Former Minister of Environment Yoon Yeo-joon worked in government administration for over 20 years, including in the Blue House, the executive branch, the National Assembly, and political parties.
Including the 10 years he worked as a political reporter before entering public office, he has been directly or indirectly involved in running the country for over 30 years.
His father, Mr. Yoon Seok-oh, also served as secretary to Dr. Syngman Rhee from 1945, immediately after liberation, and after the establishment of the government in 1948, he continued to work as Vice Minister of General Affairs for two more years, showing that both father and son worked in the Presidential Office.

In 2011, during the Lee Myung-bak administration, the author published “Qualifications of the President” in which he sharply commented on past presidents.
The book borrows the conceptual framework of 'statecraft' ('governance capacity' or 'governance strategy'), and knowledge of Eastern and Western imperial studies and governance studies enriches the discussion.
It goes without saying that the author's political experience and extensive reading are the foundation of this book. A revised and expanded edition was published in 2025, after three presidential elections.
Here, the author diagnoses the merits and demerits of 14 years of national administration.
It is encouraging that Korea has escaped the 'middle-income trap' and entered the ranks of developed countries.
However, the crisis in the political and social aspects is more urgent than in the past.
The biggest problem is that politics, which exists to solve social and economic problems, has lost its original function and is instead functioning as an obstacle to the national economy.

The book is divided into three parts.
Part 1 is the concept of 'statecraft' traced through the historical discourses of the East and the West, Part 2 is an evaluation of the statecraft of past presidents, and Part 3 is the main content of the author's thoughts on the qualifications of the president.
The revised and expanded edition revised and supplemented President Lee Myung-bak's statecraft evaluation from 2011.
New evaluations of Presidents Park Geun-hye, Moon Jae-in, and Yoon Seok-yeol have been added here.
In Part 3, the author's lectures and subsequent research and commentary since the publication of the 2011 work have been added.
If the 2011 work was written independently, the revised and expanded edition is marked as co-authored.
The co-author is writer Han Yun-hyeong.
The content added to the revised and expanded edition was interviewed and drafted by Han Yun-hyeong, and reviewed and revised by Yoon Yeo-jun.

We live in an era where 'political civil war' is intensifying and there are even concerns about 'physical civil war'.
Everyone says that the current constitution has reached its limits, and some even argue that the presidential system should be abolished.
Nevertheless, South Korea must still hold a new presidential election without amending the constitution.
At this point, it is more urgent to discuss the ‘qualifications of the president.’
This book will serve as essential knowledge not only for those who aspire to rule the Republic of Korea, those who wish to assist such leaders, but also for citizens who wish to imagine what kind of person a worthy ruler would be and what kind of country such a ruler would rule.

We have all recently witnessed the 'unfitness of the president' and have been heartbroken to see how ridiculous a person who is put in a position of responsibility can become.
It is comforting to see the level of resistance from the younger generation, who seem to embody democracy much more than the older generation.
However, this moment, when we feel the 'unqualification of the president' so keenly, may be the time to question the 'qualification of the president' again.
--- From "On the Revised and Expanded Edition"

The majority of the people were suffering from a serious mental and emotional illness of defeatism and self-destruction.
While the theories of Japanese imperialism's invasion, such as 'Asiatic despotism', 'peninsular character theory', and 'stasis theory', were prevalent, we ourselves were caught up in a 'culture of resentment', and an extreme sense of defeatism was rampant in our society, with the idea that 'we can't do it (meaning that Koreans can't do it either).'

--- From “Introduction, Part 1, Chapter 1”

Therefore, to avoid confusion in terminology, here we will refer to the state in the general sense as a body politic (or polity), which is an academic term, unlike the modern nation-state.

--- From "Part 1, Chapter 2"

Emperor Taizong of Tang believed that floods and disasters were simply the laws of nature, and that governing a country was like planting a tree. If you cherish and nurture it, it will prosper day by day, but if you don't, it will wither and die over time.

--- From "Part 1, Chapter 3"

The first person to seriously and directly consider the principles and techniques of governance of a modern state was Niccolo Machiavelli.
Above all, he deeply explored how to build, maintain, and prosper the 'stato', the early modern state that was emerging at the time.
--- From "Part 1, Chapter 4"

Thus, the experience of colonial rule led to the formation of opposing ideas among Koreans: a highly powerful state and a people who submit to or resist it.
This oppressive ruling system and behavior not only caused Koreans to resist foreign rule, but also to have an extremely negative perception of the modern state itself.

--- From "Part 2, Chapter 1"

If at that time, even the 200 or so vicious and high-ranking pro-Japanese collaborators had been properly punished, it would have been difficult for the perception to arise that Korean society had failed to properly “liquidate pro-Japanese collaborators” and thus justice had not been served.

--- From "Part 2, Chapter 3"

May 16 needs to be viewed in the context of April 19.
To conclude, they were two different political responses that arose under identical socio-economic conditions and within the same fundamentally political structure, and they came from two different forces: students and soldiers.

--- From "Part 2, Chapter 4"

However, the Yushin regime was difficult to run even for the most outstanding individuals, as it aimed for a high degree of centralization and personalization of power.
Moreover, after the death of First Lady Yuk Young-soo, President Park began to show a significant decline in her sense of governance.

--- From "Part 2, Chapter 5"

He showed an obsession with victory in running the country based on the hegemonic value that 'the principle of politics is that those with power do what they want.'
If President Park Chung-hee was a meticulous staff-type, President Chun Doo-hwan was a combat commander who appeared to be arrogant, and was closer to a proactive, reckless problem-solver who created favorable situational conditions.
--- From "Part 2, Chapter 6"

At the time, the Blue House staff even self-deprecatingly referred to themselves as a "mayfly government."
It appears that President Roh's popularity-oriented leadership style, which is sensitive to public opinion and values ​​legitimacy, appearance, and image over substance, has had a significant influence on this.

--- From "Part 2, Chapter 7"

Reform is a double-edged sword.
The sharper the blade, the more likely it is to end up hurting oneself when the one holding the hilt is weak in morality and justification.
The Kim Young-sam administration, which prioritized reform, was no exception.

--- From "Part 2, Chapter 8"

He made immortal contributions to the struggle for democracy and was eventually able to rise to the top leadership of the country.
He demonstrated his outstanding qualities as a politician and succeeded in ‘starting a business’.
However, he revealed significant problems in running the country as president, that is, in 'Su-seong'.

--- From "Part 2, Chapter 9"

By the end of his term, the consensus among most people in society, regardless of whether they were conservative or progressive, was that President Roh Moo-hyun's administration had been a failure.
However, after leaving office, he tragically ended his life while under investigation by prosecutors on charges of receiving illegal funds, which led to the formation of an atmosphere of remembrance.
--- From "Part 2, Chapter 10"

The most regrettable thing about President Lee Myung-bak's governance was the lack of publicness, which is a core value of statecraft.
On the one hand, state power is delegated to public officials through elections, but this does not mean that they can operate everything they want during their term as long as it does not violate the law.

--- From "Part 2, Chapter 11"

In that sense, if the problem with the Lee Myung-bak administration's governing style was the 'lack of publicness,' then the Park Geun-hye administration was monopolizing power by privatizing the public sphere without even recognizing what publicness is.

--- From "Part 2, Chapter 12"

President Moon Jae-in expanded his political influence to the presidency not through his personal charisma, but as the eldest brother and leader of the pro-Roh group that came together after the tragic death of former President Roh Moo-hyun.
His reputation for being a good person was also proof that he was not at odds with anyone in the group.
That may be true, but there was no way to rule the Republic of Korea without being at odds with anyone.
--- From "Part 2, Chapter 13"

I had mixed feelings watching President Yoon Seok-yeol's downfall.
While I was wondering, 'How did Korea's conservatives get to this point when they weren't even this bad?', I also felt that they must have been helpless in the face of a president who was running wild because I had experienced firsthand how opportunistic they were.
--- From "Part 2, Chapter 14"

President Yoon's statecraft is unprecedented since the founding of the Republic of Korea, and if we must compare it, we must go back to the pre-modern history of the East and compare it to those who were called "foolish kings who were ignorant of reason" and "dark rulers."
--- From "Part 2, Chapter 14"

Since democratization, we have experienced four horizontal regime changes, each with its own unique form, and have thus far experienced both left-right and right-wing approaches to state administration.
We have also had both professional and professional politicians become presidents.
As a result, we were able to realize that if we do not elect a president who possesses proper statecraft, it will be difficult to run the country normally, let alone achieve national development.
--- From "Part 3, Chapter 1"

When democratic values ​​are internalized, there will be no misunderstandings about the position of president.
The president should not be at the top of a vertical hierarchy, but should occupy a position similar to that of a "chief among fellow citizens."
You should think of yourself as riding high on the shoulders of your fellow citizens and cabinet staff, assisted by them.
The President is merely the head of the executive branch, and should not be mistaken for the head of state.
The role of the president as head of state is purely in the realm of foreign relations, but there have been many who mistakenly believed that the president should also act as a head of state who transcends the executive branch in the realm of domestic politics.

--- From "Part 3, Chapter 2"