and a society that allows competition.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e This book, \"The Culture of Growth,\" is another study that answers the question of how the economies of Western Europe and Asia (especially China), which had maintained similar levels, diverged so greatly after the 17th and 18th centuries.\u003cbr\u003e The answer, newly discovered by renowned economic historian Joel Mokir, lies in cultural differences.\u003cbr\u003e So what about the research done so far on the bifurcation of the two regions?\u003cbr\u003e Let's take a quick look first.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Before the Industrial Revolution, Chinese and European technologies alternated between growth and stagnation, sometimes ahead of each other. \u003cbr\u003eAs of 1700, it is impossible to tell which technology was more advanced.\u003cbr\u003e In some areas, China has overtaken Europe, while in others it has struggled to catch up.\u003cbr\u003e While efforts to catch up with other nations were more concentrated in Europe, the Jesuits' activities in China, where they reformed the calendar and introduced European spectacles and fire pumps, demonstrate that the effort to catch up was not limited to Europe.\u003cbr\u003e Whatever the historical reasons, the economic symptoms showing that the two societies had completely diverged only became apparent after 1700, when an innovation that might be called a \"phase transition\" occurred in Europe.\u003cbr\u003e While China's technology did not completely stagnate, as some scholars claim, it did not experience the same level of technological advancement as Europe. \u003cbr\u003eTherefore, Joseph Needham's question (why, although China's science and technology initially advanced far beyond Europe's, it was unable to maintain that pace) has not yet received a satisfactory answer.\u003cbr\u003e However, the California School's assertion that there was no indication of a divergence between China and Europe before the Industrial Revolution and that cultural differences were unimportant in the East-West divergence is completely at odds with Needham's assertion that China's scientific and technological development slowed after the Ming Dynasty.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e While the exact point of divergence is still unclear, at some point the two societies clearly began to diverge, and many theories have been put forward about the historical background under which Europe finally overtook China in technology.\u003cbr\u003e Kenneth Pomeranz and Ian Morris point to geography as reasons for the Great Divergence, citing location, the presence of natural resources, and belligerent neighbors as examples. \u003cbr\u003eLess clear is the argument that China's technological creativity was slowed by low wages, a mirror image of the argument that Britain's high wages spurred the development of labor-saving technologies, which in turn fueled the Industrial Revolution.\u003cbr\u003e This argument is supported by economists (McCloskey, 2010, pp.\u003cbr\u003e 186-196; Kelly, Mokyr, and O Grada, 2014) and historical sociologists (Vries, 2013, pp.\u003cbr\u003e Although it was discarded by the 184-189, many scholars could not resist the shallow charm of this theory (Rosenthal and Wong, 2011, pp.\u003cbr\u003e 36, 120; Slack, 2015, p.\u003cbr\u003e 9).\u003cbr\u003e While there is ample evidence that real wages in China are lower than in Europe, the conclusion that low wages have generally stifled innovation is flawed economics.\u003cbr\u003e First, if wages were low because labor productivity was low, unit labor costs may have been quite high. \u003cbr\u003eBut even if that weren't true, cheap labor is still a cost, and cheap labor can be used more intensively, so innovations that make labor more efficient across society would always be welcome.\u003cbr\u003e Moreover, there is no evidence that technological advancements have reduced labor costs, either before, during, or after the Industrial Revolution.\u003cbr\u003e Sometimes it saved labor, but sometimes it saved capital and energy.\u003cbr\u003e And sometimes, we just create new or better products without cutting anything.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Justin Lin offered a more reasonable, but less notable, answer to Needham's question.\u003cbr\u003e Lin argued that there are two types of technological advancement. \u003cbr\u003eThe first is experience-based technological change, which is purely based on learning by doing and is merely a by-product of production, and the second is knowledge-based technological change, which is the result of the conscious application of the results of scientific research and development to production.\u003cbr\u003e He said that a large population would have clearly been advantageous, since the former was a typical feature of technological change before the Industrial Revolution and that progress was an unintended byproduct of productive activity.\u003cbr\u003e Therefore, China, which had a much larger population than Western Europe, was technologically far ahead of Europe around the Middle Ages.\u003cbr\u003e It was only when Europe began to systematically study propositional knowledge about production that the balance finally tilted in its favor.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e However, strictly dividing technological development into these two types may be a bit excessive. \u003cbr\u003eNeedless to say, even in the 18th century, the relationship between science and technology in Europe was subtle and complex, and advances in industrial and agricultural technology were often achieved without a deep understanding of natural phenomena.\u003cbr\u003e Experience-based technological change did not rely solely on numbers.\u003cbr\u003e Clearly, the level of education and the will to innovate of skilled craftsmen were also important.\u003cbr\u003e In a way, the 18th-century Industrial Revolution also relied on the skills of artisans, which were still tacit knowledge, and scientific breakthroughs were rare.\u003cbr\u003e Although formal and codified knowledge only began to influence technology in broader areas of production after 1815, behavioral learning and serendipitous discovery, by-products of productive activity, remain important to this day. \u003cbr\u003eSo, while Lin's paper is certainly groundbreaking and should be considered a step in the right direction for this debate, it leaves unanswered the question of why and how differences in the way innovation emerges in Europe and China.\u003cbr\u003e If Europe's success was due to its ability to create propositional knowledge, and if this ability led to significant increases in production and productivity, why hasn't the same propositional knowledge developed elsewhere?\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e So now let's look at the reason.\u003cbr\u003e Economic growth is generally possible because nations build collective knowledge about nature and the environment and use this knowledge productively.\u003cbr\u003e Almost every society that has ever existed in history has achieved some degree of technological advancement. \u003cbr\u003eBut only once in human history has the explosive accumulation of knowledge created its own momentum, transforming the material foundations of human society more completely and rapidly than ever before.\u003cbr\u003e Such instances occurred in Western Europe during and immediately after the Industrial Revolution.\u003cbr\u003e The Enlightenment, which emerged in the late 17th century, was the culmination of changes in the European intellectual elite culture that had persisted for centuries prior.\u003cbr\u003e The changes that emerged in the marketplace of ideas were a phenomenon unique to Europe, different from those in other parts of the world.\u003cbr\u003e The intellectual cultural shift that began around 1500 had for centuries been confined to a small group of scholars and theologians, but by 1660 an elite had dramatically transformed the way knowledge was acquired and validated.\u003cbr\u003e For a time, changes in cultural beliefs could move independently of other economic variables such as commercialization, urbanization, and economic growth. \u003cbr\u003eBut ultimately, the shift in intellectual culture had a positive economic impact, a feedback loop that even the most enthusiastic 17th-century modernist and devout believer in the concept of progress could not have imagined.\u003cbr\u003e At least in this respect, we can significantly revise our view of the Great Divergence as a temporary phenomenon caused by minor, insignificant events and geographical differences.\u003cbr\u003e In other words, unlike other regions at the time, Europe was a society that combined pluralistic culture and competition of ideas.\u003cbr\u003e In such a society, knowledge is spread and shared.\u003cbr\u003e Therefore, existing knowledge is challenged by new knowledge and is modified and supplemented.\u003cbr\u003e In the end, it was this European culture that was important.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e To assess the impact of the European Enlightenment on economic development, it is important to remember that the Enlightenment encompassed two highly innovative and complementary ideas. \u003cbr\u003eOne is the notion that knowledge and understanding of nature can and should be used to improve the material condition of humanity.\u003cbr\u003e Another is the notion that government and the privileged class should work for society as a whole, not just the rich and powerful.\u003cbr\u003e The combination of these two ideas, their triumph in the marketplace of ideas, created a synergy that enabled the massive economic transformations we have seen today, from industrialization and the growth of physical and human capital to the discovery and mastery of natural phenomena and resources that were unimaginable as recently as 1750.\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:95%;padding-top:20px;padding-bottom:20px\"\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:left;font-size:16px;font-weight:bold;padding-bottom:20px\"\u003e GOODS SPECIFICS \u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"text-align:left;font-size:14px;line-height:1.6em;\"\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:100%;margin-bottom:5px;line-height:1.6em;font-size:14px\"\u003e - \u003cstrong\u003eDate of publication:\u003c\/strong\u003e February 26, 2018\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:100%;margin-bottom:5px;line-height:1.6em;font-size:14px\"\u003e - \u003cstrong\u003eFormat:\u003c\/strong\u003e Hardcover book binding method guide\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:100%;margin-bottom:5px;line-height:1.6em;font-size:14px\"\u003e - \u003cstrong\u003ePage count, weight, size:\u003c\/strong\u003e 648 pages | 988g | 148*217*35mm\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:100%;margin-bottom:5px;line-height:1.6em;font-size:14px\"\u003e - \u003cstrong\u003eISBN13:\u003c\/strong\u003e 9788962631715\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv style=\"width:100%;margin-bottom:5px;line-height:1.6em;font-size:14px\"\u003e - \u003cstrong\u003eISBN10:\u003c\/strong\u003e 8962631717 \u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\n\u003c\/div\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003ccenter\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"height:10px\"\u003e\u003c\/td\u003e\u003c\/tr\u003e\u003c\/table\u003e\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\u003cspan\u003e\u003c\/span\u003e\n\n\u003c\/center\u003e\n\n\n\u003c\/center\u003e","brand":"LIBRAIRIE COREENNE","offers":[{"title":"Default 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