A Fierce Encounter Between the Green and Red Revolutions
Crowd Science: The Foundation of China's Rise

A Look Back at China Beyond History

This book, written by a world authority on modern and contemporary Chinese history and the history of science, covers the history of Chinese agricultural science, focusing on the period of Mao Zedong's rule.
Most people will probably say “ah-ah” before even reading it.
This is especially true when we recall the worst 'Great Famine' in human history, which killed tens of millions of people around 1960.
But this book shatters these preconceptions.
Drawing on a variety of sources, including official documents, biographies, press reports, local interviews, and posters, this book vividly and engagingly demonstrates that the Mao era was not an anti-scientific period, but rather a time when the people laid the foundation for a sustainable agricultural model through "crowd science," in which they directly participated, produced, and utilized.
In addition, by raising the fundamental question, “What type of development is sustainable?” and emphasizing that discussions on agricultural science must consider not only productivity improvements but also environmental and social issues, it also presents important implications for Korean society, which is considering sustainable agricultural policies.

A more problematic aspect from China's perspective was that green revolutionaries sought to use the power of science and technology to avoid social and political revolution.
For this reason, socialist China never accepted the term 'green revolution'.
Instead, the same type of agricultural techniques were referred to as 'scientific farming'.
--- p.18

The "rural scientific experiment movement" that began in the mid-1960s was rooted in grassroots "scientific experiment groups" organized throughout rural China, based on the principle of the "three unions": "old workers and peasants" with abundant practical experience, "intellectual youth" with revolutionary enthusiasm, and field cadres who maintained correct political views. They sought to enforce "politics first" in the field of science and technology as well.
--- p.19

The radical argument that prioritizes crowd science and the technocratic position that privileges elite and professional science correspond to the two poles of the so-called dichotomy of the land and the West.
Although the state tried to resolve the issue through slogans such as “Soil and Ocean Combination” and the “Three Union” organizational law that united cadres, technicians, and farmers into a single scientific experiment team,
--- p.50

The term "To" refers to a set of meanings that constitute the radical vision of science in the Mao era: indigenous, Chinese, local, simple, mass, and rustic—science produced by the masses to achieve the goals of socialist revolution.
This was in contrast to the Western—foreign, Western, elite, professional, and ivory-tower.
--- p.75

This was in stark contrast to the specialized (quantitative) sciences that received massive investment under Deng Xiaoping's technocratic line, represented by the 'Four Modernizations'.
With these changes came the end of grassroots scientific experimental groups throughout China and the three-way epistemology they represented.
From this point on, scientific farming became more and more “green revolutionary” and less and less “red revolutionary” in character.
--- p.96

Beginning in 1953, Fu Jielong began research into cultivating Trichogramma parasitic wasps, an internationally accepted biological control agent for controlling sugarcane borers.
--- p.114

In the spring of 1975, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs convened a national plant protection conference and decided that “integrated pest control with prevention as the top priority” would be the national policy going forward.… ‘Integrated pest control’ primarily meant maximizing the efficiency of agricultural and manual methods to minimize the use of expensive chemical pesticides.
--- p.116

In the fall of 1972, Fu Zhelong accepted an invitation to visit Dashagongsa to give a lecture on pest control to farmers and officials.
He focused particularly on the use of insect-based pest control and microbe-centric approaches.
Soon after, with the enthusiastic support of local official Mai Baoxiang, Fuzhelong launched a pilot project.
--- p.117

Commune workers were willing to ban the catching of frogs, which were beneficial for catching pests, and to build microbial control facilities and wasp farms.
Additionally, it was decided to educate farmers, establish and train a technical team, and systematize duck farming to control rice field pests.
--- p.118

Lismei perfectly embodied the radical zeitgeist of the time, which emphasized the need to produce “native experts” for China’s development.
For Fu Jielong, sponsoring Lismei was a very effective way to show that he supported the discussion agenda of crowd science without losing his identity as a "foreign-trained expert."
--- p.124

Fu Zhe Rong… took his research to the countryside, where he converted a “squalid hut” into a plausible wasp breeding ground, where he conducted experiments raising Anastathus wasps.
At the same time, he trained more than 30 technical personnel who could carry out pest control work.
The article highly praised the fact that Fu Zhelong lived and worked alongside farmers in the countryside for six months, learning many things and gradually becoming "tempered" like steel being refined in a furnace.
--- p.125

Upon arriving at the scene, Fu Zhelong and his colleagues immersed themselves in life in the people's commune.
In keeping with the discussion's vision of breaking down the barriers between mental and physical labor, scientists engaged in physical labor, attended conferences on agricultural production, built research equipment using the limited resources available at the local commune, and slept alongside workers in a newly built workshop for cultivating microbial agents.
--- p.128

China was no match in both scientific fields.
However, it was entirely possible to lay the foundation for Torah as a unique style of science unique to socialist China that other countries could learn from.
This was linked to China's aspirations during the détente era to offer the world—not only the Third World but also friendly European countries like Sweden—a "third way" beyond the options offered by the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.
--- p.136

One biographer, who wrote three books about Yuan Longping, made sure to include a chapter in each work on “the effect of promoting the study of Party Thought,” or more specifically, on Mao Zedong Thought.
He described Yuan Longping as “not only a renowned breeder, but also a natural philosopher who closely combined Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought with his research on hybrid rice.”
--- p.170

One biography tells that during his early years at Anjang Agricultural School, Yuan Longping used discarded earthenware jars from kilns to grow seedlings.
This can be said to be a specific example of 'self-reliance' and 'frugality', which were commonly seen in propaganda literature at the time.
--- p.184

It was necessary to equip the peasants with the scientific knowledge necessary to build a 'new socialist countryside'.
This process was accomplished through education, exploration of new technologies, participation in scientific laboratory groups, and, in rare instances, interaction with scientists.
--- p.218

By 1965, workers and peasants had joined new agricultural research groups along with technical cadres.
“In the past, workers and peasants only discussed old experiences, but now… they can talk about new things too.
“This has made our understanding of whether farmers can also practice science clearer.”
--- p.220

Many leftist observers saw the potential for scientific reconstruction in China in the 1970s.
But if someone were to say that Maoist science “minimized the element of domination” over nature or over fellow human beings, even those most sympathetic to the ideals of the Mao era would likely find it difficult to agree.
It was undoubtedly a 'matter of struggle'.
But it was never non-violent.
--- p.249

According to a 1971 document from Xinxian County, Shaanxi Province, “the vast majority of the poor peasant masses” said, “To sprout, you must first grow seeds, and to grow seeds, you must first grow people.”
For this reason, revolutionary leaders had to select "sprouts" from among peasants and intellectual youth, encourage them to participate in the three major revolutionary movements, and form scientific experiment groups.
--- p.270

China's grassroots communities were also urged to embrace self-reliance as a principle for community-level economic development.
A widely accepted standard goal of self-reliance was that local communities should become self-sufficient or even export units, without having to import grain.
--- p.276

The state has increasingly encouraged grassroots production of seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides to prevent local communities from having to “call up to higher-ups” for help.
The “four self-helps one” approach was taken for seed production.
That is, local communities are responsible for selecting, distributing, storing, and using their own seeds, and replenish their stocks through appropriate exchanges with neighboring regions.
This slogan was first presented at the 1958 National Seed Work Conference.
--- p.279

“…I was different from the farmers in the production unit who sprayed pesticides everywhere without any thought, whether there were pests or not.
…because I had knowledge.
Farmers would say, 'I've been farming for decades, but you're better than me since you've only been farming for three years.'
That's not what I said.
“That’s what the farmers said.”
--- p.317

A 1974 publication explained it this way:
“From the perspective of the collective production task, failure was a loss.
But for the science team, especially our young people, failure was a great education.
“Our failures forced us to experience the painful process of integrating theory and practice, of re-educating the peasants and reforming their worldview.”
--- p.381

The year after Mao's death and the end of the Cultural Revolution, the new leadership characterized the radical policies pursued in science, youth, the economy, and everything else as "a colossal failure."… A recent historical study of intellectual youth and the Communist Youth League estimates that youth-led scientific experiment groups before the Cultural Revolution achieved only 20 to 30 percent success.
--- p.386

In a situation where the narrative of failure is already firmly established… the stronger the Maoist character, the more likely it is to be perceived as flawed in retrospect.
In particular, only China and the socialist world are criticized for their ‘politics’ and ‘ideology’.
Politics and ideology are ubiquitous, yet… let’s assume that the American economic and political system collapses and something fundamentally different takes over.
How will people of the new era evaluate the USDA's youth program, 4-H?
--- p.388

Agricultural mining and scientific experimentation campaigns were essential in convincing farmers of the value of new technologies and training them in the skills needed to adopt them.
The new technologies adopted made possible a massive increase in food production, which in turn made food widely available at low prices.
This became a very important foundation for economic growth in the post-Mao period.
--- p.396

The Xinxiangcun movement seeks to provide rural China with a space protected from capitalist forces by pursuing an alternative path.
In contrast, the state-led plan to build a new socialist countryside primarily seeks to continuously strengthen the connections between villages and the global market.
--- p.405

Li Changping's call for "farmers' seed sovereignty" reflects a recent trend in which more and more Chinese people are joining the global food sovereignty movement (called plant sovereignty or grain sovereignty in Chinese).
--- p.424

Had there not been the Mao era's affirmation of the science of soil, it is highly probable that the various forms of knowledge that had protected the countryside for so long would have been entirely negated.
Compared to the past, it is much more difficult to find a tone affirming peasant knowledge in official state policy today.
And it is precisely this gap that is being filled by critical social scientists involved in participatory plant breeding projects and people's food sovereignty movements.
--- p.428

The Chinese experience does not suggest that the flaws in the Green Revolution ideology can be miraculously resolved by the Red Revolution.
The environmental harm caused by chemical-intensive agriculture, and the human cost of emphasizing increased production over fair distribution of food and labor, have caused as much damage in China as in any other country on Earth.

--- p.431