Introduction

Chapter 1: America: What It Wants and Where It's Going

The MAGA Phenomenon | The Political Engineering of Anger | Keeping the Yards Narrow, Keeping the Fences High | Has America Relinquished Its Hegemony? | Will the Strategy That Won 40 Years Ago Work Again? | Trump's Justified 'Ripping Off' Strategy | Is America Really Weakening?

Chapter 2: How Should We View the US-China Competition?

America's "Ingratitude Frame" | Is US-China Competition an Inevitable "Fate"? | A Critical Miscalculation by the US | This Approach to US-China Relations Must Be Cautioned | The Reality of the "Peak China Theory"?

Chapter 3: Will Korea Survive or Be Eliminated?

China's Paradoxical Innovation, Created by Sanctions and Deprivation | The Answer Lies in Past History | Now is Both a Crisis and an Opportunity | Korea at a Life-or-Death Crossroads | Four Secrets to China's AI Innovation | Why Korea Can't Follow China's Path | Timely Government Intervention is Essential | Post-AI: Where Will the Next Battleground Be?

Chapter 4: Surviving on the Road Without a Path

Will we be swept up or abandoned? | Impossible de-China or necessary de-China? | Before Korea aims to leap into the 'AI G3' | Are we facing the crisis properly? | In the cold winter of the new Cold War, what is our path? | Victory Day and APEC: Clues and opportunities not to be missed | In conclusion

The True Face of America Revealed by 'MAGA'

What exactly does America want? Chapter 1 provides a three-dimensional analysis of the rise of Trump, the nature of the MAGA phenomenon, and America's current "true intentions."
The United States, which has claimed to be the defender of free trade and democracy since World War II, is now undermining the liberal order by implementing policies such as tariff bombs, establishing an America-first supply chain, and pressuring allies to shoulder more defense costs, all under the guise of "America First."
Is America's unpredictable behavior a temporary phenomenon stemming from the idiosyncrasies of one individual, Trump? The authors argue that the current state of the United States, epitomized by "MAGA (Make America Great Again)" slogan, is the result of a complex interplay of factors: the decline of American manufacturing due to globalization and the rise of China, mass unemployment and deepening inequality, the anxiety caused by the "majority-minority" phenomenon, and the political incompetence that has neglected this.
Since the 1980s, the wave of globalization has brought enormous wealth to the United States, but it has also spurred the rise of emerging economies like China.
The United States actively supported China's entry into the WTO in 2001 and attempted to manage "Rising China" within the liberal order, but as a result, American manufacturing was quickly replaced by Chinese manufacturing.
In addition, as the number of immigrants of color flowing into the United States increased, not only economic discontent but also cultural anxiety and conflict began to deepen.
This accumulated 'anger of half of America' is the very basis of the MAGA phenomenon.
In other words, MAGA is not a temporary political slogan born from a single cause, Trump, but rather an undeniable “new face of America” born from the contradictions and conflicts of the liberal order.

The authors also point out that the current US course of action is rooted in “the perception that ‘our allies have been eating us up over the past 30 years’” (p. 50).
According to the hegemonic stability theory, when the power of a hegemonic power is relatively weak, the existing hegemon focuses on short-term national interests and exhibits a predatory behavior that seeks to extract a kind of "tribute" from its allies. The current United States is similar to this.
So, is America's national power objectively declining? The authors argue that America's hard-line policy toward China and its protectionist trade policies are not due to a weakening of American power or a strengthening of Chinese power, but rather to a "rapid decline in the 'subjective will' of the United States" (p. 36), diagnosing that the United States is abandoning its role as a "benevolent hegemon providing global public goods."
The United States will now be blatantly focused solely on competition with China, and as such, South Korea must acknowledge that the existing perception of the United States as the "leader of the liberal order" is outdated and emphasize the need to closely monitor the intensifying US-China competition and the global trend toward de-unipolarity and multipolarity.

America's "Ingratitude Frame" and "Peak China Theory"

“US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has repeatedly denied the US-centric liberal international order that has persisted since the Cold War and acknowledged the emergence of a G2 system or multipolar system involving the US and China” (p. 58). Chapter 2 interprets the mutual perceptions and competitive structure of the US and China and examines what position South Korea should take within it.

At one time, the United States tried to assimilate China into the liberal order.
However, the tone changed drastically during the first Trump administration.
Professor Cha Tae-seo currently calls the U.S.’s frame toward China the “ingratitude frame” (p. 63).
“The US’s perception is that after supporting China’s accession to the WTO and giving it a chance, it is now trying to shake up the free world order” (p. 63).
Professor Kim Young-han also explained that this public perception in the U.S. stemmed from the sentiments of American manufacturing workers who felt their jobs were being stolen by China, and as a result, U.S. industrial policy increasingly focused on "securing competitiveness against China," which, coupled with the international leadership competition between the U.S. and China, further deepened the conflict between the two countries.

So, does this mean the US-China conflict is beyond resolution? Professor Kwon Seok-jun believes it will be difficult for the US to give up the benefits of free trade, such as technological compatibility and cost savings.
He also analyzed that “it is now becoming increasingly difficult for the United States to play the card of decoupling to contain China, and on the other hand, China has already achieved internalization and self-sufficiency in most industries, limiting the impact of sanctions” (p. 69).
The US-China conflict cannot simply devolve into a 'race to the bottom.'
Professor Lee Hee-ok goes a step further, stating, “Even if China wants a ‘battle of existence’ with the United States, the cost of a breakdown in negotiations is too high” (p. 76).

Realistically, open confrontation is inevitable, and as the US-China relationship unfolds amidst multilayered interests and close interdependence, South Korea needs to read its complex context more carefully going forward.
In this context, the analysis of the 'peak China theory' that was mainly developed in this chapter offers very important implications at a time when 'anti-Chinese sentiment' is spreading indiscriminately.
Has China already passed its growth peak? Or does it still have potential? We must not overlook the possibility that the various discourses surrounding China are the product of ideological interpretations.
For example, the 80th anniversary military parade held last year confirmed Xi Jinping's continued presence.
The recent rumor of Xi Jinping's downfall has clearly revealed itself to be fake news spread by external forces seeking to highlight China's instability.
The authors emphasize that to accurately understand US-China relations and devise strategies, it is necessary to objectively and dispassionately grasp the complex context surrounding these three countries.

In an era where technology is a weapon, Korea's present and future

Chapter 3 delves into the current state of the technology industries in the U.S., China, and Korea, and provides a detailed analysis of how Korea can secure its own competitiveness while maintaining its technological sovereignty amidst the U.S.-China competition.
In January 2025, the AI ​​model 'DeepSeek-R1' released by the Chinese startup DeepSeek sent a huge shockwave around the world.
Currently, in China, AI is deeply penetrating our daily lives and promoting new technological developments, to the point where “a robot dog called ‘B2’ is clearing trash from Mount Tai, and Starbucks coffee is delivered by drone to the Great Wall of China” (p. 138).
Professors Kwon Seok-jun and Lee Hee-ok analyze that the fundamental cause of technological innovation in China is 'deficiency caused by the United States.'
Ironically, the United States' strong sanctions have promoted China's independence.
Moreover, China's massive investment in the technology sector foreshadows the possibility of a second or third DeepSec shock in the future.

What about Korea? The authors offer a sobering assessment: "At least in manufacturing and high-tech industries, Korea faces an existential crisis" (p. 123).
In addition, Professor Lee Hee-ok warns that “China may be intentionally underestimating its own technological level” (p. 139), and that innovation in China is progressing at a much faster rate than Korea realizes.
So, does this mean Korea has no chance of becoming a technologically advanced nation? Professor Kwon Seok-jun argues, "It's not that Korea has no way out of this situation" (p. 126).
With advanced semiconductor production technologies increasingly reaching their limits in terms of manufacturing processes, engineering, physics, and cost-effectiveness, now is the perfect time to secure technologies with superior price-performance ratios.

Meanwhile, the authors' four-part outlook on the next-generation technology battlefield after semiconductors and AI is one of the most interesting parts of this chapter.
Professors Kim Young-han and Kwon Seok-jun's insights into the question, "What is humanity's greatest deficiency and need now?" (p. 151) and "The answer can be found by thinking about what 'humanity's greatest challenge' is" (p. 154) stimulate diverse imaginations about future society.
Professor Kim Young-han's prediction that "people's main demand in the future will likely come from 'fields that make people less unhappy or happier'" (p. 152) is particularly meaningful in a situation where concerns are rampant that artificial intelligence and technology will alienate humans.

How will Korea become a leader in new opportunities?

Chapter 4 analyzes Korea's current situation, focusing on keywords that capture current issues such as the "ROK-US alliance," "de-China," and "sovereign AI," and suggests the direction Korea should take.
Regarding the Taiwan issue, South Korea faces two crises simultaneously: the "dilemma of involvement," which could lead to its being drawn into an unwanted conflict within the ROK-US alliance, and the "dilemma of abandonment," which could lead to its being abandoned if necessary.
This is a harsh diplomatic reality that has been newly highlighted as the US-China competition intensifies.
Meanwhile, the previous administration's excessive ideological approach diminished the realism of its perception of China and instead led to a reexamination of the effectiveness of de-China.
With South Korea-China trade surging into a deficit, is "de-China" truly necessary? If so, how far is it realistically feasible? Professor Kim Young-han asserts that the "complete de-China" demanded by the United States is unrealistic.
However, he also emphasizes the importance of a trade diversification strategy to reduce risks, stating that “escaping excessive dependence on the Chinese market and the Chinese production bases of our large corporations is an essential task for minimizing risks to the Korean industrial structure” (p. 169).
Professor Kwon Seok-jun also agrees with this perspective and suggests that Hyundai Motor Company's electric vehicle business case should be benchmarked in other industries.

So, what policy direction should Korea establish in the technology industry going forward? There's no disagreement that AI is now a core area that determines the nation's fate, and that both the government and the private sector must fully mobilize their capabilities.
The current government is pursuing various policies with the goal of achieving the "AI G3" leap forward, and various discussions, including sovereign AI, are actively underway under this framework.
Professor Kwon Seok-jun argues that “China, not the United States, is the country most likely to develop sovereign AI, sovereign AX, and sovereign vertical AI” (p. 183), and closely compares and analyzes the current state of the technology industry environments in the United States and China.
Furthermore, based on this, it objectively identifies what Korea lacks to become a true AI powerhouse and presents in detail the key conditions that must be secured in the future. This is sufficient to serve as a standard for objectively reviewing the current administration's AI policies.


Finally, by covering the North Korea-China-Russia connection between the 80th anniversary of China's Victory Day parade held in September and the APEC summit scheduled for October 31st in Gyeongju, we examine the implications of the recent international situation for Korea and provide a guide for a more three-dimensional understanding of US-China relations and the technology industry.
"The Revolution in US-China Relations" reminds us that the challenges facing South Korea amidst the intensifying US-China competition are not simply diplomatic choices, but strategic issues that will determine the nation's sustainability.
And he emphasizes that the answer lies not in which side one takes, but in how Korea establishes its own technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy.