Chapter 1: Introduction: The Political Sociology of Global Conflict
Chapter 2 Symbiosis
Chapter 3 Competition among Capitals
Chapter 4: Spheres of Influence
Chapter 5 Conclusion: The Return of Inter-Imperial Rivalry

supplement
1.
China's growth model in crisis
2.
Bold: It's too early to declare the Chinese century has begun.
3.
Clash of Empires: A Conversation with Hong Ho-feng

Translator's Note

American companies become proxy lobbyists for the Chinese government.

In examining US-China relations, this book analyzes how the two actors have evolved over the course of the major turning points of the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.
China adopted an open-door policy after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, and in the United States, the Democratic Party became the ruling party after 10 years with the election of Bill Clinton in 1993.
As a result, human rights idealists gained influence in American diplomacy, and they attached a condition to China's improvement of human rights records in order to renew its most-favored-nation trade agreement (there was also a hidden ulterior motive for the United States to pursue protectionism to avoid labor unions).
While this provision was a key Democratic presidential campaign promise, the situation was not so simple. If MFN status was not renewed, American companies operating in China faced significant retaliation. Meanwhile, the Chinese government, faced with the economic crisis of 1992-1994, adopted export-oriented growth policies, and both countries desperately needed free trade with each other.


At this time, the Chinese government overcame the crisis by using American companies as proxy lobbyists.
Detroit automakers, for example, had high hopes for the benefits they would receive from US-China trade liberalization.
The Chinese government coaxed these companies, allowing American companies to begin exerting influence on Congress on China's behalf.
However, there was one unexpected point.
As we might easily imagine, it was not American shoe and apparel companies manufacturing in China that became proxy lobbyists, but rather companies that had nothing to do with China trade and did not directly benefit from tariffs, such as telecommunications companies like AT&T, satellite manufacturers like Hughes Electronics, energy companies like ExxonMobil, and aircraft manufacturers like Boeing.


The author's analysis of the data shows that during this period, the Chinese government encouraged prominent U.S. companies to call or send individual letters to the White House and members of Congress, urging them to "not link China's human rights provisions to trade liberalization."
Moreover, many of these companies were campaign donors who influenced the president and members of Congress.
For example, AT&T was the largest corporate donor to the 1992 election, giving more than $2 million.
Hughes Electronics was also a staunch Clinton donor, with its CEO sending two blunt letters to the president.
This was a request to reconsider sanctions against China, including the MFN issue, as they had provided financial support during the election campaign.


On May 26, 1994, Clinton announced that he would renew MFN status regardless of China's human rights improvements, a reversal of trade policy toward China that was a victory for a business coalition over a coalition of labor unions, human rights advocates, foreign policy elites who had aimed to improve human rights, and American labor-intensive industries.


According to the author, the Chinese state actively recruited and coordinated American companies as proxy lobbyists.
It is difficult to find specific evidence from US sources that China was enlisting American companies to lobby the White House and Congress at this time.
But some reports show how Chinese officials used coercive tactics to direct American companies to lobby Washington on China's behalf.
For example, Chinese officials have warned that Chinese state-owned airlines will halt aircraft orders unless Boeing demonstrates a commitment to lobbying for policies favorable to China.
In other words, the continued interaction between the Chinese state and American political and economic elites has restrained America's impulse to view China as a geopolitical competitor.

What's Changed US-China Relations Since 2010

But the era of US-China trade liberalization is coming to an end.
Faced with a crisis of over-accumulation following the Great Recession of 2008, the Chinese Communist Party and state-owned enterprises aggressively pressured foreign companies, including American ones, in the U.S. market to restore profitability.
This competition between capitals on the world stage has intensified the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China by encouraging the Chinese state to expand its sphere of influence in Asia and beyond.
Faced with this confrontation, American companies, which had previously been proactive in ensuring friendly US-China relations, backed down and did nothing to intervene when conflicts arose between US and Chinese foreign policy elites.
Instead, American companies began asking the government for help in the face of fierce competition from Chinese companies.
This shift in attitudes among American companies toward China suggests that animosity between the United States and China has been rising on almost every issue since around 2010.

Washington's policy toward China changed markedly, especially during the second term of the Obama administration.
At this time, the pivot to Asia policy was prominent, and the US military deployed aircraft carriers and naval units to the South China Sea to counter China's territorial claims to neighboring countries.
At the same time, Obama accelerated the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement.
The Obama administration used polite and soft rhetoric, but its rhetoric clearly concealed a willingness to align America's allies.
The clash between the two empires also intensified competition between capitals from other European and Japanese companies.

As the world's first and second largest economies, their combined GDP accounts for nearly 40 percent of global GDP and over 50 percent of defense spending, making them likely to bring about the most significant shifts in global politics in the future, determining the future world order or chaos of the 21st century.
However, the author says it is wrong to predict that China will overtake the United States in the global economy.
Statistics show that while China is a successful economy, it lags far behind the United States in many areas.
Of course, under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party's confidence has greatly increased, as evidenced by the fact that it has let diplomats off the hook to directly insult American leaders.
But China's current problems are more structural, with the same problems of overcapacity and debt that arose at many state-owned enterprises after the 2008 financial crisis.
To this end, the Xi Jinping government has launched more aggressive competition with foreign companies, but this is actually a strong indication of China's insecurity.
The author examines the state's control and instability as he examines China's economic history from the 18th century onward.


Competition between capital between the United States and China is bound to increase, and as a result, geopolitical competition will inevitably intensify in the coming years.
However, the author believes there are grounds for not losing optimism.
By comparison, the current rivalry between the two empires bears a striking resemblance to the rivalry between Britain and Germany in the early 20th century. Fortunately, even though China is becoming increasingly militarized and aggressive, it is far less militaristic than Germany was at the time.
The author argues that while relations between the US and China will undoubtedly deteriorate, this is more likely to lead to competition within global governance institutions such as the WHO, WTO, and the UN than to direct military conflict.