Was Manchukuo a puppet state hastily created by Japan?
Or was it a failed utopia?

Manchukuo, a country founded in northeastern China in 1932, suddenly disappeared in 1945 with Japan's defeat in the Pacific War.
This book is an introductory book that provides a comprehensive overview of Manchukuo, including why it was founded, what its purpose was, how it was run, and how the Japanese and Chinese were involved in this process.
Japanese humanist Shinichi Yamamuro drew this portrait of Manchukuo by comparing it to the Chimera, a monster from Greek mythology with the head of a lion, the body of a sheep, and the tail of a dragon.
The translation published in 2009 was republished with translation errors corrected and ambiguous sentences made clearer.

There once was a country called Manchukuo.
Manchukuo, a state that suddenly appeared in northeastern China on March 1, 1932, and disappeared on August 18, 1945, with the abdication of Emperor Puyi.
That life lasted only 13 years and 5 months.
However, for the Japanese who lived there, the end of the nation may have been the beginning of the true experience of Manchukuo.
Only after experiencing the indescribable horrors of the Soviet invasion, repatriation, or detention in Siberia*—the very borderline between life and death—did individuals begin to ask themselves what Manchukuo was and how they themselves had related to it, and to draw diverse images of Manchukuo.
The various fragments of Manchukuo that still live in the memories of those people are etched in countless memoirs and memoirs, and we can still examine them today.
--- p.15~16, from “A Look at Manchukuo”

The main reason Manchuria was called Japan's lifeline was because it bordered colonial Korea and was considered the front line of defense against the Soviet Union and China.
So, if the Soviet Union or China were to expel Japan from Manchuria with overwhelming force, Japan's rule over Korea itself would be in jeopardy.
These concerns became an obsession that Japan must have power in Manchuria.
This was also why the “Policy Programme for China” drafted in May 1924 through an agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of General Staff, the Ministry of the Army, and the Ministry of the Navy stipulated that “maintaining order in Manchuria and Mongolia is of vital interest to the region, especially to the Empire in governing Korea, and the utmost care must always be taken to this end.”
Itagaki also emphasized the threat of the Soviet Union, saying, “If Russia crosses the border, it is only a matter of time before Korea is occupied,” and emphasized that occupied Manchuria is essential for the defense of Korea.
--- p.49~50, from “Chapter 1: The Only Way for Japan to Survive”

Regarding the policy plan of the 22nd, Ishihara said, “The central government did not even consider the September 19th opinion on occupying Manchuria and Mongolia, and even Major General Tatekawa did not agree with it at all, so I knew that it could not be carried out, so I swallowed my tears and retreated to the Manchuria and Mongolian independent country.
The last bastion was to record the opinion that “when the opportunity comes again, there will soon be a day when the theory of Manmong territory will be realized.”
Ishihara's plan for an independent Manchurian state was a final standoff, a retreat that swallowed back tears and, when the opportunity arose, a transition to realizing the long-cherished dream of Manchurian independence.
The theory of the Mongol-Manchurian occupation of Manchuria, which had been refined by the Kwantung Army centered around Ishihara since 1928, was forced to 'retreat' just before it was put into practice due to the army's central government's rejection.
--- p.81, from “Chapter 2: It will become a paradise for all the peoples living in Manmong”

What determined the politics of Manchukuo in this way was to avoid international criticism of it being a puppet state and a protectorate, and to ostensibly take the form of political decisions being made through the independent initiative of local Chinese people, while internally it was a request for how to efficiently realize Japan's ruling intentions through Japanese officials under the guidance of the Kwantung Army.
Whether it is the ten thousand-year rule, the ten thousand-year ratio, the centrality of the General Affairs Office, or internal guidance, they are all nothing more than stopgap measures and schemes to cover up the discrepancy between legal and de facto authority while representing the duality of authority.
Thus, while possessing this contradiction of superficial and internal disparity, the principle of Japan-Manchuria relations was to make Manchukuo “permanently comply with our national policy.”
--- p.203, from “Chapter 3: Becoming a Model for World Politics”

Okura, who introduced this testimony, emphasized that it was by no means a one-sided view from the Chinese side, and also introduced the testimony of Japanese people living in Manchuria.
According to him, the causes of discontent with the new state included the tyranny of the opium monopoly, military police, and police officers, the tyranny of Japanese officials, and the confiscation of firearms for self-defense, and he said, “If the army withdraws now, it is no exaggeration to say that all Japanese will be killed,” and that a high-ranking military official also said, “If the Russo-Russian War breaks out now, about 10 divisions of the Japanese army will have to fight against the Manchurians.”
These Japanese testimonies must have been the honest real experiences of people who were in daily contact with other ethnic groups in the area.
However, there is no need to quote these testimonies, as most of what the Chinese officials said was accepted as fact by the Kwantung Army and Japanese officials.

--- p.264~265, from “Chapter 4: The Great Defense Strategy is Always Cooperation with the Japanese Empire”