Introduction: How did prosecutorial common sense become essential knowledge in our society?

Part 1: How do prosecutors around the world differ from ours?

Can a "good person" also be a "good prosecutor"? The dangers of "selective investigations."
Why Westerns Only Feature Sheriffs and Not Prosecutors: The Architects of the Prosecutorial System Are the "Sovereign People"
Look closer: The Okay Ranch Duel: What will be the outcome of the trial?
Is a Prosecutor General Really Necessary?: There Is No "One Prosecutor" in the US, Germany, or France
Read more: Why did France abandon its plan to create a one-man prosecutor general?
Why were investigation and prosecution separated during the French Revolution?: Investigation and prosecution: "Give everything away and you'll have a tyrant."
A closer look: The history of the prosecution system's transfer from France to Germany to Japan to Korea
Why Did the UK Crown Prosecution Service Only Arise in 1986?: What the UK's Turbulent Criminal Justice Reforms Indicate
What does it mean to conduct an investigation "objectively"?: A preliminary examination judge who "doesn't hunt"
A Closer Look: The "Utro Incident," a Historic Scandal, and the Continuation of the Pretrial Judge System
Can a prosecutor conceal evidence of innocence?: How to prevent 'indictment' from becoming 'persecution'
What will be the fate of the "American Yoon Seok-yeol" who used his investigative powers for political revenge? How US courts punish prosecutorial tyranny.
A Closer Look: The Prosecutor General's Disciplinary Action and His "Determination to Lose"
Which country has the world's worst prosecutors? The former Soviet Union's monstrous "Procuratura" prosecutors.
Read More: The Prosecutor General Should Be Banned from Political Entrepreneurship

Part 2: The Dark History of the Prosecutor's Republic That Swallowed South Korea

Prosecutors Who Sabotaged the Internal Rebellion Investigation: Are They Supporting a Coup?: The Prosecutors' Dark History of Pandering to Unjust Power
Why did the prosecution abandon its "legal skills" in front of Yoon Seok-yeol?: Prosecutors and Yoon Seok-yeol, both enemies of the Democratic Republic.
Look Further: Chameleon Prosecutors: Is Cancellation of Detention and Suspension of Detention the Same Thing?
Did you think the military and the Secret Service would be as infinitely obedient as prosecutors? The fatal anachronism of "prosecutors as one"
Can you talk about the rule of law while refusing to enforce it?: The "Yoon Seok-yeol-style sanctuary" that undermines the legitimacy of the prosecution.
Read more: Can a prosecutor hide his phone password?
Why is 'procedural justice' only reserved for the powerful?: The noble due process corrupted by Yoon Seok-yeol.
The Lee Jae-myung Indictment Under the US "Political Indictment" Statute: The Prosecution's Political Weaponization and the "Banana Republic"
How is the immunity from arrest for members of the National Assembly justified? The judiciary can also be complicit in "political oppression."
Look further: A judge can't hold the country hostage.

Issues in Prosecutorial Reform Discovered in Part 3 Global Cases

What if the prosecutors who betrayed the people could be ousted through elections? The "Prosecutor Election System" and Direct Democratic Control of the Prosecution Service
Look closer: Judges are also elected.
The "Progressive Prosecutor Movement": Are Elected Prosecutors Different?: There's No One-Shot Solution to Preventing Prosecutorial Autocracy
What if the citizens could decide on the indictment of Kim Gun-hee? Grand Jury and Prosecution Review Boards Reflect Citizens' Perspectives on Indictments
Look further: Citizens can file their own lawsuits.
Should the prosecution have the exclusive right to request warrants? The "May 16 Coup" was exploited to "protect the December 3 Rebellion."
Is impeaching a prosecutor more difficult than impeaching a president?: Enforcing the law with "dirty hands" defiles the rule of law.
Look Closer: US Prosecutors Strip Off for Minor(?) Misconduct
Can Prosecutors Who Distort the Law Be Criminalized?: German Prosecutors Punished for "Distorting the Law"
Were there judges who were dragged down before the king?: Prosecutorial reform and judicial reform must go hand in hand.

Concluding remarks: Following the compass of ‘public trust’
Appendix: Federal Prosecutors
References

Expanding institutional imagination through the history and characteristics of global prosecutors.

The prosecution system is an invention created in each country based on historical experience and the demands of its citizens, and its blueprint has been constantly revised, sometimes through chance events.
A look into the origins and history of each country's prosecution system clearly reveals that the sovereign people are the ones who determine how the prosecution is organized and what authority is granted to it, and that the prosecution must be under the control of the people.
The modern prosecutorial system originated in France.
Before the French Revolution, crimes were prosecuted by the "Coroner of the King," the office that legally represented the king.
However, during the revolutionary period, a shift in perception occurred that "prosecutions must be carried out in the name of the people," and the prototype for the criminal procedure and prosecution system was established through the 1808 Criminal Code (p. 62).

Additionally, France currently prevents concentration of power through devices such as having multiple examining judges and prosecutors general (chief prosecutors of the High Public Prosecutor's Office).
Until the 19th century, Germany had courts overseeing both prosecution and trial. However, after the Napoleonic Wars, the French prosecution system was imported, and prosecution and trial became separate. (p. 63) Germany is also the birthplace of the "objective duty," which requires prosecutors to strive to uncover objective truth from a neutral standpoint, rather than obsess over securing a guilty verdict.
Therefore, German prosecutors must actively investigate and collect not only the facts of the defendant's charges but also evidence supporting his innocence and his favor (p. 94).

In the early days of the United States, prosecutors were merely low-ranking officials in the courts and assistants to judges, and it was the sheriff's job to arrest and prosecute lawbreakers.
However, in the mid-to-late 19th century, as the wave of democratization swept across American society, the 'prosecutor election system' was introduced, in which prosecutors were elected.
The role and authority of prosecutors elected by the citizens have become increasingly powerful, and now they have the harmful effect of ruling over the citizens. (Page 28) On the other hand, in the UK, there was no prosecutorial system until 1986, and the police were responsible for both investigation and prosecution.
However, a murder case that occurred in 1972 and the resulting unjust imprisonment of three boys caused a huge social uproar, leading to criminal justice reform that divided the powers of investigation and prosecution.
Accordingly, the Prosecution Service was established in 1986, and the Prosecution Service Inspection Service was established in 2000, establishing multiple layers of institutional mechanisms to prevent abuse of power. (p. 66)

Japan adopted the modern French criminal justice system in 1872, but later revised its criminal procedure law to strengthen the status and authority of prosecutors under the influence of the German criminal justice system.
The formation of an investigative structure that allowed prosecutors to directly arrest and detain suspects and conduct searches and seizures was also intended to enable Japan to effectively colonize Korea.
This prosecution-centered system was transplanted to Korea during the Japanese colonial period.
After liberation, the prosecution system became more solid to keep the oppressive police in check, and after the democratization in the 1980s, when the military and intelligence agencies, which had been the core of violent public power, were weakened, the prosecution filled the vacuum created.


While there have been some partial changes to our prosecution system to date, these have been driven solely by the needs and demands of past dictatorships or the prosecution itself. (p. 64) Because the will of the sovereign people was not actively reflected in the formation and changes of the prosecution system, the prosecution in South Korea has become an entity far removed from democratic control.
The risk of corruption within the prosecution is inherent in the system, and this can manifest in extreme forms at any time if the conditions are right, as we have clearly seen through "Yoon Seok-yeol's Prosecutor's Republic."
Therefore, we must design a system that will ensure that even the worst prosecutors can properly exercise their prosecutorial power.
What systems and devices do other countries have in place to minimize the harm caused by the prosecution?

What systems have each country established to prevent abuse of prosecutorial power?

To prevent the prosecution's abuses, we must decentralize its excessive powers and establish an institutional structure that ensures that any unjust exercise of power can be punished.
One of the representative systems that embodies the idea of ​​democratic self-governance, which seeks to place the prosecution under citizens' control, is the United States' prosecutorial election system.
In the United States, 45 states have implemented a system where prosecutors who go against the will of the people can be directly judged or reappointed through elections and recall votes.
As a result, prosecutors have no choice but to listen to the public's voice and be mindful of their reactions. (p. 195)

Choosing who to investigate and prosecute is the prosecutor's most powerful and dangerous power.
France's examining magistrate system is a check against this danger.
Although the preliminary examination judge belongs to the court, he or she is not involved in the trial and is assigned the task of investigation. Unlike the prosecution in our country, he or she does not hold the power of investigation and prosecution in his or her own hands.
This is because if one agency leads the investigation and prosecution, ‘targeted investigation and targeted prosecution’ may occur.
Therefore, in France, the prosecutor and the examining judge share investigative and prosecutorial powers, and exercise these powers under double and triple layers of constraints and oversight. (p. 77)

The prosecution's absurd decisions to indict or not to indict are making the public furious.
The grand jury in the United States and the prosecutorial review committee in Japan are systems that ensure that the "public's perspective" is "actually" reflected in the decision on whether to indict.
The grand jury system allows ordinary citizens to directly investigate and determine the validity of prosecutors' attempts to indict criminal suspects.
A grand jury is convened by a court at the request of a prosecutor and is composed of 12 to 23 randomly selected citizens. A majority vote determines whether to indict or not to indict.
The grand jury system is an independent body that does not belong to any of the legislative, executive, or judicial branches and serves as a buffer and referee between the government and citizens.
As ordinary citizens, jurors are free from political pressure or personnel favoritism, and thus can be more impartial than judges or other decision-makers (p. 214).

One weakness of this grand jury system is that it cannot handle cases where prosecutors have unfairly "decided not to indict."
Japan's Public Prosecutors' Office is a system that allows prosecutors to reexamine and indict cases that were not indicted.
The Prosecution Review Board is established in 165 local courts and branches, and is composed of 11 members randomly selected from voters in the respective regions every six months.
The decision of the Prosecution Review Board was not binding, but in 2009, 50 years after the system was implemented, the system was reformed and gained the effect of forcing prosecution.
Thanks to this, prosecutors, who are reluctant to indict public officials and politicians, can be more effectively monitored and restrained. (p. 219)

It is a clear democratic principle that criminal justice should be in line with the public's expectations.
When the prosecution fails to follow this principle, the people should not only demand it in words, but also step forward and correct it.
However, in reality, there is no system of sovereign participation in South Korea.
The only entity that can check the prosecution's 'unfair indictment' is the judiciary, and the only entity that can check 'unfair non-indictment' is the National Assembly.
The only way for the prosecution, an unelected and powerful force, to gain democratic legitimacy is to gain the trust of the people.
If the prosecution fails to gain trust, the process of rectifying the prosecution through the will of the sovereign people begins.
That is the prosecution reform.

Issues in Prosecutorial Reform: A Global Case Study

The American prosecutorial election system introduced above also has vulnerabilities.
If prosecutors were elected, it would seem that they would listen to the will of the citizens, but in reality, there were negative consequences, such as them focusing only on major cases out of election considerations or becoming obsessed with obtaining guilty verdicts by any means necessary.
Additionally, minority groups were treated unequally and the focus was on harsh punishment rather than crime prevention and reform.
Moreover, the election competition was not very fierce, so the re-election of the incumbent prosecutor was prominent.
In the end, even the elected prosecutors ended up abusing their power.
That's how the 'Progressive Prosecution Movement', the American version of the prosecutorial reform movement, began.
In 2015, billionaire investor George Soros partnered with civic groups to support reform-minded prosecutorial candidates, resulting in progressive prosecutors being elected in 13 districts as of December 2023.
Another significant achievement is the advancement of many women of color into the prosecutorial profession, previously considered the exclusive domain of white men. (p. 205)

Just because public officials are elected doesn't mean they all exercise their power democratically.
If you wield power arbitrarily without communicating or interacting with the people, it is very likely to become a sword that stabs democracy.
What about the South Korean prosecution, which possesses unprecedented power and discretion? It neither secures democratic legitimacy through popular election nor is it subject to democratic control by the people.
No matter how much a prosecutor abuses his power, the people have no way to replace him.
To prevent the prosecution from becoming a dictatorship, we need institutional mechanisms to reflect public opinion in the exercise of prosecutorial power, as well as clear means of punishing unfair exercise of prosecutorial power.
The domestic prosecutor disciplinary system is ineffective because disciplinary action is carried out by the prosecution itself.
The amendment to the Prosecutors' Disciplinary Act, intended to improve this irrationality, passed the National Assembly on June 5, 2025, marking the beginning of change.

Overseas, it is much more thorough and active than this.
In the United States, not only are the courts in charge of disciplining prosecutors who abuse their power, but the Department of Justice also has independent agencies, the Office of the Inspector General and the Office of Legal Ethics, to provide double oversight.
The UK has its own strict disciplinary system for prosecutors, while also establishing a separate Office of the Inspector General whose primary task is to oversee prosecutors.
In France, the Supreme Court of the Judiciary, a constitutional body, is responsible for disciplinary action against prosecutors, but a 2008 constitutional amendment allowed ordinary citizens to request disciplinary action against prosecutors.
Our country's Supreme Prosecutors' Office has an inspection department that monitors prosecutorial misconduct, but it is not effective.
Therefore, the only realistic disciplinary system for prosecutors is the impeachment system involving the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court. (p. 237)

What if prosecutors who make unjust or unlawful indictments or non-indictments could be subject to criminal punishment, not just disciplinary action or impeachment? In 2018, the German Federal Supreme Court found a prosecutor at the Freiburg Public Prosecutor's Office guilty of perverting the law for not prosecuting despite ample evidence.
Likewise, Germany has a crime of distorting the law stipulated in Article 339 of its criminal code, and countries such as Spain and Norway also punish public officials for distorting the law.
Additionally, countries such as Austria, Switzerland, and France can punish judges who distort the law through abuse of power.
In Korea, there are limitations to punishing acts of legal distortion through abuse of power and dereliction of duty, and calls for the creation of new crimes of legal distortion have been consistently raised (p. 251).

No country's prosecution system is a perfect 'model'.
Therefore, you cannot blindly follow it.
However, if we can figure out what principles and values ​​are embedded in it and apply them to our reality, we will be able to create our own rational and creative system.
It's time to find areas for improvement in the existing prosecution system and to use our imagination to create a new prosecution system that suits us.
The author emphasizes that we must remember that we are all the designers of the new prosecution system.