Preface to the Korean edition
introduction
Introduction: Why the 21st Century is the American Century

Part 1: Weapons and Strategy

01 David's Sling: The Rise and Fall of Weapons
The Rise and Fall of Great European Weapons Systems
New power, new way of war
Conclusion: War and the Crisis of Vision

02 Soldiers and Scientists: The Origins of America's Military Failures
The rise of technicians
The Atomic Bomb: The Physicist as Warrior
A soldier falls in love with a scientist
Operational Research and Imperial Scientists
The Fall of Scientist Strategists
conclusion

03 False Dawn: The Nuclear Failure
The incredible strangeness of nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons and strategic bombing
How Nuclear Weapons Became Inappropriate
Use and misuse of nuclear weapons

04 Fundamental Principles of U.S. Grand Strategy: U.S. Strategy and the Sea
The Formation of U.S. Maritime Strategy
Old strategy, new geopolitics
From strategy to operations

Part 2: The Obsolescence of European Weapons

Part 1: Ground War

05 From Gunpowder to Oil: The Glory of the Tank
The problem with guns
Gunpowder Meets Oil: The Origins of Armored Warfare
The Golden Age of Tanks 175
Snake Meets Mongoose: Tanks and Anti-Tank Missiles
Weird Science: Keeping the Tank Running

06 Detection of obsolescence
Nowhere to Hide: Sensors and Tanks
Platforms and Computers: Data Collection and Utilization
If price is no object: The Tank's fight for survival
Obsolescence: The End of Armored Warfare

Part 2: Naval Battle

The rise and fall of 07 inclusion
Origin of inclusion
Battleship as a reductio ad absurdum
After the Fall: Surface Warfare After the Battleship

08 Aircraft carrier as a midwife
Between Ages: The Rise and Fall of the Aircraft Carrier
Aegis: Precision-Guided Missiles Against Carrier Strike Groups
Aegis and Naval Warfare After the Aircraft Carrier Era

Part 3 Air Battle

09 First thoughts on air power
Aircraft as a fighter
The First Attempt: The Battle of Britain and the British Response
The Holy Grail: America's Quest for Precision
From Incendiary Bombs to Atomic Bombs: Japan's Conclusion

10 Failures Revisited: The Vietnam War and the Failure of Air Power
Easy Victory: The Promise of Airpower in the Vietnam War
Blind Man's Bluff: War Without Doctrine
Sudden Dawn: The Emergence of Precision-Guided Bombs
What hit me? - First thoughts on the failure of air power
There must be a better way: thinking about reform.

11 A New Paradigm of War: Operation Desert Storm and the Future of Air Warfare
Clausewitz of Air Warfare: Colonel Warden's Thoughts on Precision
The Air Force's Action and Iraq's Defeat
Keeping Aircraft Alive: Helicopters and Stealth Planes
Precision-guided weapons and victory
Tomahawk: Cruising with Intelligence
Conclusion: The Gulf War as a Transition to the Future

12 Endgame: The Obsolescence of Manned Aircraft
Agility and Invisibility: The Struggle for Survival 379
From Invisibility to Loss of Consciousness: Stealth Warfare and G-LOC

Part 3: Space and Precision

13 A New Foundation for American Strategy: Space and Modern American Strategy
U-2 and Sputnik: The Origins of Space-Based Reconnaissance
The Digital Revolution in Space and War
Lacrosse Game: Radar Footage
Electronic Information and Signal Intelligence: Eavesdropping
Fortune-telling: The Data Crisis

14 Space and the Future of American Strategy
Why Space? Intercontinental Hypersonics
Invisible Order: The Topography of the Universe
From 'Star Wars' to 'Our War': First Thoughts on Space War
Track and Destroy: Space as a War Zone
War of the Worlds
Conclusion: From Surveillance to Launch

15 Return of the Bloody Infantry
Infantry and the Sensor/Data Revolution
21st century killing techniques
Beyond total war

Conclusion: The Eternal Dilemma: Control and Use of the Seas in the American Era
Precision-Guided Weapons and the Sea: A Grand Strategy Crisis
The Power of the Oceans and the End of the Aircraft Carrier Era
Projection of power at a turning point
Reviews

NOTES

A classic of military science written by the greatest geopolitician of his time
The era of great war is coming again.

Thirty years ago, the world could not have imagined a war between great powers.
But now that world is coming.
This is not a story from somewhere in the distant Middle East, or somewhere along the Russian border in Europe.
The cruel reality of war is looming right before our eyes.
China is unwilling to tolerate a situation where the hegemonic United States can intercept its warships and merchant vessels transiting the Western Pacific at any time, and it feels it has the capacity to defy US control.
The United States fears that China will seize control of Taiwan and use Taiwan as a base to control the South China Sea and the entire Western Pacific.
When the vital interests of two great powers collide, the likelihood of war breaking out increases in one way or another.
Imagine what would happen if the United States and China clashed over dominance in the Western Pacific.
What will happen if Korea is engulfed in that war, or worse, if it becomes a stage for it? What must we do now to prevent such a situation? "The Future of War," written by George Friedman, the foremost geopolitician of our time and often called the Nostradamus of the 21st century, has been republished to provide crucial insights and predictions for this debate.


It's hard to believe that George Friedman's The Future of War was written 30 years ago, as many of the analyses and predictions it makes are remarkably consistent with today's military realities.
His analysis and insights into weapons systems and past wars are profound.
This book is about the weapons systems and doctrines that have shaped warfare for thousands of years, and about world hegemony based on geopolitics and weapons systems.
This book is about what happens on the battlefield when weapon systems collide with weapon systems and doctrines collide with doctrines.
This book is dominated by the insight that the problems with weapons systems and doctrines that emerged in the David-Goliath confrontation over 3,000 years ago continue to this day, as hypersonic missiles soar across battlefields.
In every war, victory or defeat depends largely on weapon systems and doctrine.
So the US won the Pacific War against Japan, lost the Vietnam War, had a stunning success in Operation Desert Storm, and struggled in Iraq and Afghanistan.
And this is what is happening on the battlefields of Ukraine today, and this is what will happen in the Taiwan Strait in the future.


George Friedman says the decisive weapons systems that will dominate the battlefield of the future lie not on land, sea, or air, but in space.
In the age of precision-guided weapons, space is emerging as a new battlefield.
The nation that dominates precision-guided weapons technology and space will dominate the battlefields of the future.
The essence of ballistic weapons is inaccuracy, and so they inevitably lead to mass mobilization, mass production, and total war. The essence of precision-guided weapons is precision, and so the scope of war is limited to the military realm.
Precision-guided weapons are the most American of weapons.
The United States, which always had to project power over long distances, sought a qualitative advantage to deal with enemies with a numerical advantage, and one of the ways to do so was to increase the accuracy of strikes.
The evolution of precision-guided weapons is now moving towards long-range hypersonic weapons.
For these weapons systems to locate, track, and strike targets at intercontinental ranges, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems must be located in space.
We also need to be in space to stop such weapons.
Ultimately, the battlefield of the future will be space, and wars will be fought between space platforms.
The nation that dominates space will become the hegemon of the 21st century.
Whether the United States can deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and what the outcome of a war in Taiwan will be may depend on the confrontation between the United States and China in space weapons systems and doctrines.


This is the beginning of the American era, not the end.
The nation that rules the universe rules the seas.

In his book, Sea Power: The Influence of History 1660-1783, American Admiral Alfred Mahan said that a nation's prosperity and hegemony come from its ability to dominate the sea, not the land.
Following his words, the great powers began to build up their naval power, and the result was a victory for the United States, which had the strongest naval power.
Since World War II, the United States has been unchallenged on all the world's oceans, and sea power has been the true foundation of American hegemony. Sea power encompasses not only naval power but also geographic conditions and industrial capabilities.
The geographic advantage of being located between two oceans not only protects the United States from the great powers of Eurasia, but also allows the United States to project its power quickly.
The geopolitical advantage of being the sole great power in North America allows the United States to focus on naval power while the great powers of Eurasia must expend resources and energy on land forces to counter each other.
America's hegemony in the 21st century will also depend on its control of the seas.
But in the 21st century, dominance over the seas will be decided not in the sea or the air, but in space, says George Friedman.


The most powerful challenge to America's maritime dominance today comes from China in the Western Pacific.
The confrontation between the United States and China over control of the Western Pacific will determine hegemony in the 21st century.
China is testing its power in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and a clash between the United States and China is expected in the near future.
What would happen if a conflict were to occur? Which weapons systems would dominate the battlefield, and which doctrine would determine the outcome? Will the United States maintain its dominance in the Western Pacific? Since World War II, aircraft carriers have been the cornerstone and symbol of American naval power.
Like David's sling, aircraft carriers gained an advantage over battleships with their superior firepower through their range advantage.
And the most powerful aircraft carrier became the supreme ruler.
No country could compete with the United States in terms of aircraft carriers.
But today, the accuracy and long range of precision-guided weapons are turning aircraft carriers into Goliaths.
Now, China's missile capabilities are beginning to significantly pressure US forces in the Western Pacific.
It is becoming increasingly difficult to guarantee that any Aegis system will be able to withstand a saturation attack from China's missiles.
Is the answer more missiles, longer-range missiles, or more intelligent precision-guided weapons? How will the United States maintain control of the Western Pacific against China's massive missile and drone forces? Perhaps American control of the seas will depend on more efficient and lethal weapons systems that can challenge China's missile forces.


George Friedman says the key lies in space.
Rather than destroying the opponent's hypersonic weapon itself, it blinds the opponent and renders it useless.
During the Cold War, the United States had already pursued the Star Wars program against the Soviet Union, and its strategic legacy continues.
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 is considered the first space war.
The United States has a significant advantage over China and Russia in satellite navigation, space reconnaissance, and communications satellite capabilities.
Including commercial satellites like Starlink, the US has more than 70% of all satellites in space.
Furthermore, the United States established the Space Force in 2019 and has been strengthening its space warfare capabilities.
George Friedman says that in the 21st century, the United States will be able to monitor and control the world's oceans through space platforms.


The Dialectics of Innovation and Obsolescence in Weapon Systems
The battle between David and Goliath continues.

The history of war is a history of innovation and obsolescence of weapon systems.
New weapons systems rarely attract attention the moment they are introduced.
It was the same with guns, tanks, airplanes, and aircraft carriers.
But even if it doesn't happen right away, it will eventually change the outcome of the war.
All weapon systems, no matter how innovative they may have been at one time, undergo a process of obsolescence over time.
It still functions, but there comes a point where the cost of keeping it functioning outweighs its benefits.
As weapon systems enter the process of obsolescence, inefficiencies in resource allocation arise, which in turn weakens overall military power.
Eventually, new and innovative weapon systems emerge, rendering existing weapons obsolete or replacing them.

The ancient Palestinians, masters of metallurgy, surrounded Goliath and his army with iron equipment, making them invincible.
Since strengthening defensive capabilities was the secret to victory, iron armor and shields became increasingly thicker and heavier.
On the other hand, the killing power has barely changed or has rather weakened.
In the end, the powerful but clumsy Goliath was defeated by the Hebrew David, who used a sling, a long-range weapon system with a range advantage.
All subsequent weapon systems have gone through this process of obsolescence.
There was a time when cavalrymen in iron armor dominated the battlefield, and then firearms replaced them.
The rifle became the machine gun, and the tank appeared to neutralize the machine gun.
The battlefield became a tank-versus-tank showdown.
Tanks became increasingly equipped with more protection, heavier, and more expensive.
Air power emerged and bombs could be delivered over longer distances.
The battlefield became a battle between aircraft and aircraft, and aircraft became more sophisticated and expensive than ever before to survive.
Meanwhile, at sea, battleships dominated the battlefield.
Battleships became larger and heavier as larger ships were more advantageous.
Eventually, World War II led to aircraft carriers becoming the mainstay of naval power.
The range of battleship guns could not match that of aircraft.
And once again, aircraft carriers began spending enormous amounts of money to protect themselves from enemy submarines and aircraft.
With the advent of precision-guided weapons, aircraft carrier defense systems have become increasingly sophisticated and complex, but they are also exposed to more lethal threats.


Whether it's a tank on the ground, a bomber in the air, or an aircraft carrier at sea, the essence is the same.
A weapon platform that allows you to attack enemies from outside their range.
The problem is that precision-guided weapons have emerged to increase the accuracy of such attacks, putting the platform itself at risk.
Expensive platforms are reaching the end of their obsolescence as they come within range of enemy precision-guided weapons. Weapon systems do not disappear when they become obsolete, nor are they entirely replaced by newer systems.
However, it is not a factor that determines the outcome of the war.
The competitor to precision-guided weapons is counter-precision-guided weapons.
To survive enemy air defenses, precision-guided weapons are becoming increasingly longer-range and faster.
Today, missiles capable of traveling intercontinental distances at hypersonic speeds exceeding Mach 5 are being deployed on the battlefield.
These long-range hypersonic projectiles require target detection and guidance, navigation, and communications support from space systems to be effective.
However, long-range hypersonic precision-guided missiles are subject to surveillance by hostile space systems and could eventually be intercepted.
At that time, a battle between space platforms will unfold.


The Pearl Harbor Attack, the Vietnam War, and the Taiwan War
How Doctrine Determines the Outcome of War

The ancient Palestinians had no need to change their doctrine based on heavily armed infantry because they could make armor better and cheaper than anyone else.
The Hebrews, who had poor economic power, could not defeat the Palestinians by fighting them in the same way.
Eventually, they adopted the mobility of light infantry, almost unarmed like David, and the low-cost, long-range weapon system of the slingshot.
The superiority of this mobile warfare doctrine based on light infantry was later demonstrated again in the confrontation between King Saul and David's armies.


Despite possessing overwhelmingly superior firepower, the United States lost the war against North Vietnam.
George Friedman's analysis of the Vietnam War is one of the most important parts of this book.
Because the Vietnam War could be today's Ukraine War or tomorrow's Taiwan Strait War.
The North Vietnamese army, like David, knew that they could not defeat the Americans using traditional methods.
They dragged the US military into an endless war of attrition based on the doctrines of guerrilla warfare, distributed maneuver warfare, and political and psychological warfare.
On the other hand, the US military started the Vietnam War with a wrong doctrine from the beginning.
The threat of destroying North Vietnamese society and economy through strategic bombing alone was not enough to stop intervention in South Vietnam.
Bombing rural areas of North Vietnam was pointless, and full-scale strategic bombing could not be undertaken without risking war with the Soviet Union or China.
The US military could neither isolate South Vietnam from North Vietnam nor destroy North Vietnam's substantial supply bases across the border.
The only way out of the war of attrition was to completely block the Ho Chi Minh Trail and force the North Vietnamese into an all-out war, but the United States deemed such a risk not worth taking and ultimately chose to lose.


The U.S. Navy, which lost most of its main battleships in the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, achieved victory six months later by destroying the Japanese main fleet at Midway.
This battle changed the course of the Pacific War.
The Japanese Navy achieved victory by launching a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor as a deliberate "decisive battle" in accordance with Mahan's teachings, but suffered a decisive defeat at the Battle of Midway.
After the defeat at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Navy quickly shifted from a battleship-centered doctrine to an aircraft carrier-centered doctrine, granting autonomy to individual fleets, enabling rapid responses to unpredictable naval battle situations.
As a result, the US Navy was able to sink all of Japan's aircraft carrier forces, which had maintained a centralized control system, in the Battle of Midway.


In today's Ukraine-Russia war, contrary to everyone's expectations, the Russian army, with its superior military power, is showing itself to be struggling considerably.
Early in the war, Russia's massive tank force was quickly defeated by Ukrainian infantry armed with hand-held guided weapons such as Javelin and drones.
Ukrainian infantrymen armed with cheap drones resemble David in some ways.
If China were to invade Taiwan, what weapons systems and doctrine would the Taiwanese military, overwhelmingly inferior in terms of manpower and firepower, employ to counter the Chinese People's Liberation Army? How would the Taiwanese military be able to thwart a Chinese landing and maintain resistance until the US military intervenes in earnest? Ultimately, the outcome of the war will be determined not by mere troop numbers and firepower, but by weapon systems and doctrines that exploit the enemy's weaknesses and maximize one's own advantages.


Why Nuclear Weapons Haven't Become War-Ending Weapons
Nuclear weapons as a false dawn

When nuclear weapons first appeared, there were predictions that their incredible power would eliminate war from human history.
But the prediction that nuclear weapons would make war obsolete was completely wrong.
The war continues and is not being deterred by nuclear weapons.
Vietnam has not hesitated to engage in armed conflict with nuclear powers such as the United States and China, the United States has waged military operations against Iraq twice, and India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, have engaged in war since 1999 and again recently.
Today, Ukraine is waging war against the nuclear power Russia.

George Friedman says the reason nuclear weapons haven't been used in 80 years is because they're simply useless.
All weapons must be linked to strategy, and all strategies must be linked to politics, but there was no connection whatsoever between nuclear weapons and politics.
Nuclear-weapon states have not used nuclear weapons against other nuclear-weapon states, let alone non-nuclear-weapon states.
Nuclear powers have been willing to endure inconclusive or even defeat in wars without resorting to nuclear weapons.
The United States accepted an inconclusive outcome in the Korean War and a defeat in the Vietnam War.
France and the Soviet Union also suffered similar defeats in Indochina and Afghanistan.


George Friedman predicted that the dominant role played by nuclear weapons in strategic planning and the structure of the international system would decline dramatically.
I believe that possession of nuclear weapons will not determine the outcome of a war, and that becoming a nuclear power will not change one's international status or influence.
Nuclear weapons will serve as a deterrent against other nations' nuclear weapons and as a virtual guarantee of the nation's own existence, but nuclear power will be of only secondary political and military significance.
He argued that from the US perspective, what was far more important than nuclear power was the evolution of "real military power," that is, conventional military power.
In particular, naval warfare is more important than any other form of conventional warfare, because America's national security depends on control of the seas.
If we follow his views on nuclear weapons, China will not be deterred from invading Taiwan simply because of the possibility of nuclear war.


The geography of space as the ultimate battlefield
Space warfare will be more similar to naval warfare than to aerial warfare.

Hypersonic missiles are emerging as game changers on the battlefield.
We need to be in space both to launch hypersonic missiles and to stop them.
The global operational range of hypersonic missiles makes global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance the only reasonable option.
And because ground-based interceptors have limited range and must contend with gravity, space-based interceptors in low-orbit or geostationary orbit will be the most effective means of interception.
George Friedman says the most effective way to neutralize a hypersonic missile is to blind it before it is launched.
It is to destroy or disrupt the global sensor system that identifies and guides targets to them.
In the age of hypersonic guided weapons, the best defense will be an attack on enemy space sensors.
The inevitable shift from manned bombers to hypersonic missiles will have the unintended consequence of space warfare.


What does space mean in military terms? George Friedman's insights into space clearly demonstrate his status as a world-renowned military expert.
He says that there is a very real order in the universe that is not perceptible to the naked eye.
Space is a place of strategic chokepoints, gateways, and wastelands, and the universe surrounding Earth has a topography as diverse and powerful as Earth itself.
This geography gives structure to war in space, in the same way that geography gives structure to war on earth.
In particular, note that the Earth is part of a two-planet system that revolves around the Sun.
The moon rotates exactly once for every orbit it makes around the Earth, so the same side always faces the Earth.
The Earth, on the other hand, rotates once every 24 hours.
This means that one side of the Moon is always visible from Earth, half of the Earth faces the Moon at any given time, and all of the Earth faces the Moon every day.
This places Earth at a clear military disadvantage.
Moreover, due to the difference in gravity, launching a weapon from the Moon to Earth would require significantly less energy than launching a weapon from Earth to the Moon.


George Friedman believes that, contrary to popular belief, space warfare will be much more similar to naval warfare than to air or land warfare.
In air combat, aircraft must return to base regularly and spend most of their time on the ground rather than in the air, whereas spaceships are similar to naval vessels in that naval ships operate away from shore installations for significant periods of time.
Aircraft are free from the constraints of terrain, other than those imposed by gravity and aerodynamic principles, but the sea and space, however vast and featureless they may seem, have characteristics imposed by physical and economic geography, and these characteristics shape the patterns of naval operations, just as they shape the patterns of space operations.


The Return of Infantry as a Weapon Platform
What the Combination of Precision-Guided Weapons and Infantry Means

In the Ukraine war, people were amazed by the power of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but what really deserves more attention is the potential of infantry as a weapon platform, armed with portable, precision-guided weapons like drones.
Infantry, the individual warrior, is the most basic and oldest weapon platform on the battlefield.
The David itself was a weapons platform providing mobility, target acquisition, and fire control.
His weapon was a slingshot and his bullets were pebbles.
As humans encountered more advanced weaponry, their power was multiplied, but with the advent of more powerful and mobile platforms such as tanks, aircraft, and battleships, their function was reduced to that of a standalone weapon platform.
George Friedman predicts that in future wars of the 21st century, infantry will once again emerge as the main force on the battlefield.
Infantry equipped with portable precision-guided weapons and communication systems will be the most stealthy, yet powerful force with great mobility and firepower.

What happens when the most concealed unit on the battlefield gains the lethality of cutting-edge weaponry? What happens when devastating firepower is concentrated in the hands of individual soldiers, who are harder to kill than tanks? What happens when revolutions in weaponry, sensors, and battle management are applied to infantry? What happens when infantry becomes a human weapon system, engaging the enemy at close range, commanding terrain, and operating in close coordination with weapon systems scattered around the globe?
The future of infantry weapons is already visible in portable anti-tank weapons such as the Javelin and new guided mortars currently in use.
The Javelin can be fired by a single infantryman and can also be 'fire and forget' as it guides itself to the point focused by the infantryman.


Warheads and rockets will continue to become smaller and more portable.
Infantry will see their surroundings through their own sensors and other sensors, and the data will be collected, analyzed, and fused by their own computers and displayed on their own screens.
The helmet's laser scanner will identify the target, and a computer will use the sighting system to locate the target and direct the missile launch.
Ultimately, future wars will be led by super soldiers, or “super infantry,” equipped with multispectral sensors, super-fast computers, intelligent weapons, and exoskeletons that enhance their physical capabilities many times over.


The advent of long-range hypersonic weapons and the age of space warfare.
Is South Korea prepared to face an enemy with space power?

The core of China's anti-access/area denial strategy is to use long-range missile power to block U.S. carrier strike groups from entering Chinese waters, generally within the First Island Chain, or to render them inoperable if they do enter.
China's missile capabilities are estimated to have ranges ranging from 1,500 km to 4,000 km and speeds ranging from Mach 5 to Mach 10.
The area within 2,500 km of the Chinese coast, that is, up to the vicinity of the Second Island Chain, is considered a real danger zone, and Guam, which is about 3,000 km away, will also be included in the strike target.
If China were to invade Taiwan, would US forces be able to enter the operational area within a limited timeframe and prevent a Chinese landing on Taiwan? And how would they establish and maintain a supply network if the war were to drag on?

As one might expect, the US carrier battle group appears like a heavily armed, blunted Goliath, while China's hypersonic missiles appear like David's slingshot.
The fight between David and Goliath ended in David's victory.
In the Vietnam War, the Goliath US army was defeated by the asymmetric tactics of the North Vietnamese army, which was David.
Will the US military follow Goliath's fate in the coming war in Taiwan?
However, the reason Goliath was defeated by David was not only because of the long-range weapon system called the sling.
Goliath had another option.
Goliath should have recognized the potential dangers of his enemy's slingshots and maneuvers.
We should have equipped ourselves with adequate shield units and forced the enemy into close combat.
At least you should have chosen a place with a terrain feature rather than an open area.
No war is won or lost solely on the basis of a specific weapon system.
The key is to prepare for all potential threats and find a combination of weapons systems and doctrines that exploit your opponent's weaknesses and leverage your own to your advantage.
George Friedman's book suggests that the key lies not on land or in the sea, but in space.
It says that we must destroy the enemy's space-based systems to blind them.
Asymmetric weapons and asymmetric strategies are countered with other asymmetric weapons and asymmetric strategies.


Is South Korea prepared to face potential space-powered adversaries? In his preface to the Korean edition, George Friedman argues that hypersonic intercontinental missiles capable of speeds exceeding Mach 10 will soon appear, and at that time, the stationing of US troops on the Korean Peninsula will no longer be a critical issue, and the South Korean military will no longer be what it is today.
The war will begin with an attack on space platforms, and if they are not destroyed first, they will be virtually defenseless against enemy attacks.
He also pointed out that in the age of hypersonic precision-guided weapons, nuclear weapons would become highly vulnerable to surprise attacks.
The United States holds the world's leading position in space-based power.
It has an overwhelming advantage over its competitors in terms of scale and technological level.
In the age of space warfare, South Korea's alliance with the United States will become increasingly important.
There is perhaps no saying more urgent for us today than the ancient Roman adage, "If you want peace, prepare for war."
And you'll find important insights into what to prepare for and how to prepare in George Friedman's The Future of War.