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Author's Preface

Chapter 1: The Land of the Morning Calm: The Calm Before the Storm

Chapter 2: Challenge and Response: Task Force Smith's Brave Resistance

Chapter 3: The UN Offensive: The Incheon Landing Operation and the Breakthrough of the Nakdong River Bridgehead

Chapter 4: Despair on the Yalu: The Chinese Intervention and the U.S. 1st Marine Division's Attack to the Rear

Chapter 5: Assignment to Command of the Eighth US Army: Restoring the Will to Fight and Transitioning to the Offensive

Chapter 6: President Truman and General MacArthur: Causes and Consequences of General MacArthur's Dismissal, and the Retreat of the Chinese Army

Chapter 7: Armistice Talks and the Stalemate: The Fierce Battle of the Hills and the Nature of the Enemy

Chapter 8: The Last Days of the War: The POW Camp Riot, the Exchange with General Clark, and the Signing of the Armistice

Chapter 9: Problems and Answers: The Significance of the Controversy Regarding General MacArthur and Its Political and Military Implications

Chapter 10: Lessons Learned and Lessons Missed: Why Our Peace Efforts Matter

Korean War Timeline
Translator's Note

“The Korean War is undoubtedly the beginning of all future wars.
It taught us that it would be a limited war.
In a situation where we have the technology to manufacture nuclear weapons
Because unlimited war means mutual destruction.
Through the Korean War, the United States, for the first time in history,
“I became familiar with the concept of ‘limited warfare.’”

General Ridgway stated that he wrote this book to convey the efforts the United States made in Korea and the lessons we learned from those efforts.
He said, “The Korean War taught us that all future wars will inevitably be limited wars.
It was not a question of whether or not to wage a limited war, but how to avoid all-out war.
In a situation where many countries now possess the technology to manufacture nuclear weapons, unlimited war is no longer even conceivable, as it would mean mutual destruction.
He stated that “after the Korean War, America’s foreign policies toward allies and potential enemies were all influenced by this awareness of reality,” and confessed that “through the Korean War, America became familiar with the concept of ‘limited war’ for the first time in history.”

He said, “Limited war is not simply a concept that means a small-scale war that does not escalate into a large-scale war.
“Limited war is a war whose objectives are clearly limited in consideration of national interests and current military capabilities,” he defined, “and an endless war without clearly delineated geographical, political, and military objectives beyond ‘victory,’ can, like all wars, expand indefinitely, and one success requires another success to guarantee it.”
The argument that we must do everything in our power to win a war may sound like a cool, manly argument, and the cry that we must "defend freedom" may sound like a messianic cry that makes our blood boil.
But in an era like today, the end of all-out war is unimaginable.
“It could mean our civilization reverting to the state it was in thousands of years ago, with not a single person left to proclaim victory,” he warned.

He says that the Korean War taught him how dangerous an all-out or unrestricted war aimed at "complete victory" or "unconditional surrender" is in a situation where he possesses nuclear weapons manufacturing technology, and that all future wars will be limited wars with clearly defined objectives, taking into account national interests and current military capabilities.
Having already experienced the unimaginable power of nuclear weapons through World War II, which mobilized all of its material and human resources, the United States sought to avoid a global catastrophe, such as the Korean War escalating into World War III and the use of nuclear weapons.
As a result, the Korean War was forced to take the form of a limited war unfamiliar to the United States, rather than an all-out war aimed at 'complete victory' or 'unconditional surrender.'


“War can no longer be resolved by military force alone.
Political, military, diplomatic, and economic policies must be implemented in a mutually complementary manner.
Political leaders set out specific goals to be achieved,
How many goals can a military leader achieve through military means?
How to best utilize those means
Must provide military judgment.
“The best results come from close cooperation between political and military leaders.”

General Ridgeway points out that war can no longer be resolved through military force alone, and emphasizes that “political, military, diplomatic, and economic policies must be implemented in a mutually complementary manner, and this requires strong leadership.”
He also emphasizes that “American national policy should no longer be set solely by the White House, the State Department, or the Department of Defense, but rather by civilian politicians and military experts working together, and that the best results come from close cooperation between military and civilian leaders.”
“Political leaders should specify the objectives to be achieved, and military leaders should provide military judgment on how many objectives can be achieved through military means and how best to employ those means. This cooperative relationship is only possible when civilian government officials and military officials consult with each other and seriously consider their opinions,” he advises.
“It is difficult for civilian political leaders to make sound decisions if they ignore important military advice from the military leadership, and while it is natural for civilian political leaders to have the upper hand under the Constitution, it can be disastrous if they fail to seek or listen to the advice of experienced military leaders, or if their opinions are dismissed,” he warns.


“If there is a war that we are not prepared for,
That is the Korean War.”
“After the victory in World War II, the United States had a nuclear deterrent and a belief in the United Nations.
Sitting comfortably behind the psychological Maginot Line
Disbanding the military and scrapping massive wartime production facilities, etc.
“The military reduction was carried out hastily, leaving us completely unprepared for war.”

Ridgeway says the Korean War taught us how foolish it is to rush into war without sufficient military power.
The United States, which achieved complete victory by mobilizing all of its human and material resources during World War II and ultimately using the atomic bomb to force Japan's unconditional surrender, was completely unprepared for war after World War II, as it sat comfortably behind the psychological Maginot Line, which stemmed from its belief in the formidable atomic bomb and the strong United Nations. It disbanded its military and converted or scrapped its massive wartime production facilities, hastily reducing its military power.
Hundreds of thousands of skilled, capable non-commissioned officers and soldiers, the backbone of the military, threw off their uniforms, overcome with the euphoria of having fulfilled their duty to their country, and Americans readily assumed that if war broke out, they could fight and win it with air power, navy, and nuclear weapons without ever setting foot on hostile soil.


Ridgeway said, “Our misreading of the future was not due to a lack of strategic or tactical intelligence, but rather to a failure to properly evaluate the information before us.
We neglected to plan for predictable and anticipated contingencies.
We have forgotten that our diplomatic power cannot be stronger than the military power we possess to support our diplomacy.
As General MacArthur said, "We left very few troops in the Far East, and those we had were optimized for managing Japanese occupied territories rather than fighting," and criticizing them, it's unfair to once again place young men fresh from World War II on the line of fire. But could we have avoided this war? Could we have avoided interfering in Korean affairs as we had in the past? Could we have allowed the fledgling Republic of Korea to perish? This begs the question.
President Truman could not stand by and watch the Republic of Korea be overthrown.
The real challenge facing the United States was a belligerent communist state that was openly intent on expanding its power through force.
The United States took this as a direct challenge to its security and made the decision to intervene because it believed that if it did not respond, it could escalate into World War III.

Lessons on Proper Civil-Military Relations Learned from the Dismissal of General MacArthur

This book also discusses proper civil-military relations and the attitude of a professional soldier, and General Ridgway deals with civil-military relations separately in Chapter 6 (President Truman and General MacArthur) and Chapter 9 (Problems and Solutions).
The dismissal of General MacArthur was more than just a case of insubordination or disobedience.
General Ridgway strongly criticized General MacArthur's claims of expanding the Korean War (advancing into mainland China, bombing bases in Manchuria, etc.) and his public expression of such claims, and even went so far as to say that "he was confusing his popularity as a symbol of patriotism in a country at war with the duties of an active-duty general," and that "if the President had not dismissed General MacArthur even though he repeatedly ignored the President's lawful directives and publicly expressed his dissatisfaction with government-approved policies, the President would have been derelict in his duties."


Proper civil-military relations go beyond simply requiring professional soldiers to faithfully follow the directives of elected political leaders and civilian authorities.
Civilian government authorities must work closely with military authorities to set achievable ends for the war and to select the means and ways to achieve those ends.
Otherwise, the conduct of war may be left in the hands of those who do not properly understand war.
Moreover, in today's complex wars, professional soldiers must be able to speak out more candidly and courageously than ever before about the policies being considered by civilian rulers.
But as General Ridgeway said, once a policy is decided, soldiers must faithfully carry out that policy as stipulated in their commissioning oath and as they swore to do.
Otherwise, you will have to step down from that position.
This book emphasizes the need to establish proper civil-military relations and the ongoing dialogue and concerns between civilian political leaders and military leaders to achieve this.
In particular, it calls for deep reflection on the need for moral courage among professional soldiers and the meaning of maintaining the military's political neutrality.

To inspire fighting spirit in the 8th US Army soldiers who are rife with defeatism
Ridgeway's leadership changed the course of the Korean War in a moment of despair.

This book also suggests important lessons in leadership.
General Ridgway explains how he transformed an army rife with defeatism and unpreparedness into one brimming with fighting spirit.
General Ridgway said that when he encountered soldiers north of Seoul on New Year's morning, January 1, 1951, shortly after taking office as commander of the Eighth Army, they seemed to have only one purpose: to fight.
It was far from the Chinese army.
They were running away, abandoning both their personal rifles and their public firearms.
In addition to this miserable state of the army, General Ridgway lamented the so-called "unprepared" units that sought comfort only by traveling by road, neglected proper communications, and made no effort to maintain contact with the enemy or properly assess the terrain.

So he first put considerable effort into restoring the fighting spirit of the US 8th Army.
He visited the command posts of his subordinate units and tried to sense the soldiers' fighting spirit with all his senses through their appearance, attitude, conversation, and actions.
The soldiers I met along the way were unsure of their commanders, unsure of why they were there, and wondering when they would be able to return home.
The first thing he did to rekindle the fighting spirit of these troops was to address their basic grievances.
We moved the unit kitchen to where the soldiers were to ensure they had warm and sufficient meals, airlifted stationery for writing letters home, and immediately supplied enough gloves so they could fight with warm hands.


He also instilled in all commanders the awareness that they should be concerned about the safety of their men, that they should not unnecessarily endanger their lives, and that under no circumstances should they abandon isolated units, but that they should always bring them home.
In particular, by using names that were provocative from the very beginning, such as Operation Killer, Operation Ripper, and Operation Dauntless, which even the US Chief of Staff (Collins) opposed, the will to fight was instilled, and through a series of powerful search and offensive operations, the front line was restored north of the 38th parallel, and it was possible to advance to the current Military Demarcation Line.


He set up his own forward command post, made by connecting two tents, at the very front line, and holed himself up there, studying the terrain map for many hours to accurately understand the unit's operational environment and identify obstacles and advantages.
Sometimes, he would fly low in an airplane to directly examine the operational terrain, studying it until he could navigate the area at night, so that he knew every road, path, hill, stream, and ridge within the operational and control area as if it were his own backyard.


The will to fight is not something that is imposed from above, but rather a quality that must be cultivated and acquired within the minds of all soldiers, from the lowest rank to the highest rank.
Ridgeway believed that it only takes root when there is a sense of personal security, a sense of belonging to the unit, and the belief that other friendly units are standing by to the left, right, and rear.
He tried to convince them that they belonged to a group that would reward their loyalty at all costs.

In particular, the moving command letter, “Why are we here and what are we fighting for?” given by General Ridgway, then commander of the US 8th Army, to the soldiers of the US 8th Army, who were rife with defeatism, in late January 1951 clearly shows how important it is in war to make soldiers aware of the essence of the military, the correct attitude toward service, and the clear purpose of war.


In this command letter, he stated, “This is not a fight for the freedom and national survival of our ally, Korea, but for our own freedom and survival. The sacrifices we have made and will make in the future are not charity for others, but actions taken to directly protect ourselves.
“The essence of the problem that has arisen in Korea is whether communism or liberalism will triumph, and whether we will allow even our loved ones to be sucked into the vortex of despair in the distant future. This is why we must fight here,” he said, rekindling the fighting spirit of all the soldiers of the Eighth US Army who had been gripped by defeatism.


“Why are we here, and what are we fighting for?”
(From a command letter issued by the commander of the 8th US Army, General Ridgway, to all soldiers of the 8th US Army on January 21, 1951)

In the weeks since I arrived in Korea, two questions have seemed to occupy the most important space in the minds of the 8th Army soldiers.
The two questions are, “Why are we here?” and “What are we fighting for?”
As Commander, I felt that all the soldiers had a right to hear my answers to these two questions, so I directed that this be disseminated to all the soldiers of the Eighth Army on January 21, 1951.
…

First, my answer to the question, “Why are we here?” is very simple and unequivocal.
We are here because our government officials, who were elected through legal procedures, decided to do so.
General MacArthur, Commander of the United Nations Command, said, “The United Nations Command will maintain a military readiness posture in Korea for as long as the political leaders of the United Nations determine that it should be so.”
My answer is simple because it doesn't require any further explanation.
My answer is unequivocal because the loyalty we swear and expect leaves no room for any doubt about these commands.

Second, the question, “What are we fighting for?” is far more important, and every soldier in the Eighth Army deserves a full and logical answer.
…this issue is not limited to the freedom of South Korea, an ally that maintains loyalty and courage even in the most brutal combat situations.
But South Korea's freedom is included as a symbol of various problems.

The question is, can the power of Western civilization, as God has allowed us to blossom on His blessed earth, resist and defeat communism? Will communists, who shoot prisoners, enslave citizens, and despise human dignity, dominate those who hold the individual and his rights sacred? Will we survive under God's guiding hand, or will we perish as dead beings in a world without God?

If these are true and beyond the possibility of challenge, this is no longer a fight solely for the freedom and national survival of our ally, South Korea.
This is a fight for our own freedom and survival as an honorable and independent nation, and it will continue.
The sacrifices we have made and will continue to make are not acts of charity for others, but rather actions to protect ourselves.


Ultimately, the question at stake here in Korea is which will triumph: communism or liberalism? Will we halt the exodus of terrified people we've seen here, or will we allow even our loved ones to be sucked into the vortex of despair someday in the distant future?
These are precisely the reasons why we must fight here.