Why American Diplomacy Fails
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Description
Book Introduction
American diplomacy wasn't omnipotent! What led to its failure?
In the Trump 2.0 era, the catastrophe in international relations didn't strike suddenly.
America, the world's leader! In the 21st century, we all live within a world order created by America.
But American diplomacy was also marked by failures as well as successes.
The United States has often misjudged its opponents, fallen into a self-centered mindset and responded inappropriately, and has also tried to unilaterally promote American values, only to have them backfire.
But often it was due to arrogance or incompetence, and sometimes failure itself was the goal.
The nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula is one of those vivid examples.
The United States prioritized tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and easily ignored the efforts of those who did their best to promote peace.
This is not a problem of error or incompetence on the part of a few bureaucrats or policymakers, nor is it due to capricious policy changes by each administration.
≪Why American Diplomacy Fails≫ is a record of lectures and discussions held directly by 11 leading scholars and experts in American diplomacy and international relations about the chaos in American diplomacy.
It examines the specifics of American diplomacy in sharply contested issues such as the Korean Peninsula issue, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza Strip crisis, and the Central American conflict, and raises questions about what the United States and the world should consider and how to respond.
In the Trump 2.0 era, the catastrophe in international relations didn't strike suddenly.
America, the world's leader! In the 21st century, we all live within a world order created by America.
But American diplomacy was also marked by failures as well as successes.
The United States has often misjudged its opponents, fallen into a self-centered mindset and responded inappropriately, and has also tried to unilaterally promote American values, only to have them backfire.
But often it was due to arrogance or incompetence, and sometimes failure itself was the goal.
The nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula is one of those vivid examples.
The United States prioritized tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and easily ignored the efforts of those who did their best to promote peace.
This is not a problem of error or incompetence on the part of a few bureaucrats or policymakers, nor is it due to capricious policy changes by each administration.
≪Why American Diplomacy Fails≫ is a record of lectures and discussions held directly by 11 leading scholars and experts in American diplomacy and international relations about the chaos in American diplomacy.
It examines the specifics of American diplomacy in sharply contested issues such as the Korean Peninsula issue, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza Strip crisis, and the Central American conflict, and raises questions about what the United States and the world should consider and how to respond.
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index
Preface
Prologue: James Rainey and Korea
introduction
A turbulent world and a drifting US foreign policy: Is there an alternative?
Moon Jae-in
Part 1: How to Solve the North Korean Nuclear Issue
Chapter 1
U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Recommendations for the Next Administration
Robert Gallucci
Chapter 2
North Korea's Journey to the New World and the Path to Preventing Nuclear Disaster on the Korean Peninsula: Is Peace Possible on the Korean Peninsula?
Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker
Part 2: Is American Diplomacy Failing?
Chapter 3
Is America's Foreign Policy Failing?: Historical Understanding and Reality
Charles Kupchan
Chapter 4
Conservative Foreign Policy in the United States: Orthodox Conservatives, Neoconservatives, and MAGA
Walter Mead
Chapter 5
A Defense of American Foreign Policy as Liberal Internationalism: A Liberal Perspective
John Ikenberry
Part 3: Key Issues in American Diplomacy
Chapter 6
The US-China Strategic Rivalry: Is There a Way Out?
Susan Thornton
Chapter 7
End of the Ukraine-Gaza War?: War, Diplomacy, and the Prospects
Carl Eikenberry
Chapter 8
America's New Economic Strategy and Middle-Class Diplomacy: How Economic Foreign Policy Works
Vinod Agarwal
Chapter 9
From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: America's Changing Regional Strategy
Van Jackson
Chapter 10
Climate Change, US Domestic Politics, and Global Governance: US Diplomacy in the Age of Climate Change
Miranda Schroers
Words of gratitude
Prologue: James Rainey and Korea
introduction
A turbulent world and a drifting US foreign policy: Is there an alternative?
Moon Jae-in
Part 1: How to Solve the North Korean Nuclear Issue
Chapter 1
U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Recommendations for the Next Administration
Robert Gallucci
Chapter 2
North Korea's Journey to the New World and the Path to Preventing Nuclear Disaster on the Korean Peninsula: Is Peace Possible on the Korean Peninsula?
Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker
Part 2: Is American Diplomacy Failing?
Chapter 3
Is America's Foreign Policy Failing?: Historical Understanding and Reality
Charles Kupchan
Chapter 4
Conservative Foreign Policy in the United States: Orthodox Conservatives, Neoconservatives, and MAGA
Walter Mead
Chapter 5
A Defense of American Foreign Policy as Liberal Internationalism: A Liberal Perspective
John Ikenberry
Part 3: Key Issues in American Diplomacy
Chapter 6
The US-China Strategic Rivalry: Is There a Way Out?
Susan Thornton
Chapter 7
End of the Ukraine-Gaza War?: War, Diplomacy, and the Prospects
Carl Eikenberry
Chapter 8
America's New Economic Strategy and Middle-Class Diplomacy: How Economic Foreign Policy Works
Vinod Agarwal
Chapter 9
From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: America's Changing Regional Strategy
Van Jackson
Chapter 10
Climate Change, US Domestic Politics, and Global Governance: US Diplomacy in the Age of Climate Change
Miranda Schroers
Words of gratitude
Into the book
American foreign policy must be more cautious and humble.
Only when the United States sheds its arrogance and unilateral bias can it regain the respect of the international community.
In 1630, John Winthrop, then governor of Massachusetts Bay, described the future of America after independence as a "city upon a hill" overflowing with individual freedom and material abundance.
This means that the United States becomes a role model for the world, and other countries voluntarily follow this exemplary American example.
The essence of American soft power is that other countries look up to the United States without having to force it.
However, when we become obsessed with "American exceptionalism" and "American supremacy," forgetting the virtues of prudence and humility, respect and voluntary compliance with the United States from other countries becomes impossible.
The high-handed attitude of asking, “Are you on our side or not?” and “Stand on the right side of history” will only serve to spread anti-American sentiment.
--- From "Introduction: A Fluctuating World and a Drifting American Foreign Policy"
First, further hard-line statements would be inappropriate going forward.
We must speak only what is necessary and speak clearly about the vitality of our alliance and the strength of its deterrent.
And now we must find ways to pursue cooperation with North Korea again.
Second, North Korea's nuclear weapons program should not be made a subject of negotiation again.
There is no need to debate the permanence of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
I believe the only realistic way to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons is to acknowledge that they are part of the current political and security landscape.
The good news is that there are no insurmountable obstacles to improving relations between North Korea and the United States, as long as they don't pose a threat to Beijing.
It may not be as easy as it sounds, but it is not impossible.
--- From "Chapter 1: U.S. Policy toward North Korea"
If I had a bet that I would get a nickel every time the word "suppression" was used in an official government statement, I would be incredibly rich.
Why do we keep using that word? Does it work? Maybe.
Maybe it will have some effect.
But it was clearly ineffective in stopping North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
We talk about deterrence, but the number of nuclear weapons continues to grow.
What should we do? What's happening? We must prepare for when North Korea reopens.
They will open the door.
North Korea is tactically very adept at making us knock, push, and bang on the door.
They keep closing the door.
But one day they suddenly open the door.
We stumble in, losing our balance.
It will be a different space than we knew before.
You won't be sitting at the table with the same people and the same goals in mind as before.
If we're not prepared, if we don't understand the situation, if we don't understand that they expect and need new things in return for what we need, the negotiation will quickly fail.
If negotiations fail, people in Seoul and Washington will say, "See? I told you so.
We can't do business with North Korea.
You will say, “It’s impossible.”
--- From "Chapter 2: North Korea's Path to a New World and the Path to Preventing Nuclear Disaster on the Korean Peninsula"
Donald Trump is a huge backlash in many ways.
It is a backlash against the hollowing out of the American middle class due to liberal over-intervention in the post-Cold War era and the continued wars in the Middle East that have been costly but have not yielded much good results.
I think the American people are now tired of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere.
Donald Trump was, in many ways, a response to the primal cry of the American voter: "too much world, not enough America."
What has it done for us? Why are we building schools in Kandahar when we should be building schools in Kansas? These are the kinds of complaints that keep piling up.
--- From “Chapter 3: Is America’s Foreign Policy Failing?”
Sometimes we make ridiculously idealistic statements.
Sometimes it seems like we're trying to conquer the world, and sometimes it seems like we're trying to distance ourselves from it.
The CIA was dispatched to rescue the American multinational corporation United Fruit, which had advanced into Guatemala, and relations with countries like Burma (Myanmar) deteriorated significantly for unclear reasons, including human rights issues.
In short, it's a mess.
A series of events occurred one after another.
So people have been critical of the foreign policy of the United States since the beginning of American history.
On the other hand, looking back at the history of the past 200 years, one clear trend in international politics is that the United States has gradually increased its power and influence in the international system.
In 1790, the United States was a very weak and peripheral country.
But after 1945, it became the world's most dominant power.
This raises a question:
How could a country with such a poor foreign policy, such a hopeless mess of politicians, such a mixture of stupidity and incompetence, become the superpower it is today?
--- From "Chapter 4: America's Conservative Foreign Policy"
I think there have already been three failures before Trump.
First, the Iraq War has significantly damaged America's credibility.
As a liberal international nation, that is.
I don't think the Iraq war was a liberal war.
I think it's closer to a hegemonic realist war.
The second crisis and failure was the 2008 financial crisis, which pushed liberalism in a neoliberal direction.
Third, the predictions made by liberal internationalists and others associated with them that China would move toward a liberal society failed.
What many liberals, including myself, consider a failure is the assumption that China would gradually open up once it joined the WTO and became integrated into the liberal international order.
Although it was not expected that China would become a democracy, there was an expectation that it would become a more pluralistic society.
Civil society is crucial to the operation of the liberal world order, and we had hoped that citizens within China would have a greater voice in cooperating with the wishes of liberal internationalists.
--- From "Chapter 5: A Defense of the American Foreign Policy of Liberal Internationalism"
My concern is that the United States, obsessed with competing with China, may pursue distorted policies that weaken America's inherent strengths.
We must maintain healthy alliances with each other.
To do that, the United States must demonstrate respect for the interests of its allies.
We must not allow competition with China to trample on their interests.
The United States must maintain its global leadership position.
So, you have to have good ideas that benefit everyone.
Not to incite competition with China.
To appeal to people around the world, you have to do the right thing, not just show that you're competing with someone else.
I believe that no matter how much advantage the United States gains in its competition with China, it will not be able to sustain that advantage unless it pursues a positive agenda.
--- From "Chapter 6: US-China Strategic Rivalry"
In recent years, the divisions in American domestic politics have increasingly influenced foreign policy.
There is an old saying in American politics.
No matter how serious the conflict surrounding American domestic politics or foreign policy, it ends when it reaches the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, respectively.
The moment we leave the shores of the United States, we will conduct our foreign policy with a unified stance.
But now that doesn't make sense.
America's foreign policy toward the world is increasingly influenced by divided domestic politics.
Let's look at one indicator of this.
A recent poll in the United States shows that about 63% of Americans over 55, roughly my age, support Israel.
But when you look at people between the ages of 18 and 34, the situation is the opposite.
64% would say they support Palestine.
Looking at racial differences, 61% of white Americans say they support Israel.
People of color are 30% more likely to say they support Israel.
--- From "Chapter 7: The End of the War between Ukraine and Gaza?"
Companies say, “We are critical to national security.
When people say, “We need to protect our industry,” you have to question whether that is true.
My favorite example goes back about 65 years.
At the time, the American wool blanket industry claimed that it would need between 150 million and 200 million wool blankets to ensure survival in the event of a nuclear war.
Basically, they argued that the wool blanket industry needed to be protected.
They argued that wool blankets should be produced in the United States while restricting imports from Japan and other countries.
This is supposed to protect us from radiation.
I'm not a physicist, but I know that wool blankets won't save us from radiation.
It might cover your head when a nuclear explosion occurs.
Unfortunately, it will not survive.
This is kind of nonsense.
When you see companies lobbying to protect themselves.
Therefore, we must be very careful when asserting what is and is not important to national security.
--- From "Chapter 8 America's New Economic Strategy and Middle-Class Diplomacy"
The most powerful source of peace in Asia is something no one wants to talk about anymore: the détente between China and the United States.
It was no coincidence that peace in Asia began in 1979.
That year also marked the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the United States.
Before détente, China had pursued a revolutionary foreign policy and enjoyed military adventures in many places.
China has been extremely hostile to the United States and its interests in Asia.
But Deng Xiaoping needed a cooperative relationship with the United States to reform the People's Liberation Army and prioritize national development over nationalist retaliatory policies.
This is similar to the choice made by several Asian countries around the same time.
In other words, development was prioritized over nationalism.
So détente has forced not only China but also the United States to exercise restraint.
Détente also promoted economic interdependence in East Asia.
Major powers have participated in regional organizations and directly contributed to stabilizing the global economy since the 2008 financial crisis.
All this happened in a world where Asia was called the Asia-Pacific, not the Indo-Pacific.
What I want to emphasize is that functional cooperation between the great powers has played a greater role in maintaining peace in Asia than any other factor.
This is where the real problem with American foreign policy lies.
The greatest danger to peace in Asia comes from replacing détente with long-term competition.
The elimination of détente and the introduction of long-term competition are the context in which we consider the Indo-Pacific and its implications.
From a regional stability perspective, this is the question we must focus on.
--- From Chapter 9, From Asia-Pacific Strategy to Indo-Pacific Strategy
In 1997, the U.S. Senate passed the resolution by a vote of 95 to 0.
The United States argued that China must also take meaningful action and should not join agreements like the Kyoto Protocol that do not guarantee such participation.
As the graph on the side shows, China's emissions were considerably lower than those of the United States or Europe in 1990, but around the time the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, China's emissions began to increase rapidly.
So, American politics began to spread the blame game, with people blaming China, asking, "What's China doing? Is China doing enough?" and using that as an excuse to deflect responsibility.
Concerns also played a role: China would become the world's manufacturing hub without any restrictions on climate action.
Then-Vice President Dick Cheney said the United States should focus on energy security.
This meant more fossil fuels.
This has become the dominant discourse in conservative American climate politics.
This is a discourse that has been particularly strong in the Republican Party.
Only when the United States sheds its arrogance and unilateral bias can it regain the respect of the international community.
In 1630, John Winthrop, then governor of Massachusetts Bay, described the future of America after independence as a "city upon a hill" overflowing with individual freedom and material abundance.
This means that the United States becomes a role model for the world, and other countries voluntarily follow this exemplary American example.
The essence of American soft power is that other countries look up to the United States without having to force it.
However, when we become obsessed with "American exceptionalism" and "American supremacy," forgetting the virtues of prudence and humility, respect and voluntary compliance with the United States from other countries becomes impossible.
The high-handed attitude of asking, “Are you on our side or not?” and “Stand on the right side of history” will only serve to spread anti-American sentiment.
--- From "Introduction: A Fluctuating World and a Drifting American Foreign Policy"
First, further hard-line statements would be inappropriate going forward.
We must speak only what is necessary and speak clearly about the vitality of our alliance and the strength of its deterrent.
And now we must find ways to pursue cooperation with North Korea again.
Second, North Korea's nuclear weapons program should not be made a subject of negotiation again.
There is no need to debate the permanence of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
I believe the only realistic way to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons is to acknowledge that they are part of the current political and security landscape.
The good news is that there are no insurmountable obstacles to improving relations between North Korea and the United States, as long as they don't pose a threat to Beijing.
It may not be as easy as it sounds, but it is not impossible.
--- From "Chapter 1: U.S. Policy toward North Korea"
If I had a bet that I would get a nickel every time the word "suppression" was used in an official government statement, I would be incredibly rich.
Why do we keep using that word? Does it work? Maybe.
Maybe it will have some effect.
But it was clearly ineffective in stopping North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
We talk about deterrence, but the number of nuclear weapons continues to grow.
What should we do? What's happening? We must prepare for when North Korea reopens.
They will open the door.
North Korea is tactically very adept at making us knock, push, and bang on the door.
They keep closing the door.
But one day they suddenly open the door.
We stumble in, losing our balance.
It will be a different space than we knew before.
You won't be sitting at the table with the same people and the same goals in mind as before.
If we're not prepared, if we don't understand the situation, if we don't understand that they expect and need new things in return for what we need, the negotiation will quickly fail.
If negotiations fail, people in Seoul and Washington will say, "See? I told you so.
We can't do business with North Korea.
You will say, “It’s impossible.”
--- From "Chapter 2: North Korea's Path to a New World and the Path to Preventing Nuclear Disaster on the Korean Peninsula"
Donald Trump is a huge backlash in many ways.
It is a backlash against the hollowing out of the American middle class due to liberal over-intervention in the post-Cold War era and the continued wars in the Middle East that have been costly but have not yielded much good results.
I think the American people are now tired of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere.
Donald Trump was, in many ways, a response to the primal cry of the American voter: "too much world, not enough America."
What has it done for us? Why are we building schools in Kandahar when we should be building schools in Kansas? These are the kinds of complaints that keep piling up.
--- From “Chapter 3: Is America’s Foreign Policy Failing?”
Sometimes we make ridiculously idealistic statements.
Sometimes it seems like we're trying to conquer the world, and sometimes it seems like we're trying to distance ourselves from it.
The CIA was dispatched to rescue the American multinational corporation United Fruit, which had advanced into Guatemala, and relations with countries like Burma (Myanmar) deteriorated significantly for unclear reasons, including human rights issues.
In short, it's a mess.
A series of events occurred one after another.
So people have been critical of the foreign policy of the United States since the beginning of American history.
On the other hand, looking back at the history of the past 200 years, one clear trend in international politics is that the United States has gradually increased its power and influence in the international system.
In 1790, the United States was a very weak and peripheral country.
But after 1945, it became the world's most dominant power.
This raises a question:
How could a country with such a poor foreign policy, such a hopeless mess of politicians, such a mixture of stupidity and incompetence, become the superpower it is today?
--- From "Chapter 4: America's Conservative Foreign Policy"
I think there have already been three failures before Trump.
First, the Iraq War has significantly damaged America's credibility.
As a liberal international nation, that is.
I don't think the Iraq war was a liberal war.
I think it's closer to a hegemonic realist war.
The second crisis and failure was the 2008 financial crisis, which pushed liberalism in a neoliberal direction.
Third, the predictions made by liberal internationalists and others associated with them that China would move toward a liberal society failed.
What many liberals, including myself, consider a failure is the assumption that China would gradually open up once it joined the WTO and became integrated into the liberal international order.
Although it was not expected that China would become a democracy, there was an expectation that it would become a more pluralistic society.
Civil society is crucial to the operation of the liberal world order, and we had hoped that citizens within China would have a greater voice in cooperating with the wishes of liberal internationalists.
--- From "Chapter 5: A Defense of the American Foreign Policy of Liberal Internationalism"
My concern is that the United States, obsessed with competing with China, may pursue distorted policies that weaken America's inherent strengths.
We must maintain healthy alliances with each other.
To do that, the United States must demonstrate respect for the interests of its allies.
We must not allow competition with China to trample on their interests.
The United States must maintain its global leadership position.
So, you have to have good ideas that benefit everyone.
Not to incite competition with China.
To appeal to people around the world, you have to do the right thing, not just show that you're competing with someone else.
I believe that no matter how much advantage the United States gains in its competition with China, it will not be able to sustain that advantage unless it pursues a positive agenda.
--- From "Chapter 6: US-China Strategic Rivalry"
In recent years, the divisions in American domestic politics have increasingly influenced foreign policy.
There is an old saying in American politics.
No matter how serious the conflict surrounding American domestic politics or foreign policy, it ends when it reaches the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, respectively.
The moment we leave the shores of the United States, we will conduct our foreign policy with a unified stance.
But now that doesn't make sense.
America's foreign policy toward the world is increasingly influenced by divided domestic politics.
Let's look at one indicator of this.
A recent poll in the United States shows that about 63% of Americans over 55, roughly my age, support Israel.
But when you look at people between the ages of 18 and 34, the situation is the opposite.
64% would say they support Palestine.
Looking at racial differences, 61% of white Americans say they support Israel.
People of color are 30% more likely to say they support Israel.
--- From "Chapter 7: The End of the War between Ukraine and Gaza?"
Companies say, “We are critical to national security.
When people say, “We need to protect our industry,” you have to question whether that is true.
My favorite example goes back about 65 years.
At the time, the American wool blanket industry claimed that it would need between 150 million and 200 million wool blankets to ensure survival in the event of a nuclear war.
Basically, they argued that the wool blanket industry needed to be protected.
They argued that wool blankets should be produced in the United States while restricting imports from Japan and other countries.
This is supposed to protect us from radiation.
I'm not a physicist, but I know that wool blankets won't save us from radiation.
It might cover your head when a nuclear explosion occurs.
Unfortunately, it will not survive.
This is kind of nonsense.
When you see companies lobbying to protect themselves.
Therefore, we must be very careful when asserting what is and is not important to national security.
--- From "Chapter 8 America's New Economic Strategy and Middle-Class Diplomacy"
The most powerful source of peace in Asia is something no one wants to talk about anymore: the détente between China and the United States.
It was no coincidence that peace in Asia began in 1979.
That year also marked the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the United States.
Before détente, China had pursued a revolutionary foreign policy and enjoyed military adventures in many places.
China has been extremely hostile to the United States and its interests in Asia.
But Deng Xiaoping needed a cooperative relationship with the United States to reform the People's Liberation Army and prioritize national development over nationalist retaliatory policies.
This is similar to the choice made by several Asian countries around the same time.
In other words, development was prioritized over nationalism.
So détente has forced not only China but also the United States to exercise restraint.
Détente also promoted economic interdependence in East Asia.
Major powers have participated in regional organizations and directly contributed to stabilizing the global economy since the 2008 financial crisis.
All this happened in a world where Asia was called the Asia-Pacific, not the Indo-Pacific.
What I want to emphasize is that functional cooperation between the great powers has played a greater role in maintaining peace in Asia than any other factor.
This is where the real problem with American foreign policy lies.
The greatest danger to peace in Asia comes from replacing détente with long-term competition.
The elimination of détente and the introduction of long-term competition are the context in which we consider the Indo-Pacific and its implications.
From a regional stability perspective, this is the question we must focus on.
--- From Chapter 9, From Asia-Pacific Strategy to Indo-Pacific Strategy
In 1997, the U.S. Senate passed the resolution by a vote of 95 to 0.
The United States argued that China must also take meaningful action and should not join agreements like the Kyoto Protocol that do not guarantee such participation.
As the graph on the side shows, China's emissions were considerably lower than those of the United States or Europe in 1990, but around the time the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, China's emissions began to increase rapidly.
So, American politics began to spread the blame game, with people blaming China, asking, "What's China doing? Is China doing enough?" and using that as an excuse to deflect responsibility.
Concerns also played a role: China would become the world's manufacturing hub without any restrictions on climate action.
Then-Vice President Dick Cheney said the United States should focus on energy security.
This meant more fossil fuels.
This has become the dominant discourse in conservative American climate politics.
This is a discourse that has been particularly strong in the Republican Party.
--- From "Chapter 10: Climate Change, U.S. Domestic Politics, and Global Governance"
Publisher's Review
American diplomacy wasn't omnipotent.
Serious questions that explore the details and origins of America's foreign policy failures.
American diplomacy has been marked by failures as well as successes.
Of course, America's hegemonic position remains intact, but given its history of past failures, the current global situation does not seem so easy for American diplomacy to handle.
Above all, the biggest challenge for American diplomacy is the rise of China and the resulting conflict between China and the United States.
However, there are no clear signs of a new Cold War yet, and military confrontation between them is not as visible as it was during the Cold War.
The world today stands on the borderline between a 'cold peace' and a new Cold War.
Can the United States prevent the current "cold peace" from solidifying into a new Cold War?
Beyond the US-China confrontation, signs of crisis are appearing in many places.
The war in Ukraine, the Gaza Strip crisis, the escalating conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, and global challenges such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the decline of the liberal economic order cast a dark shadow over the future of the world order.
The United States is undoubtedly the key player in preventing a regression into a new Cold War, maintaining global peace and security, and reestablishing a world order in turmoil. However, Pax Americana is now a relic of the past.
It is no longer easy to characterize the United States as a liberator, hegemonic stabilizer, security patron, or benevolent benefactor after World War II.
However, the inertia still remains and the international community's expectations for it are also high.
Can the United States, once again a respected leader in the international community, rectify the chaotic and uncertain 21st-century world order? "Why American Diplomacy Fails" is a valuable record in which eleven world-renowned scholars examine the chaotic nature of American diplomacy and its origins, examine current issues, and seek alternatives in the face of crisis.
How to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue
The United States missed a crucial opportunity in the Korean Peninsula crisis.
In Chapter 1, Professor Robert Gallucci, a U.S. administration official who has witnessed the ups and downs of North Korea-U.S. relations over the past 30 years, provides a clear analysis of the North Korean nuclear issue.
At this stage, a nuclear freeze or dismantlement will not be easy, and coercion such as the ROK-US alliance and deterrence and sanctions will be necessary.
However, the North Korean nuclear issue cannot be resolved through coercion alone.
Dialogue and diplomatic negotiations are essential.
Professor Gallucci does not expect the advent of a second Trump administration to bring about a new, groundbreaking breakthrough in North Korea-US relations.
Rather, it is pessimistic that we could end up on the brink of nuclear war.
To prevent this catastrophe, I advise the incoming Trump administration to:
“Avoid hostile rhetoric toward North Korea.
We must engage and engage with North Korea, but we must not neglect deterrence.
Deterrence is the most important leverage in negotiations.
To achieve this, we need to strengthen the ROK-US alliance, and above all, we must prioritize the North Korean nuclear issue as a policy priority.”
In Chapter 2, Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker examine various ways to avoid a nuclear disaster on the Korean Peninsula.
First, researcher Karlin, who has analyzed North Korean issues for over 40 years at the CIA and State Department, predicts that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is gradually worsening and that a turnaround seems difficult.
Since the 1990s, North Korea has sought to find solutions for regime security and economic development through normalizing relations with the United States, including Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un.
However, after the failure of the Hanoi summit between North Korea and the United States in February 2019, hopes for improved relations with the United States were dashed and new alternatives began to be sought.
North Korea is seeking a way to survive by improving relations with both Russia and China.
The adoption of an offensive nuclear doctrine and the establishment of a hostile relationship with the South after December 2023 can be understood in the same context.
Dr. Hacker also criticizes that while North Korea's desire to possess nuclear weapons is problematic, the United States' policy failures have also contributed to worsening the North Korean nuclear issue.
There were six turning points in the nuclear negotiations with North Korea, and the United States made mistakes each time.
Among these, the United States' blunders during the second nuclear crisis in 2002 and President Trump's failure to negotiate at the Hanoi summit in February 2019 brought about a fatal setback in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and diplomacy.
Dr. Hacker advises, "Don't make the North Korean nuclear issue worse," and "Always be prepared for changing circumstances, whether they worsen or improve."
It also emphasizes the need to find a gradual and practical solution that halts North Korea's nuclear weapons activities, reduces its nuclear facilities, materials, and weapons through diplomatic negotiations, and promotes nuclear dismantlement over time.
Regarding North Korea negotiations, Carlin and Hacker urged the second Trump administration to “learn from the past.”
Don't make the situation worse.
“Always be prepared,” he suggests.
Voices that are no longer one
American foreign policy shaped by division and conflict in domestic politics
Part 2, under the theme of "Is American Diplomacy Failing?", covers various theoretical positions on American foreign policy, their origins, and how each position developed into policy.
First, in Chapter 3, Professor Charles Kupchan recalls that American foreign policy was not smooth.
From the early days of independence to the end of the 19th century, there was isolationism; until just before World War II, there was a clash between the lines of realism and idealism; and after 1945, when the United States established its hegemonic position, there were attempts to satisfy both idealism and realism, but they were not very successful.
In particular, he points out that U.S. foreign policy has lost consistency due to domestic political changes and partisan conflict.
He reminds us that American foreign policy can be successful when it builds a national consensus centered on pragmatic realism.
However, with the emergence of Trump 2.0, that possibility has become even more unlikely.
In Chapter 4, Professor Walter Mead assumes that to understand American conservative foreign policy, it is necessary to first understand the four ideological underpinnings of American foreign policy.
First, Hamiltonian realism, which advocates for a wealthy nation and a strong military; second, Wilsonian idealism, which argues that American ideals should be spread throughout the world; third, Jeffersonianism, which argues that war should be avoided because it entails great costs and sacrifices and that emphasis should be placed on promoting the welfare of citizens; and lastly, populist Jacksonianism, which opposes the United States' role as a crusader for democracy and human rights and is indifferent to the liberal trade order. Of these, Hamiltonianism and Jacksonianism are diagnosed as the core of conservatism.
Professor Mead categorizes Trump as a prime example of Jacksonianism, and predicts that it will be difficult to predict the foreign policy of the American conservative camp as the conservative centrists who could mediate the tensions and conflicts between Hamiltonianism and Jacksonianism disappear.
In Chapter 5, Professor John Ikenberry defines the mainstream of American liberal foreign policy as liberal internationalism and reexamines the merits and demerits of this position.
First, as representative examples of the success of liberal internationalism, they include economic growth and expansion of international trade through the establishment of a liberal economic order after World War II, the reintegration of Germany and Japan into the international community, the creation of a reciprocal international order through the establishment of multilateral institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and WTO, the incubation of social democratic ideals, and the successful transition to capitalism and democracy in some developing countries (South Korea is a representative example).
Meanwhile, Professor Eikenberry cites the invasion of Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis brought on by neoliberal policies, and misjudgments about China's transition to liberalism as examples of failure behind this success.
He makes a pessimistic prediction that with the emergence of Trump 2.0, "America First" and unilateralism will become the keynote of American foreign policy.
A turbulent world and America's response
US-China relations, Ukraine/Gaza crisis, new economic strategy, Indo-Pacific strategy, climate change crisis
Part 3 focuses on the major foreign policy issues currently facing the United States.
In Chapter 6, researcher Susan Thornton traces the current deterioration of US-China relations to the "national exceptionalism" prevalent in both the US and China.
The United States and China are two great powers with significant differences, and it is true that they cannot avoid competition in many areas.
China provided a pretext for this, but the United States also bears a significant responsibility for exaggerating and distorting the Chinese threat and for making China a domestic political issue from a Cold War anti-communist perspective, thus complicating US-China relations.
Thornton recommends moving away from "American supremacy" and working with China to transform the confrontational rivalry between the US and China into a constructive competition.
Thornton predicts that while Trump's summit diplomacy and transactional approach could have some positive effects, his unilateral and high-handed diplomatic approach will likely be detrimental to improving US-China relations.
In Chapter 7, which covers the Gaza Strip and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, former Ambassador Karl Eikenberry expresses concern about the increasing civilian casualties and deepening humanitarian tragedy as the two wars prolong, and he worries that despite international mediation efforts, the problem remains difficult to resolve.
Former Ambassador Eikenberry notes that American society is deeply divided over whether to support Ukraine and Israel, and that these two wars raise moral questions about "just war," including the principles of proportionality, moral relativism, mass killings of civilians, and the appropriateness of the weapons used.
In Chapter 8, Professor Vinod Agarwal approaches the recent changes in US foreign economic policy from a new theoretical perspective called the 'New Economic Strategy'.
The New Economic Strategy is a policy that mobilizes various economic policies for purposes such as competitiveness, national security, and protecting the interests of the middle class. It is a regression from the traditional free trade system that the United States has advocated, and it is an unequal policy that benefits the wealthy, such as high-tech companies, more than the middle class.
Unfortunately, Trump 2.0 will see policies like high tariffs, incentivizing American companies to invest abroad again, industrial policies, technological decoupling, energy independence, and anti-multilateral economic order policies that run counter to the interests of the American middle class and the world.
In Chapter 9, Professor Van Jackson delves into America's Indo-Pacific strategy.
The Obama administration's rebalancing policy toward Asia was rebranded as the Indo-Pacific Strategy by the Trump administration and carried over to the Biden administration.
Professor Jackson argues that the relatively long period of peace that has existed in East Asia since 1979 lies in the US Asia-Pacific strategy, which is centered on alliances, deterrence, economic interdependence, and US-China détente.
Professor Jackson's analysis is that peace in East Asia is in jeopardy as the country shifts to the Indo-Pacific strategy, a hostile policy aimed at containing and blockading China.
He also criticizes countries in the region that blindly accept America's Indo-Pacific strategy.
Professor Jackson suggests that the current crisis should be overcome through open regionalism and US-China détente, while respecting the existing norm of the balance of power.
In Chapter 10, Professor Miranda Schröers of the Technical University of Munich discusses the impact of domestic political conflict in the United States on climate change policy.
Trump, along with the Republican Party and conservatives, are passive about climate change and environmental regulations, and focus on economic growth utilizing cheap energy resources.
Meanwhile, the Democratic Party and the progressive camp have been actively responding to climate change.
The inauguration of the second Trump administration will be a major blow to climate change policy.
It is difficult to rule out the possibility of re-withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and cuts in personnel and budget in the environmental sector.
Serious questions that explore the details and origins of America's foreign policy failures.
American diplomacy has been marked by failures as well as successes.
Of course, America's hegemonic position remains intact, but given its history of past failures, the current global situation does not seem so easy for American diplomacy to handle.
Above all, the biggest challenge for American diplomacy is the rise of China and the resulting conflict between China and the United States.
However, there are no clear signs of a new Cold War yet, and military confrontation between them is not as visible as it was during the Cold War.
The world today stands on the borderline between a 'cold peace' and a new Cold War.
Can the United States prevent the current "cold peace" from solidifying into a new Cold War?
Beyond the US-China confrontation, signs of crisis are appearing in many places.
The war in Ukraine, the Gaza Strip crisis, the escalating conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, and global challenges such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the decline of the liberal economic order cast a dark shadow over the future of the world order.
The United States is undoubtedly the key player in preventing a regression into a new Cold War, maintaining global peace and security, and reestablishing a world order in turmoil. However, Pax Americana is now a relic of the past.
It is no longer easy to characterize the United States as a liberator, hegemonic stabilizer, security patron, or benevolent benefactor after World War II.
However, the inertia still remains and the international community's expectations for it are also high.
Can the United States, once again a respected leader in the international community, rectify the chaotic and uncertain 21st-century world order? "Why American Diplomacy Fails" is a valuable record in which eleven world-renowned scholars examine the chaotic nature of American diplomacy and its origins, examine current issues, and seek alternatives in the face of crisis.
How to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue
The United States missed a crucial opportunity in the Korean Peninsula crisis.
In Chapter 1, Professor Robert Gallucci, a U.S. administration official who has witnessed the ups and downs of North Korea-U.S. relations over the past 30 years, provides a clear analysis of the North Korean nuclear issue.
At this stage, a nuclear freeze or dismantlement will not be easy, and coercion such as the ROK-US alliance and deterrence and sanctions will be necessary.
However, the North Korean nuclear issue cannot be resolved through coercion alone.
Dialogue and diplomatic negotiations are essential.
Professor Gallucci does not expect the advent of a second Trump administration to bring about a new, groundbreaking breakthrough in North Korea-US relations.
Rather, it is pessimistic that we could end up on the brink of nuclear war.
To prevent this catastrophe, I advise the incoming Trump administration to:
“Avoid hostile rhetoric toward North Korea.
We must engage and engage with North Korea, but we must not neglect deterrence.
Deterrence is the most important leverage in negotiations.
To achieve this, we need to strengthen the ROK-US alliance, and above all, we must prioritize the North Korean nuclear issue as a policy priority.”
In Chapter 2, Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker examine various ways to avoid a nuclear disaster on the Korean Peninsula.
First, researcher Karlin, who has analyzed North Korean issues for over 40 years at the CIA and State Department, predicts that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is gradually worsening and that a turnaround seems difficult.
Since the 1990s, North Korea has sought to find solutions for regime security and economic development through normalizing relations with the United States, including Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un.
However, after the failure of the Hanoi summit between North Korea and the United States in February 2019, hopes for improved relations with the United States were dashed and new alternatives began to be sought.
North Korea is seeking a way to survive by improving relations with both Russia and China.
The adoption of an offensive nuclear doctrine and the establishment of a hostile relationship with the South after December 2023 can be understood in the same context.
Dr. Hacker also criticizes that while North Korea's desire to possess nuclear weapons is problematic, the United States' policy failures have also contributed to worsening the North Korean nuclear issue.
There were six turning points in the nuclear negotiations with North Korea, and the United States made mistakes each time.
Among these, the United States' blunders during the second nuclear crisis in 2002 and President Trump's failure to negotiate at the Hanoi summit in February 2019 brought about a fatal setback in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and diplomacy.
Dr. Hacker advises, "Don't make the North Korean nuclear issue worse," and "Always be prepared for changing circumstances, whether they worsen or improve."
It also emphasizes the need to find a gradual and practical solution that halts North Korea's nuclear weapons activities, reduces its nuclear facilities, materials, and weapons through diplomatic negotiations, and promotes nuclear dismantlement over time.
Regarding North Korea negotiations, Carlin and Hacker urged the second Trump administration to “learn from the past.”
Don't make the situation worse.
“Always be prepared,” he suggests.
Voices that are no longer one
American foreign policy shaped by division and conflict in domestic politics
Part 2, under the theme of "Is American Diplomacy Failing?", covers various theoretical positions on American foreign policy, their origins, and how each position developed into policy.
First, in Chapter 3, Professor Charles Kupchan recalls that American foreign policy was not smooth.
From the early days of independence to the end of the 19th century, there was isolationism; until just before World War II, there was a clash between the lines of realism and idealism; and after 1945, when the United States established its hegemonic position, there were attempts to satisfy both idealism and realism, but they were not very successful.
In particular, he points out that U.S. foreign policy has lost consistency due to domestic political changes and partisan conflict.
He reminds us that American foreign policy can be successful when it builds a national consensus centered on pragmatic realism.
However, with the emergence of Trump 2.0, that possibility has become even more unlikely.
In Chapter 4, Professor Walter Mead assumes that to understand American conservative foreign policy, it is necessary to first understand the four ideological underpinnings of American foreign policy.
First, Hamiltonian realism, which advocates for a wealthy nation and a strong military; second, Wilsonian idealism, which argues that American ideals should be spread throughout the world; third, Jeffersonianism, which argues that war should be avoided because it entails great costs and sacrifices and that emphasis should be placed on promoting the welfare of citizens; and lastly, populist Jacksonianism, which opposes the United States' role as a crusader for democracy and human rights and is indifferent to the liberal trade order. Of these, Hamiltonianism and Jacksonianism are diagnosed as the core of conservatism.
Professor Mead categorizes Trump as a prime example of Jacksonianism, and predicts that it will be difficult to predict the foreign policy of the American conservative camp as the conservative centrists who could mediate the tensions and conflicts between Hamiltonianism and Jacksonianism disappear.
In Chapter 5, Professor John Ikenberry defines the mainstream of American liberal foreign policy as liberal internationalism and reexamines the merits and demerits of this position.
First, as representative examples of the success of liberal internationalism, they include economic growth and expansion of international trade through the establishment of a liberal economic order after World War II, the reintegration of Germany and Japan into the international community, the creation of a reciprocal international order through the establishment of multilateral institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and WTO, the incubation of social democratic ideals, and the successful transition to capitalism and democracy in some developing countries (South Korea is a representative example).
Meanwhile, Professor Eikenberry cites the invasion of Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis brought on by neoliberal policies, and misjudgments about China's transition to liberalism as examples of failure behind this success.
He makes a pessimistic prediction that with the emergence of Trump 2.0, "America First" and unilateralism will become the keynote of American foreign policy.
A turbulent world and America's response
US-China relations, Ukraine/Gaza crisis, new economic strategy, Indo-Pacific strategy, climate change crisis
Part 3 focuses on the major foreign policy issues currently facing the United States.
In Chapter 6, researcher Susan Thornton traces the current deterioration of US-China relations to the "national exceptionalism" prevalent in both the US and China.
The United States and China are two great powers with significant differences, and it is true that they cannot avoid competition in many areas.
China provided a pretext for this, but the United States also bears a significant responsibility for exaggerating and distorting the Chinese threat and for making China a domestic political issue from a Cold War anti-communist perspective, thus complicating US-China relations.
Thornton recommends moving away from "American supremacy" and working with China to transform the confrontational rivalry between the US and China into a constructive competition.
Thornton predicts that while Trump's summit diplomacy and transactional approach could have some positive effects, his unilateral and high-handed diplomatic approach will likely be detrimental to improving US-China relations.
In Chapter 7, which covers the Gaza Strip and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, former Ambassador Karl Eikenberry expresses concern about the increasing civilian casualties and deepening humanitarian tragedy as the two wars prolong, and he worries that despite international mediation efforts, the problem remains difficult to resolve.
Former Ambassador Eikenberry notes that American society is deeply divided over whether to support Ukraine and Israel, and that these two wars raise moral questions about "just war," including the principles of proportionality, moral relativism, mass killings of civilians, and the appropriateness of the weapons used.
In Chapter 8, Professor Vinod Agarwal approaches the recent changes in US foreign economic policy from a new theoretical perspective called the 'New Economic Strategy'.
The New Economic Strategy is a policy that mobilizes various economic policies for purposes such as competitiveness, national security, and protecting the interests of the middle class. It is a regression from the traditional free trade system that the United States has advocated, and it is an unequal policy that benefits the wealthy, such as high-tech companies, more than the middle class.
Unfortunately, Trump 2.0 will see policies like high tariffs, incentivizing American companies to invest abroad again, industrial policies, technological decoupling, energy independence, and anti-multilateral economic order policies that run counter to the interests of the American middle class and the world.
In Chapter 9, Professor Van Jackson delves into America's Indo-Pacific strategy.
The Obama administration's rebalancing policy toward Asia was rebranded as the Indo-Pacific Strategy by the Trump administration and carried over to the Biden administration.
Professor Jackson argues that the relatively long period of peace that has existed in East Asia since 1979 lies in the US Asia-Pacific strategy, which is centered on alliances, deterrence, economic interdependence, and US-China détente.
Professor Jackson's analysis is that peace in East Asia is in jeopardy as the country shifts to the Indo-Pacific strategy, a hostile policy aimed at containing and blockading China.
He also criticizes countries in the region that blindly accept America's Indo-Pacific strategy.
Professor Jackson suggests that the current crisis should be overcome through open regionalism and US-China détente, while respecting the existing norm of the balance of power.
In Chapter 10, Professor Miranda Schröers of the Technical University of Munich discusses the impact of domestic political conflict in the United States on climate change policy.
Trump, along with the Republican Party and conservatives, are passive about climate change and environmental regulations, and focus on economic growth utilizing cheap energy resources.
Meanwhile, the Democratic Party and the progressive camp have been actively responding to climate change.
The inauguration of the second Trump administration will be a major blow to climate change policy.
It is difficult to rule out the possibility of re-withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and cuts in personnel and budget in the environmental sector.
GOODS SPECIFICS
- Date of issue: March 14, 2025
- Page count, weight, size: 448 pages | 626g | 143*221*30mm
- ISBN13: 9791157064199
- ISBN10: 1157064191
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