Why did Kim Yo-jong suddenly start referring to South Korea and South Korea as the "Republic of Korea"? Why has Kim Jong-un remained silent for years on US demands for denuclearization talks? Why has North Korea refused South Korea's offer of humanitarian aid for over a decade? Will a confrontation between South Korea, the US, and Japan versus North Korea, China, and Russia, unprecedented even during the Cold War, really unfold? "North Korea's nuclear weapons vs.
Is a "balance of terror" possible on the Korean Peninsula, where the irreversible nuclear age of the "US nuclear program" has arrived? Jeong Wook-sik, Korea's leading researcher on the ROK-US alliance and North Korean nuclear issue, examines North Korea's drastically different behavior since 2019 and anticipates the resulting shifts in inter-Korean and US-North Korea relations, as well as the tectonic shifts in the East Asian order.

If a new North Korea were to emerge, what would be the most fundamental and impactful change? Above all, I believe it would be North Korea's abandonment of any desire to normalize relations with the United States.
While the "familiar North Korea" we know has consistently sought to improve relations with the United States, regardless of its radical rhetoric, the "new North Korea" is putting that aside and developing a national strategy.
And these changes mean that the 'rules of the game' have completely changed.

--- p.25

The United States, which does not find improving inter-Korean relations particularly attractive, and North Korea, which must bring such a partner to the negotiating table.
This is when the nuclear card appeared.
Since the early days of the Cold War, the United States has steadily strengthened international regulations on nuclear weapons, including by establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 1957) and leading the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT, 1970).
(…) But North Korea rebelled against this.
Ironically, North Korea's goal in going against the Empire's will was to become friendly with the Empire.
--- p.27

North Korea's nuclear weapons were not just a card for North Korea.
If North Korea used its nuclear development as leverage to normalize relations with the United States, the United States sought to maintain and strengthen the "status quo on the Korean Peninsula" using North Korea's nuclear program as a pretext.
The phenomenon the United States desires on the Korean Peninsula is an armistice system, the ROK-US alliance, and tensions between South and North Korea, North Korea and the US, and North Korea and Japan.
However, the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue will immediately mean a fundamental change in the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
In the end, from the US perspective, the North Korean nuclear issue was a problem that was more advantageous to leave as a problem than to solve.

--- p.28

As Clinton said, Kim Jong-un was different.
He (…) placed North Korea at a crossroads of fate: either to become a nuclear power or to negotiate with the United States.
(…) This can be interpreted as a ‘determination’ to come to the table and negotiate denuclearization, as it has achieved a ‘balance of power’ against the United States.
(…) provoked Trump, who calls himself a ‘master of negotiation.’
Finally, he readily agreed to Kim Jong-un's proposal for negotiations, saying, "I am the only one who can solve the North Korean nuclear issue."
Another key player who stepped forward as a mediator in the historic negotiations between North America and the United States across the Pacific was the Moon Jae-in administration.
This is the beginning of the 2018 Korean Peninsula Peace Process, which now remains a vague dream.

--- p.33~34

In his letter, Kim Jong-un asked, “What has Your Excellency done for you, and how should I explain to the people what has changed since we met?”
He even used the word "fool" to refer to himself, saying, "Unless Your Majesty sees our relationship as a stepping stone that only benefits you, I wouldn't make myself look like a fool who just gives and gets nothing in return."
He added that, unlike before when he showed impatience, “we are in a different situation than then, and there is no reason to rush.”
--- p.46~47

It is a lazy analysis to attribute Kim Jong-un's change of heart solely to the failure of the Hanoi summit.
(…) If the Hanoi no-deal was a ‘shock’ to Kim Jong-un, it is because the series of events following the Panmunjom meeting led Kim Jong-un to another ‘decision’ rather than a change of heart.
Kim Jong-un's second resolution is that North Korea has abandoned its obsession with inter-Korean relations and North Korea-US relations and has made nuclear weapons the "national system of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," encompassing politics, security, economy, and diplomacy.

--- p.34~35

“I hope to discuss the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula directly with Your Excellency, rather than with South Korean President Moon Jae-in in the future, and I believe that the excessive interest President Moon is currently showing in our issue is unnecessary.” This is an excerpt from a personal letter Kim Jong-un sent to Trump on September 21, 2018.
(…) This is a personal letter written a day after the conclusion of the Pyongyang North-South Summit.
At the time, North Korea offered ‘unprecedented hospitality’ to the South Korean delegation, including President Moon Jae-in.
(…) Why did Kim Jong-un ask Trump to ‘exclude Moon Jae-in’?
--- p.56~57

It's not that the Yoon Seok-yeol administration has no way out.
The starting point for that path is the realization that in South Korea, conservative governments are in a much more advantageous political position than centrist and progressive governments.
Even when looking at North Korea policy alone, conservative governments are relatively free from political controversies over whether they are pro-North Korea or pro-China, even if they pursue a forward-looking stance or policy.
(…) In May 2022, Unification Minister Kwon Young-se said this at his confirmation hearing.
"Fundamentally, North Korea policy should be a 'continuation,' and I don't think it's a good idea to completely ignore the previous administration and start anew." However, since then (...) the Yoon Seok-yeol administration, far from continuing its legacy, has turned around and is beating up the previous administration. The phrase "ABM" (Anything But Moon) has even emerged, showing a relentless pursuit of erasing the Moon Jae-in administration's traces in every field.

--- p.76~78

Why does this phenomenon occur? From the conservative administration's perspective, North Korea policy is a "battle with itself."
This means that the key to North Korea policy is overcoming the temptation to exploit North Korea or inter-Korean relations in times of political crisis or defensiveness.
(…) The conservative regime, which failed to ‘fight with itself,’ has kicked away every opportunity to solve the Korean Peninsula problem.
(…) The keynote of the Yoon Seok-yeol government’s North Korea policy, dubbed the “bold plan,” is “If North Korea puts down its nuclear weapons one by one, we will fire a big shot.”
(…) The Yoon Seok-yeol administration has been indiscriminately disparaging Moon Jae-in’s peace policy, saying that it relies solely on North Korea’s goodwill.
But isn't Yoon Seok-yeol's bold plan essentially demanding North Korea denuclearize, saying, "Please believe in my good intentions"?
--- p.78~81

The nuclear policies of North Korea and the United States are becoming more similar as they fight.
While trying to stop this, the Yoon Seok-yeol administration, which should be protecting the lives and property of the people, is instead pouring oil on the 'war of terror and apocalypse' between North Korea and the United States.
Of course, the goal is to suppress hostile actions by the other side, but the method used – the Korean Peninsula-style balance of terror – is extremely fragile and unstable.

--- p.116~117

The basis for the stereotype about North Korea, namely its chronic economic difficulties, is the Bank of Korea's estimate.
(…) According to this, North Korea’s average annual economic growth rate is approximately -0.9%.
However, North Korea's Voluntary National Review Report submitted to the UN's High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development shows completely different figures.
(…) This figure is 6% higher than the Bank of Korea’s estimate for the same period.
At the time, North Korea was strongly demanding a resolution to the sanctions, complaining that its economic development was seriously hindered by US sanctions.
North Korea, which wants to emphasize the pain of sanctions, has no reason to falsely report high growth rates to the UN.

--- p.127~128

Economic sanctions have been a powerful tool in North Korea policy, including denuclearization.
This is because North Korea, which is suffering from economic difficulties, desperately needs the lifting of sanctions.
North Korea has changed its position on sanctions.
(…) it has no value as a means of pressuring or negotiating nuclear abandonment.
And that's not all.
Resolving sanctions is essential for resuming economic cooperation between the South and the North.
Nevertheless, the fact that North Korea chose 'sanctions and cooperation' means that it has also abandoned its desire for inter-Korean economic cooperation.
The paradigm of inter-Korean relations is changing.

--- p.133~134

The Moon Jae-in administration has offered to help North Korea at every opportunity, but North Korea has either not responded or refused.
The Yoon Seok-yeol administration is threatening to once again suspend aid to North Korea, which has already been suspended.
Because of this, the people still have the illusion that South Korea and the international community are helping North Korea.
This discrepancy, coupled with the perception that "the people are starving while the Kim Jong-un regime is obsessed with nuclear weapons and missiles," is making it even more difficult to establish a new North Korea policy.
--- p.141

If we take off our colored glasses and look at it, North Korea's choice is not unusual.
The core of the parallel development line is the ‘economic feasibility of security.’
And this is a time-honored logic that follows in the footsteps of the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" in the US, which sought to offset the reduction of conventional armaments by increasing nuclear power, Khrushchev of the Soviet Union who copied it, and Deng Xiaoping of China who sought economic development by completing the "two bombs, one star" (atomic bomb, hydrogen bomb, and artificial satellite).
The Park Chung-hee regime, which pursued both economic development and independent national defense, also attempted to develop nuclear weapons in the same context.

--- p.146~147

The more South Korea clings to the already strong US extended deterrence, the more the US will boldly present South Korea with an unfair bill.
From the demand to increase the defense cost-sharing despite the fact that South Korea has given the United States a surplus of money, to the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Semiconductor Act, America's selfish behavior knows no restraint.
We must break the vicious cycle of enduring America's oppression and unfair bills in exchange for filling non-existent needs and compulsions.

--- p.172

The argument that ‘nuclear weapons must be countered with nuclear weapons’ is gaining ground, but on the Korean Peninsula, the nuclear weapons of the United States and North Korea are already in a sharp confrontation.
However, the more we cling to America's trouser legs by saying that American nuclear weapons outside of Korean territory cannot be trusted, the more trust we gain will be superficial and we will end up handing over the real benefits.
The Yoon Seok-yeol administration, fixated solely on "nuclear sharing" as the core agenda of Korea-U.S. relations, failed to address America's "semiconductor egoism," and ultimately resulted in Korea's status as a "semiconductor powerhouse" being shaken.
On the other hand, Japan, which has drawn the line that nuclear sharing discussions are unnecessary, is moving forward with a semiconductor joint venture with the United States.

--- p.183

The prevailing rhetoric among North and South Korean authorities today can be summarized as, "We do not want war, but we will not avoid it either."
We need to shift this to, 'If we don't want war, let's find a way to prevent it.'
Furthermore, while South Korea and the United States talk about “unconditional dialogue” with North Korea, they are still attaching the condition of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” which is an impossible and currently unrealizable ultimate goal.
Meanwhile, North Korea, which has firmly closed the door to dialogue, is demanding the "withdrawal of its hostile policy" as a condition for resuming dialogue.
Now, the ROK-US alliance and North Korea must face reality.
The more South Korea and the United States emphasize denuclearization, the further away it becomes, and the more North Korea demands the withdrawal of its hostile policies as a condition for dialogue, the more its hostile policies are strengthened.

--- p.224

Finally, I would like to ask Chairman Kim Jong-un and make an appeal.
What kind of future do you want to leave to your children?
The future of children, including my daughter known as 'Kim Ju-ae', cannot be considered separately from the climate crisis.
Moreover, the Korean Peninsula is one of the regions vulnerable to climate change.
North Korea is more vulnerable than South Korea.
(…) Wouldn’t seeking a virtuous cycle of peace and carbon emissions reduction through arms control and disarmament be the best gift for children and a way for South and North Korea to become role models for the rest of the world?

--- p.243~244