“Where should the Republic of Korea go and how should it go?”

The author of this book, Song Min-soon, served as the 34th Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Director of the Office of Unification, Foreign Affairs and National Security in the Presidential Office, and a member of the 18th National Assembly. He was at the center of the decision-making process for South Korea's foreign and security policies aimed at developing the ROK-US alliance and resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.
He has witnessed firsthand the détente between the East and the West, the regime change in Eastern Europe, and the post-Cold War diplomacy, paving the way for the Republic of Korea.
The key words that the author, after more than ten years of reflection and discussion since “The Glacier Moves,” posed in answering 12 core questions are strategic “autonomy” and “coexistence” between the South and the North.
First, given the shift in world order and the emergence of North Korea as a nuclear power with the advent of Trump's second term, the question arises: "Is there even a life jacket for South Korea's security?"
And it seriously warns us about how long we can remain complacent, as if we were biting a sugar-coated tinderbox to see how far we can bite before the gunpowder explodes.

By asking, "Can we move toward a self-reliant alliance?", he emphasizes the need to move beyond an alliance dependent on the United States. By asking, "How far can South Korea's nuclear capabilities go?", he argues that if North Korea's denuclearization is effectively a phantom, South Korea must also secure potential nuclear capabilities within international nonproliferation norms and seek a nuclear balance between the two Koreas.
On the Korean Peninsula, it is not just the US nuclear umbrella and North Korea's nuclear weapons that should be balanced; rather, South Korea, along with the US nuclear umbrella, should also be positioned as one axis of nuclear balance on the Korean Peninsula.
They argue that only then will we be equipped with a life jacket for security amidst the chaotic international order and the shaky ROK-US alliance, and that wartime operational control should naturally be transferred.
I believe that this is the path to achieving autonomy in national security.

The question, "What if the South and the North lived as good neighbors with good walls?" argues that, although the South and the North are not foreign countries under the current constitution, they must find a way to live as normal neighbors subject to the normal relations between nations.
Through "stability and coexistence" between the South and the North, we must free ourselves from not only the North Korean nuclear threat but also the heavy burden imposed on us by the turbulent inter-Korean relationship.
It emphasizes that we should not give up on the path to unification, but we should not be held back by the illusion of unification that has no immediate possibility of realization.
He also criticizes the Korean political world.
'In the midst of an existential security crisis that has persisted for over 70 years, the two major political camps in Korea have become accustomed to politically instrumentalizing the security crisis and its resolution.
We must break away from the behavior of 'conservatives using the emergence of a crisis to gain votes, while progressives use the resolution of the crisis to gain votes.'

South Korea has succeeded in filling the glass halfway to its goal of "peace, prosperity, and unification," which it has pursued as a national goal for the past 75 years.
Now, to fill the other half of the glass, you must successfully navigate unfamiliar waters.

--- p.13

The 'old world' that was so familiar and convenient to Korea is gone, and in its place is a 'new world' of struggle for survival.
We are moving closer to a Hobbesian world order, where brute force reigns supreme rather than law and authority.

--- p.22

The United States, together with South Korea, is developing a missile defense system to deter and defend against North Korea's nuclear weapons, and is building preemptive strike and massive retaliatory capabilities. These are, in effect, measures to confront the existence of a "nuclear-armed North Korea."
This shows 'practical action' that is different from the 'declarative language' of 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.'

--- p.36

Since the US-Soviet declaration of the end of the Cold War, South Korea has harbored hopes of overcoming the two stages of "establishing an armistice" and "ending the Cold War," and the three stages of establishing "cold peace/negative peace" all at once.
It pursued a policy that would lead directly to the four stages of ‘warm peace/active peace.’

--- p.43

At some point, when blatant great power politics are unfolding around the Korean Peninsula, it is said to Washington, “Korea is a more important country to China than to the United States.
Is it possible that we will have a president who says, “We will have to wait and see whether the United States should defend itself or not?”
--- p.58

The extended deterrence strategy is the concept that 'when the United States or its allies are attacked by an enemy's conventional or nuclear weapons, the United States maintains a posture to repel the enemy with overwhelming military power, including nuclear and conventional weapons, and thereby deters the enemy's intention to invade in advance.'

--- p.60

In wars between powerful nations and smaller nations, they often find themselves drawn into a 'protracted war' and are desperate to avoid 'defeat'.
This phenomenon is evident in the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union and the United States' war in Afghanistan, and the recent Russian war in Ukraine.

--- p.79

Although it is not the same as Korea's 'three-axis system', there is an example that provides implications.
This is the 'Cold Start' operational plan adopted by India with Pakistan in mind.
It means eliminating the enemy's threat in advance or retaliating after the fact through local warfare rather than a preemptive strike using conventional power and an all-out war.

--- p.91

In order for the South and the North to move from "cold peace" or "passive peace" to "warm peace" or "active peace," South Korea must establish an independent posture and status within the ROK-US alliance.
It is necessary to maintain the foundation of existing security policy while making progressive changes.

--- p.112

North Korea's nuclear development is like a poisonous mushroom growing amidst the confrontation between the United States and China.
The strengthening of the so-called "authoritarian network" linking China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran is likely to improve the conditions, including the temperature and humidity, necessary for the growth of poisonous mushrooms.

--- p.135

From this time on, the tendency to use sanctions, often called the "lazy man's diplomacy tool," began to appear more frequently and more easily.
In particular, the Trump administration (second term), which came to power in 2025, is undermining America's ability and standing to maintain international order by abusing tariffs as a means of sanctions and negotiation.

--- p.151

The United States has adopted a contradictory stance over the past 50 years on the issue of acquiring nuclear fuel cycles for South Korea, using both “coaxing” and “threats.”
Sometimes they promised to provide technical assistance to Korea, while at other times they threatened to refuse "civilian nuclear cooperation" or make it difficult to provide "security assistance."

--- p.174

South Korea stands on a narrow bridge across a valley, with North Korea's nuclear threat on one side and the U.S. nuclear umbrella on the other.
This is Korea's security reality, one that is difficult to find in any international political environment.

--- p.183

There is a saying that “the most expensive diplomacy is cheaper than the cheapest war.”
In a similar vein, it is said that “no matter how expensive peace is, it is better than war.”
But now, Korea is walking a path that is 'expensive but not close to true peace.'
We must choose a path to true peace that is less expensive than it is now.

--- p.209

Therefore, the argument that the US and China have no choice but to move towards a “Cold Peace” rather than a “Cold War” is gaining more traction.
Although the systems emphasize differences, they aim to compete while accepting the other's basic legitimacy.

--- p.232

The Trump administration's handling of Europe surrounding the Ukraine war is showing signs of a return to the 19th-century "sphere of influence" politics.
Europe's problems are for Europe to handle.
As a result, Europe is also likely to adopt a hedging strategy, distancing itself from the United States, at least during Trump's term.

--- p.244

However, in the case of North Korea, its national power is incomparably smaller than that of Russia or China.
Moreover, unlike Britain or France, it operates a closed socialist economic system that has already proven to be a failure.
So, it is difficult for North Korea's version of 'parallel development of nuclear weapons and the economy' to succeed as Kim Jong-un claims.
However, it will contribute to their survival to some extent with support from China and Russia.

--- p.264

As the saying goes, “Good fences make good neighbors,” a complete border is needed between the South and the North.
It is about living as normal neighbors with a fence between them that clearly defines the boundary.
The idea is to maintain immediate stability by properly managing the fence between neighbors, gradually create a state of peace, and ultimately preserve the path to unification.

--- p.303

Ultimately, existing unification policies will not even bring us close to actual unification, but will only burden us with unnecessary burdens and diminish our diplomatic capacity to actively adapt to the world that will unfold in the future.
Because of this non-autonomous status, South Korea is sometimes called an "unsung power" in the formation of the international security order.

--- p.313

For South Korea to be freed to some extent from the shadow of great power politics, a balance of military power between the South and the North must first be achieved.
As South Korea builds its potential nuclear capabilities, it must evolve its alliance with the United States from one of dependence to one of self-reliance.

--- p.340

If the United States can eliminate or overcome obstacles to establishing diplomatic relations, such as nuclear and human rights issues, through negotiations with North Korea, South Korea would actively welcome this.
This is because it runs parallel and complementary to the path of creating a state of ‘active peace’ on the Korean Peninsula.

--- p.351

Even in a hypothetical scenario, if South Korea were to take the lead in unification, China would likely be concerned that South Korea, with its superior economy and openness, along with its 3,100-kilometer border, could exert a sensitive influence on the Chinese people's consciousness.

--- p.378

China has a strategy to ultimately neutralize South Korea by distancing it from the United States as much as possible.
However, North Korea's persistent nuclear armament policy has made it difficult for China to secure strategic interests by pushing South Korea closer to the United States.
Given the virtual impossibility of North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons, China is likely to be cautious about the impact of South Korea's "normal neighbor" policy.

--- p.385

There is a common saying among observers outside of Korea about Koreans.
“There are two things I don’t know about myself.
“We don’t know how well we live and how dangerous a place we live in.”
But recently, it seems that many people are somewhat aware of 'how well they are living'.
However, awareness of 'how dangerous a place it is' is becoming increasingly scarce.

--- p.407