Preface to the Korean edition
introduction

01 Introduction: Exploring Alliance Formation

Main argument
Literature related to the alliance
Research methods and processes

02 Explanation of Alliance Formation

Alliances as a Response to Threats: Balancing and Bandwagoning
Joining and Splitting Together: Ideology and Alliance Formation
Foreign aid and alliance formation
Transnational infiltration and alliance formation
conclusion

03 From the Baghdad Pact to the Six-Day War

Main topics
Background and related countries
The Baghdad Pact and the Rise of Nasser's Egypt
Superpower Rivalry and the Sinai War
The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Realignment of Regional Alliances
United Arab Republic: A Second Attempt at Hegemony
Nasser's new approach
Superpower policies in polarized conflicts
Six-Day War
conclusion

04 From the Six-Day War to the Camp David Accords

Main topics
Superpower Promises and War of Attrition
Cooperation and Conflict in the Arab World
Diplomacy of the October War
Step-by-step diplomacy and regional alliance readjustment
After the Camp David Accords
conclusion

05 Balance and Harnessing

Balancing Action and Alliance Formation
Bandwagoning and alliance formation
conclusion

06 Ideology and Alliance Formation

Ideology and Alliance Formation in the Middle East: An Overview
Ideology and Superpower Alliances in the Middle East
Ideology and Politics Among Arab States: Integration and Division
conclusion

07 Means of Alliance: Aid and Infiltration

Foreign aid and alliance formation
Transnational infiltration and alliance formation
conclusion

08 Conclusion: Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power

Analysis of Alliance Formation: An Evaluation
Alliance formation and the balance of world power
Maintaining the Blockade: Alliance Formation and American Grand Strategy
Conclusion

Appendix 1.
Alliances in the Middle East, 1955–1979
Appendix 2.
balance of world power

Is the cause of alliances a balance of power or a balance of threats?
Do nations choose to balance or bandwagon with threatening states?

Traditional balance of power theory states that states seek to balance themselves against the strongest state.
In contrast, Walt's balance of threat theory sees nations seeking balance against the most threatening nation.
It is not that the opposing country is the most powerful, but rather that it is perceived as the most threatening, and thus seeks to balance the source of that threat.
According to the balance of threat theory, the level of threat is determined by overall national power, geographical proximity, attack capability, and attack intent.
In particular, we place importance on perceived aggressive intent when determining whether a country is a threat.
And alliances are the most common way for countries to pursue balance by sharing threat perceptions.


During World War II, the major countries joined the Allied Powers, which had far superior combined national power, because the Axis powers, centered around Germany, were a far greater threat.
Even during the Cold War after World War II, most major countries joined NATO, led by the United States, which clearly had the upper hand in terms of total national power, because the Soviet Union was the most threatening country.
In the 1991 Gulf War, major Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt joined the US-led multinational coalition because they viewed Iraq as the greatest threat in the region.
Today, in East Asia, as the threat from China grows, a US-led, US-Japan-ROK balanced alliance is forming.


When faced with a threatening state, countries generally choose balancing rather than bandwagoning.
Bandwagoning is fundamentally vulnerable because it requires relying on the mercy of a country that threatens its own security.
When countries join a balanced alliance, they gain a relatively better position relative to their fellow allies.
However, when the power of the threatening state is so overwhelming that balancing action is meaningless, or when it is impossible to find suitable allies to support it against the threatening state, a state may exceptionally choose to bandwagon.
Italy, fearing that it would be Hitler's first target during World War II, chose a strategy of allying with Germany and taking advantage of it.
Unable to count on support from the United States and Britain, Finland chose to side with the Soviet Union after suffering two defeats in wars with the Soviet Union.
If China were to invade Taiwan, whether Taiwan and other regional countries would choose to balance the situation or join the bandwagon would depend on the capabilities and willingness of the United States, its ally, from the perspective of balance-of-threat theory.


Preface to the Korean edition by Stephen Walt
A balancing coalition will be formed to counter China's pursuit of regional hegemony.

How does Stephen Walt view his balance of threat theory and the East Asian situation surrounding Korea from this perspective? His conviction in the theory remains unchanged, whether it was 37 years ago when this book was first published or now.
In the preface to the Korean edition, he attributes the weakening of NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union to the disappearance of the Soviet threat.
The recent strengthening of NATO following Russia's invasion of Ukraine can also be seen as a reflection of the growing threat from Russia.
The phenomenon of nations forming or strengthening alliances in response to shifts in threat levels, rather than simply shifts in relative power, is clearly evident in East Asia today.
As China, with its growing national power, becomes more explicit in its ambitions to reshape regional and even global order, various efforts are being made by the United States and regional countries to balance the threat posed by China.


But Walt believes that Asian nations are not strong or united enough to balance themselves against a potential hegemon, China.
Asian countries are separated from each other geographically and by painful historical legacies.
Ultimately, it is predicted that the United States, which does not want China to dominate Asia, will lead a coalition to counterbalance China to prevent such a situation.
In this process, the United States says it is important not to be seen as a disturber of peace by regional countries.
As China is seen as challenging the status quo and raising the risk of war, Asian nations will increasingly align with each other and with the United States.


Walt also says that the implications of the balance of threat theory for Korea are clear.
As China's power and ambitions grow, the alliance between South Korea and the United States becomes more important than ever.
Because Korea and the United States are facing a huge common threat.
Walt believes that cooperation with other Asian countries, including Japan and the United States, will be crucial to Korea's security and prosperity.
He says that to maintain a favorable balance in the region, South Korea must resist any temptation to side with China.
Rather than clinging to friendly relations with China, we should focus on cooperation with other countries.
Walt believes that balancing the Chinese threat in East Asia depends on an effective balancing coalition, and that South Korea's strategic choices are essential for building such a balancing coalition.


How Alliances in the Middle East Have Formed and Transformed
A Case Study on the Validity of the Balance of Threat Theory

Stephen Walt studied cases of alliances in the Middle East to prove the validity of his balance of threat theory.
It shows how alliances were formed and transformed in the Middle East from the 1955 Baghdad Pact to the Six-Day War in 1967, the October War in 1973, and the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978.
As the United States and the Soviet Union intervened in the Middle East through military and economic aid, Middle Eastern politics became an arena of alliance diplomacy intertwined with confrontation between regional powers and competition between the two superpowers.
In particular, Egypt has been at the center of major changes, from several attempts at Arab unity to the Arab-Israeli war and the unilateral peace agreement with Israel.


The examples of alliances in the Middle East support the balance of threat theory, which holds that states seek alliances in response to changes in the level of threat, not changes in relative power among states.
The primary concern of Middle Eastern states has always been the balance of threats, not the balance of power.
The threat came primarily from Nasser's Egypt, which advocated Arab unity and sought to establish a dominant position in the Arab world, and later from radical Syria.
Pan-Arabism was a major driving force behind Arab unity, but in practice, its pursuit has been a source of division.
For the Middle Eastern countries, the distant Soviet Union and the United States were not considered real threats.
Rather, it was seen as an alliance partner to balance out the opposition forces in the region.
Arab states have effectively exploited the rivalry between the two superpowers to obtain the support they need to confront Israel and other threats within the region.
The two superpowers provided massive military and economic aid to their regional client states to keep them in alliance, but they had no real influence on their important policy decisions.


Walt says that even among the countries of the Middle East, balancing rather than coercing threats was more common.
There were attempts to appease the radical and demagogic Nasser, but monarchies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan allied with each other or relied on US support to balance the radical forces in Egypt and Syria.
In the case of Egypt, it also led the Arab coalition against Israel to maintain a balance with Israel and relied heavily on Soviet military support.
However, Egypt's defeat by Israel in the October 1973 war marked the beginning of a major shift in Middle Eastern politics.
Egypt switched its alliance from the Soviet Union to the United States and signed a separate peace treaty with Israel to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula.
Egypt's departure from the Arab coalition against Israel made it difficult for Arab states to form an effective coalition against Israel.
In the 1991 Gulf War, major Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, joined the US-led coalition against Iraq, which invaded Kuwait.
Walt points out that the United States has overextended its commitments to regional allies by underestimating the balancing tendencies of regional states.


The ROK-US alliance from the perspective of balance of threat theory
How will Korea maintain balance in East Asia?

In ancient Greece, Milos, which stood alone against the great powers without any allies, was destroyed by Athens, and Mytilene, which had an ally called Sparta but could not receive help, was also defeated by Athens.
On the other hand, Corcyra was able to win the decisive battle against Corinth by bringing Athens, which was hesitant for fear of provoking Sparta, into the alliance.
According to the balance of threat theory, most countries tend to choose balance when faced with external threats.
Even if faced with an overwhelming threat, if you can secure the support of your allies, choose balance.
However, both Milos, who appealed to the opponent's sense of justice rather than to an alliance, and Mytilene, who had unwavering faith that the allies would come, had to pay the price for their arrogance and misjudgment.
On the other hand, Corcyra was rewarded for its strategic acumen and efforts by forming an alliance with the maritime power of Athens.


Surrounded by potential and powerful threat states, what strategy should South Korea adopt to ensure national security and prosperity? China's ambitions won't end with Taiwan.
Their true goal would be to push the United States out of the Western Pacific and become the region's dominant power.
Japan will not miss this opportunity and will seek to regain its status as a military power with the support of the United States under the pretext of containing China.
Regardless of which side has the upper hand or the balance, it is still dangerous for Korea.
The only alternative that has and can prevent this dynamic is the ROK-US alliance.
The ROK-US alliance is essentially a balancing alliance against China (and North Korea), and potentially against Japan.
In many cases of alliances, the most important condition for an alliance is neither a formal treaty nor large-scale economic or military support.
It is a shared perception of strategic threats.
A true alliance begins when South Korea and the United States can see threats with the same eyes.
That is what the Cercyns preached to the Athenians, and that is what the British leaders always whispered to the American leaders.


True allies are not only difficult to find, but also costly.
The fact that British troops are present wherever American troops go in conflict zones suggests what the terms of an alliance that transcends treaties are.
Britain does not want a Europe dominated by Russia or Germany.
And the British know what they have to do to get what they want.
If Korea does not want an East Asia dominated by China or Japan, and if it wishes to maintain a favorable balance with those two countries, it must possess the appropriate strategic vision and decisiveness.
I recommend this book to readers considering Korea's balanced strategy.